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**REBUILDING AFGANISTAN:
COUNTERINSURGENCY AND RECONSTRUCTION
IN OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM**

by

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December 2003

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RECONSTRUCTION IN OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM**

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ABSTRACT

International efforts at the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan are confronted by a paradox in their strategy for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM that has crippled their ability to locate and defeat the enemy and establish stability. In their narrowly focused pursuit of the strategy of attrition, coalition military forces have neglected the fundamental principle that guides small wars: that the protection of the population and the elimination of the influence of the insurgent forces are paramount to gathering the necessary intelligence to locate the threat. The disregard for the control of the population has eliminated the coalition's primary source of intelligence directly impinging on its ability to locate or separate the insurgent from the population and trapping it in an operational quagmire. Additionally, international aid efforts have focused on short-term relief rather than long-term reconstruction, establishing the foundation for continued dependence and instability rather than self-sufficiency. The purpose of this thesis is not to limit or narrowly define the threat in Afghanistan as an insurgency, but to illustrate how the situation when framed in terms of an insurgency can be effectively managed and the threats eliminated to produce a stable and self-sustaining country on the world stage.

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CHAPTER I

The United States faces a paradox in its strategy for the conduct of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM that has crippled its ability to locate and defeat the enemy. In its narrowly focused pursuit of the search and destroy mission, the United States has neglected the fundamental principle that guides small wars: that the protection of the population and the elimination of the influence of the insurgent or guerrilla forces are paramount to gathering the necessary intelligence to locate the threat. The United States has failed to perceive the diminishing returns from the pursuit of a strategy of pure attrition. The disregard for the control of the population by the United States has eliminated its primary source of intelligence directly impinging on its ability to locate or separate the insurgent from the population, thereby trapping the United States in an operational quagmire. The purpose of this chapter is to establish the context for the current U.S. strategy by providing a brief background that highlights some of the major issues that impede U.S. efforts to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan. In addition, this chapter will introduce the framework for the analysis of the conduct of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

A. BACKGROUND

On September 11, 2001, 18 men armed with box cutters began a chain of events that would pit the small, third world nation of Afghanistan against a coalition of the most powerful nations on the planet. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM began on 26 September 2001 with the insertion of a team of CIA covert paramilitary officers into an area of Afghanistan just north of Kabul (Woodward, 2002, pp. 139-142). Their mission was to establish initial contact with elements of a loose coalition of ethnic minority groups opposed to the Taliban regime known as the Northern Alliance in order to orchestrate the downfall of the Taliban government. By 7 October, the U.S. had begun its air offensive against the Taliban, striking the targets of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. Following several delays due to inclement weather, U.S. Army Special Forces from the 5th Special Forces Group were inserted into Afghanistan and quickly established alliances with several key anti-Taliban movements integrating 21st century airpower with forces

employing medieval and early twentieth-century technology and tactics. While U.S. air strikes continued upon key Taliban and al Qaeda infrastructure, the conglomeration of anti-Taliban movements known as the United Front (UF) accompanied by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) made significant advances toward the crucial northern Taliban stronghold of Mazar-i-Sharif. On 27 October, thousands of students from Pakistani madrassas heeded the call of jihad from their Wahabbi Muslim mullahs and departed Pakistan to purge the holy land of the new crusade, nearly doubling the size of Taliban and al Qaeda forces. However, by 30 October, the number of SOF on the ground had also doubled facilitating an escalation in the air campaign, which then spread from the northern border with Tajikistan to the southern Taliban stronghold of Kandahar. In early November, U.S. and UF efforts began to gain momentum. On 9 November U.S. Special Operations Forces in conjunction with the Tajik Northern Alliance forces led Mohammad Fahim seized the Taliban stronghold of Mazar-i-Sharif while forces loyal to the Uzbek warlord Dostam captured the northern provinces of Jowzjan, Faryab and Samanagan, opening a second northern front at Takhur. Simultaneously, other United Front forces pushed south of Kabul while forces loyal to the warlord Ismael Kahn made significant progress toward the western city of Herat driving the Taliban's line of control further southward. On 10 November U.S. Special Forces, utilizing advanced satellite communications, facilitated the reversal of the alliances of local warlords with the Taliban enabling forces led by the UF (National Islamic Movement) warlord Dostam to capture the key northern city of Taloqan, effectively blocking the Taliban from the west, and driving their retreating forces eastward toward the city of Konduz.

By 11 November, U.S. and UF forces had captured almost half of Afghanistan. With the fall of Bamiyan in central Afghanistan to the UF Shi'a warlord, Hizb-i Wahdat, the Taliban lost the only road that linked their forces in Kabul to those in the north. Within the next two days, both the cities of Herat and Kabul fell to United Front forces, sending shockwaves through the Taliban regime. Southern ethnic Pashtun tribal leaders, fearing encroachment of their traditional tribal lands by the ethnic minority dominated United Front, issued a statement warning the United Front to stay out of Kandahar, providing the impetus for several anti-Taliban Pashtun tribes to intensify their resistance against Taliban control. On 14 November, the eastern city of Jalalabad fell to forces

loyal to the former provincial governor, Haji Qadir, blocking a major area of refuge for fleeing Taliban forces. By 19 November U.S. and UF forces had consolidated their hold on the city of Kabul and captured the city of Konduz, trapping thousands of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in the northern provinces of Kunduz and Baghlan. On 25 November, an uprising in the fortress of Qala-i-Jhangi outside of Mazar-i-Sharif produced the first U.S. casualty of the war, CIA operative Mike Spann. Within three days of Spann's death forces loyal to Dostam had suppressed the revolt killing an estimated 500 to 600 foreign Taliban. On 26 November, forces loyal to the UF general Daoud accompanied by the forces of Dostam entered Konduz under light resistance following a two-week siege, abating previous fears of a massacre of foreign Taliban stemming from the United Fronts' vow to murder all non-Afghan Taliban forces. The following day, UN-backed talks between four delegates from each of Afghanistan's major ethnic groups began in Bonn, Germany in order to lay the foundation for an interim government. At the same time in Afghanistan a thousand U.S. Marines air landed outside of Kandahar and established Forward Operating Base (FOB) Rhino, quelling heightened ethnic tensions in the south resulting from continued fears of an ethnic minority incursion into traditional Pashtun lands. By 28 November, the U.S. had begun its assault on the Taliban capital of Kandahar with an intensive bombing campaign supplemented by UF commanders relying upon local Pashtun forces. Over the next two days during the talks at Bonn, increased tensions stemming from the UF delegation's protests over the presence of a post-war International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul resulted in the UF delegate walking out of the meeting. Despite the UF delegate's absence the meetings continued. By 4 December, ethnic Pashtun fighters had captured a portion of the Kandahar airport while U.S. and local mujahideen forces had begun their initiative in the Tora Bora region to eliminate suspected al Qaeda bases.

On 5 December, the Bonn delegation announced the election of a thirty-member, six-month interim administration headed by the ethnic Pashtun Harmid Karzai. The newly created transitional government would last until such a time that the new regime could convene a formal loya jirga, the traditional Afghan meeting of tribal elders, to decide the new leadership of Afghanistan. The formation of the transitional government sought to mitigate ethnic tensions by integrating members of all four of Afghanistan's

major ethnic groups. Despite this effort, ethnic tensions between the majority Pashtuns and Afghanistan's ethnic minorities were again inflamed with the awarding of the cabinet's top three positions --the ministries of Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs-- to ethnic minorities (Luscher, 2001). Within two days of the conclusion of the delegation at Bonn, Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban regime, relinquished control of Kandahar and fled signaling the end of Taliban rule in Afghanistan.

1. Tora Bora

Following their fall from power, many Taliban and al Qaeda forces sought refuge in the former mujahideen cave complexes located in the White Mountains south of Jalalabad known as Tora Bora. In response to rumors that Usama bin Laden had taken refuge in this area, U.S. forces began an assault on Tora Bora on 1 December with a massive bombing campaign utilizing B-52 bombers in preparation for a ground assault. Under the cover of intense bombing, an estimated 2,500 Afghan fighters accompanied by 40 U.S. Special Forces began the ground assault on the Tora Bora region on 5 December (Donnelly, 2002). By 11 December, al Qaeda forces had brokered a cease-fire to negotiate a surrender; however, U.S. Special Forces, infuriated at the halt of operations that produced little to no results, resumed the bombing campaign on 13 December. By 17 December, the operations at Tora Bora had ended with an empty victory for U.S. and Afghan forces. The U.S had learned that the Afghan militia practiced free-market loyalty and had allowed many Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, to possibly include bin Laden, to escape to Pakistan during the cease-fire. Additionally, local Afghan village elders from three villages claimed that U.S. bombs had killed an estimated 150 Afghan civilians, enraging local villagers, potentially driving them to side with the fleeing Taliban and al Qaeda forces thus facilitating their escape from the region. (Ibid). While the operation at Tora Bora had succeeded in driving many of the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda from Afghanistan, the operation allowed these forces to take refuge in the uncontrolled tribal region across the Pakistani border from where they have since launched numerous cross-border attacks on coalition and Afghan forces with impunity.

During the week following the fall of Tora Bora, Harmid Karzai, was sworn in as the first official president of the new Transitional Afghan Administration (TAA). One of

Karzai's first actions was the controversial appointment of the Uzbek warlord, Dostam, to the position of Assistant Minister of Defense. This was met with mixed response among the Afghan populace and international community. Dostam, who at one time had opposed the assassinated Northern Alliance leader and national hero Massoud, was accused of past human rights violations during a previous power struggle for Kabul following the withdrawal of the Soviets. The selection of Dostam was to be the first of many controversial appointments made by Karzai during his tenure as Afghan president that would lead many people to question the legitimacy of the newly formed government.

2. 2002: Transformation

By January 2002, large concentrations of Taliban and al Qaeda forces had dissipated resulting in sporadic, dispersed attacks on U.S. and coalition forces by smaller bands of guerrillas employing hit-and-run tactics. On 18 January, the transitional president, Harmid Karzai, announced, "the cultivation, manufacturing, processing, impermissible use, smuggling and trafficking of opium poppy and all its derivatives" to be illegal, reasserting the previous ban on opium production imposed by the Taliban in 2000 (Afghanistan's Real War: Poppy and Poverty, 2002). While Karzai's move had placated the international community, it had created a dilemma that has struck at Afghanistan's economic recovery at the grassroots level. Following several years of drought, many Afghans had returned to the cultivation of the poppy plant due to its requirement for less water and its economic superiority over the production of traditional agricultural crops. The international community has attempted to alleviate this problem through crop substitution and subsidization, promising up to \$500 per acre of poppy destroyed and the required seeds to substitute wheat as an alternative (Gall, 2003). However, regional warlords entrusted to enforce the central government's ruling have kept much of this money and Afghan farmers, who stand to profit up to twelve times as much from the production of opium, have refused to switch to the less economical alternative (Ibid, 2003). Further, local and regional warlords have encouraged the continued production of opium within their areas of control for the revenue generated through taxation of the opium trade. In addition, profits from the production of opium have been linked to a resurgence in the activity of the Taliban and other insurgent forces

that consider the drug trade a further extension of the jihad against the west. In a report by the Washington Times highlighting the link between drugs and terrorism, Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, commander of the U.S. 10th Mountain Division in Afghanistan, stated, “[the] Taliban and its allies have regrouped in Pakistan and are recruiting fighters from madrassas in Quetta in a campaign funded by drug-trafficking,” (de Borchgrave, 2003, p. 15). Poppy cultivation has created a dilemma for Afghanistan; while it provides the necessary resources for the insurgent and criminal elements who pull at the fabric of stability of the country from its periphery, it also represents the only economically viable cash crop for the majority of Afghan peasants following the economic hardship created by several years of drought (Internal Affairs, Afghanistan, 2003). This problem will continue to plague Afghanistan and foster instability in the absence of a strong central government that can enforce its policies and a viable economy that can generate enough revenue for the government and create a sufficient number of well-paid job opportunities.

On 21 January at an international meeting in Tokyo, representatives from several nations including the U.S, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and a delegate from the European Union, pledged an estimated 4.5 billion dollars over five years in international aid to support the reconstruction of Afghanistan (Margesson, 23 June 2003). Despite this donation, the international aid fell short of the U.N. estimate of the ten billion dollars over five years that it would cost to rebuild Afghanistan (Ibid). This raised many questions as to how a government and a country without sufficient natural resources and an economic infrastructure could rebuild without the necessary resources. (Billions Pledged in Afghan Aid, 28 August 2003).

a. Operation ANACONDA

On 2 March 2002 U.S. commanders, in response to growing intelligence that Taliban and al Qaeda remnants had regrouped in the Shah-i-Khot region of eastern Afghanistan, launched Operation ANACONDA, the largest ground offensive in Afghanistan thus far. Roughly 1,500 Afghans, U.S. and coalition Special Forces, and soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division were committed to a search-and-destroy mission under the cover of heavy U.S. bombing to root out the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda from their mountain sanctuary. The operation ended on 18 March with U.S. commanders

claiming victory. In reports that paralleled the body count inflation reminiscent of Vietnam, U.S. commanders estimated the operation had resulted in the deaths of 800 to 1,000 Taliban and al Qaeda; however, sources on the ground could find no evidence to substantiate this claim (U.S. Declares Anaconda A Success, 2002). Overall commander of the operation, Maj. General Hagenbeck, responded stating that, “few whole bodies had been found because many of those killed had been vaporized by the intense bombing by U.S. B-52[s].”(Ibid). While the true figures resulting from Operation ANACONDA remain irrelevant to the overall success in Afghanistan, the intensity of the fighting and the size of the opposition in the operation revealed that the U.S. had severely underestimated the number and capability of the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda still in Afghanistan.

On 25 March, coalition forces from the United States, Britain, and France began a program for the establishment of an official Afghan National Army (ANA). The first phase of the program involved the demobilization of provincial militias (AMF) while the second involved the re-establishment of the Kabul Military Academy and the training of the first division of the ANA by coalition forces. Karzai envisioned a 70,000-man, multi-ethnic army representative of the ethnic make-up of the country (Burnett, 2003). The ANA would provide security to each province with a dedicated division loyal to the central government. However, the creation of the ANA had been plagued with problems since its inception. Desertion, insufficient equipment, and lack of adequate facilities had caused the training to fall critically behind schedule, producing only 5,000 out of the 10,000 forces projected to be fully trained by September 2003 (Burnett, 28 September 2003). In a report, entitled *Re-building the Afghan Army*, Dr. Antonio Giustozzi of the Crisis States Program stated,

Little of the money spent, at least by the Ministry of Defense, reaches down to the troops in terms of direct or indirect benefits, being more often than not pocketed by the commanders. The Ministry of Defense has been unable to pay any salary to the troops due to opposition of the Finance Minister, and guarantees only a (not always regular) supply of food. As a result, the military capabilities of the Afghan transitional army are abysmally poor. (Giustozzi, 2003, p. 13).

The government appointments created a self-compounding dilemma in which the ANA, to receive qualified men from the militias, would be forced to honor the

ranks and positions appointed by the government, despite their organizational incompatibility. Dr. Antonio Giustozzi of the Crisis States Program noted, “By the end of 2002 there were 2,500 officially recognized generals on the payroll of the Ministry of Defense.” (Guistozzi, 2003, p. 11). In addition, political and ethnic bias had infiltrated the officer corps through the Minister of Defense, Marshal Fahim. Fahim, an ethnic Tajik and member of Shura-i Nezar political organization, is responsible for the selection of officers for the new army. Of the 38 selected by Marshal Fahim in 2002, 37 were ethnic Tajiks, while out of the total 100 generals appointed in 2002, 90 belonged to the Shura-i Nezar (Ibid, pp. 20-21). Perhaps the largest problem confronted by U.S. and coalition advisors was how to demobilize several hundred thousand members of provincial and warlord militias throughout the country of Afghanistan. The advisors determined that the new Afghan Army would accept those members of the militia between the ages of 22 and 28 who could provide their own weapon while the remaining militia forces would receive a monetary sum for their past service and be encouraged to become a provincial militia and police force (Guistozzi, 2003, p. 14). An estimated 170,000 former militia were excluded from the ANA for various reasons (Ibid, p.14). The men who were not selected had known nothing but fighting for the majority of their lives, had no transferable skills, and no money, creating the opportunity for local warlords and powerbrokers to rebuild their personal armies and assume dominance over their regions, producing yet another centrifugal factor pulling legitimacy and control away from the central government.

On 3 April, 350 supporters of the anti-Karzai regime warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were arrested in Kabul for plotting to conduct terrorist attacks against the Karzai regime, ISAF, and coalition forces throughout Afghanistan (Rogers, 31 August 2003). The raid seized explosives, bombs, and weapons and prompted U.S. assets using a Predator surveillance drone armed with Hellfire missiles to attempt to eliminate Hekmatyar in his stronghold located in the Konar River valley near the Pakistani border. Hekmatyar, the former Prime Minister of Afghanistan and leader of the Hizb-i-Islami/Gulbuddin, or the Islamic Party, has been implicated in several attacks against the Karzai regime and coalition forces. He is considered one of the three major threats to

stability in Afghanistan along with Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban, and Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda terrorist network.

In early May the command of U.S. and coalition operations shifted from the divisional command of the 10th Mountain Division to that of the 18th Airborne Corps and its subordinate unit, the 82d Airborne Division under the command of Lieutenant General Daniel McNeill. With this shift in command came sweeping changes and new conventional restrictions to operations that had been largely bottom-driven and SOF focused for eight months. Strict control measures were emplaced on the ability of SOF to associate with the local populace, while sweep and clear operations by culturally abrasive conventional forces resulted in enmity and the alienation of the indigenous population. The net result of these changes was to limit the quality and quantity of available intelligence, thereby impairing the ability of U.S. and coalition forces to find and destroy Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents.

In early June, Afghanistan's former king Mohammed Zahir Shah arrived in Afghanistan to decide the future of his former country in the first national loya jirga in nearly forty years. The meeting resulted in the election of, transitional president Harmid Karzai, as the first official president of the newly liberated Afghanistan. The new government would consist of twenty-nine cabinet positions dominated by the three key ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and the interior. The new loya jirga-elected government would serve until the first open elections in 2004, when it was hoped Afghanistan would have achieved a degree of stability and autonomy. Despite the promise of stability and multi-ethnic unity, political tensions continued to mount as ethnic Pashtun majority dissatisfaction grew with the preponderance of the twenty-nine cabinet positions going to ethnic minority Tajiks despite the election of Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, to the highest position in the country (Johnson, 27 Oct 2003).

Early July marked an increase in U.S.-Afghan tensions as Operation FULL THROTTLE resulted in the deaths of an estimated forty-eight civilians at a wedding party near the village of Deh Rawod, producing the first anti-U.S. rally since the fall of the Taliban (Internal Affairs, Afghanistan, 28 August 2003). On 6 July, unknown attackers assassinated the newly elected moderate vice president, Abdul Haji Qadir, sparking

allegations of political conspiracy and furthering mistrust in the new Karzai regime. In late July, Kabul police thwarted an assassination attempt on senior Afghan officials when a man described only as a “foreigner” by the Afghan intelligence service was found to be driving a car packed with explosives shortly after he was involved in a minor car accident. It is unclear as to whether Karzai was the intended target of the attack. However, the incident marks another event in the string of attempts to eliminate members of the new Afghan regime (Afghans Avert Assassination Plot, 29 August 2003).

In late August, Afghan Planning Minister, Mohamed Mohaqeq, alleged that massive amounts of international aid were being diverted through “well-connected people instead of the government” bypassing the financial management of his office (Afghan Minister Attacks Aid ‘Abuse’, 28 August 2003). Mohaqeq claimed this diversion of funds resulted in the inability of the government to direct funding to where it was needed and over spending resulting in a further de-legitimization of the central government, limiting its ability to fund necessary programs, and furthering social grievances of the average Afghan. Embezzlement is pandemic throughout the country and extends from the local police administrator who keeps his officers’ pay to the provincial governor who refuses to relinquish the money his province has generated in tax revenue to the central government. This pervasive corruption has impeded the reconstruction effort and degraded the legitimacy of the central government in the eyes of the populace. Governmental corruption has produced a popular apathy in the national control of Afghanistan and a focus on immediate and local concerns.

On 5 September, a single gunman dressed as a member of the Afghan National Army attempted to assassinate President Harmid Karzai and Kandahar governor Gul Agha Sherzai outside the provincial capital in Kandahar. While the attack failed, it marked the fifth attempt at political assassination against members of the Karzai regime since February 2002, and is indicative of a trend of escalation in the use of terrorist tactics by those opposed to the rule of the new regime and the continued coalition presence in Afghanistan (Assassination Attempt in Afghanistan Latest of Several, 29 August 2003).

Throughout the remainder of 2002 terrorist incidents against the new Afghan regime and coalition forces continued to rise moving from two incidents in January to 44 by the end of November (refer to Figure 1). Actions ranged from overt assassination attempts against political leaders, to car bombs in Kabul and standoff rocket attacks on U.S. and coalition forces. While these actions could be categorized as random acts of terror, they fit a larger pattern consistent with what U.S. doctrine on counterinsurgency refers to as actions characteristic of the latent and incipient stage of an insurgency (FM 90-8). Despite this trend, U.S. strategy remained unchanged and continued to focus on conventional search and destroy operations, facilitating the resurgence and growth of underground insurgent forces.

3. 2003: Insurgency

In late January 2003, U.S. and coalition forces engaged the largest concentration of enemy forces they had encountered since the end of Operation ANACONDA. The attack took place near the Pakistani border in the town of Spin Boldak and resulted in the deaths of eighteen individuals suspected as being part of the Hizb-i-Islami/Gulbiddin (HIG). As the winter ended, terrorist attacks again grew in frequency, as did the appearance of larger groups of what the U.S. and coalition forces were referring to as the Anti-Coalition Movement (ACM) and the HIG. This increase in the frequency and the size of attacking groups was highly indicative of a shift in tactics from what U.S. doctrine labels a phase one latent and incipient insurgency to a phase two insurgency consisting of guerrilla warfare (FM 90-8, 1986, p. 1-7). Despite the shift in operations by what U.S. leadership was now correctly identifying as insurgent forces, the U.S. mission continued using the same strategy in the one-size fits all world of conventional army strategy. On 20 March U.S. forces launched Operation VALIANT STRIKE in response to increasing cross border attacks from Pakistan and specific signals intelligence (SIGINT) from the area southeast of Kandahar (U.S. Troops Raid Afghanistan in Hunt for Al Qaeda, 29 August 2003). Over 800 of the U.S. 82d Airborne Division participated in an operation “to clear and search villages, gather intelligence, search for weapons caches and seek out remaining al Qaeda and Taliban forces,”(Schult, 3 September 2003). Despite this intensive effort, no enemy forces were encountered. While the operation did not succeed in the capture or elimination of Taliban or al Qaeda forces, it did result in the seizure of one largest

weapon caches discovered in the region. The cache, consisting of hundreds of rockets, mortar rounds, and rocket propelled grenades, was indicative of a larger force operating in the area. Despite the Army's success in discovering this particular cache, there were most likely others in the area. The Army departed the area without emplacing surveillance or security, allowing local militants to resume their activities albeit without one of their weapons caches. While this is but one example of the Army's plan for securing Afghanistan, this operation is indicative of the typical operations conducted throughout the country –sweep through an area, clear it, and then leave--allowing the insurgents to flow back into the area and, once again, exert their dominance. While U.S. forces continued their search, clear, and abandon tactics, Anti Coalition Movement (ACM), emboldened by the coalition forces' inability to locate them, stepped up their attacks by confronting U.S. and Afghan forces openly in force-on-force engagements. The U.S. military responded by increasing close air support to its troops involved in village-clearing operations. On 9 April, a USMC Harrier jet mistakenly dropped a one thousand pound bomb on a house killing eleven civilians near the town of Shkin (U.S. Bomb Kills Afghan Civilians, 30 August 2003). Incidents such as this have fueled a growing resentment among the Afghan populace, pushing them further away from U.S. support and closer to the ACM in this zero sum game of political influence and control.

1 May 2003 marked a turning point in the U.S. perception in the status of the war on terror. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, paralleling Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in his 1962 statement “we are winning the war,” announced that major combat in Afghanistan had ended. He stated, “[We] have concluded we're at a point where we clearly have moved from major combat activity to a period of stability and stabilization and reconstruction activities. The bulk of this country today is permissive, it's secure.”(Rumsfeld: Major Combat Over in Afghanistan, 11 August 2003). Despite Secretary Rumsfeld's assessment, attacks in Afghanistan continued throughout the summer, increasing in both the size of the attacking force and the frequency of attacks. On 17 August, the largest attack by ACM forces since the fall of the Taliban occurred when an estimated 400 Taliban drove across the Pakistani border into the Paktika Province and raided two police stations, killing twenty-two police and holding the station until dawn before fleeing back across the border to Pakistan (Afghan Rebels Attack

Police; 22 Killed, 2003, p. 15). This attack and others that have occurred throughout the summer typify an insurgent show of force in an attempt to demonstrate the inability of the government to protect its population. The central government, unable to control the provincial warlords and tax the funds generated within their provinces, remains unable to pay its civil servants. Many of the local Afghan police and border guards had gone months without pay, leaving them susceptible to bribery by ACM forces, furthering the perception of inefficacy in the Karzai regime and loosening government control (Dixon, 2003, p. 1). Perceptions of government corruption and inefficacy coupled with the dissynchronization of stated Islamic values and the environment have produced in Afghanistan what Chalmers Johnson (1982) refers to as “social disequilibrium” creating an area ripe for revolutionary political change (p. 93). In August 2003, the Bush Administration vowed to reassess the situation in Afghanistan and reaffirmed its commitment to the people of Afghanistan. However, the question remains: can the United States identify the situation in Afghanistan and develop a strategy that will pull the country from the brink of collapse?

B. ANALYSIS

The U.S. began Operation ENDURING FREEDOM with the intent of accomplishing six military outcomes:

To make clear to the Taliban leaders and their supporters that harboring terrorists is unacceptable and carries a price. To acquire intelligence to facilitate future operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban regime that harbors the terrorists. To develop relationships with groups in Afghanistan that oppose the Taliban regime and the foreign terrorists that they support. To make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base of operation. And to alter the military balance over time by denying to the Taliban the offensive systems that hamper the progress of the various opposition forces. And to provide humanitarian relief to Afghans suffering truly oppressive living conditions under the Taliban regime. (Rumsfeld, 7 October 2001).

The Bush administration specifically sought to avoid the process of nation building utilizing U.S. combat forces in a country that had known nothing but war for the past thirty years (Woodward, 2003, p. 231). However, the unexpected and sudden collapse of the Taliban regime coupled with the transition from overt, conventional warfare to a terrorist insurgency left the U.S. stuck to a proverbial “tar-baby,” and

responsible for the reconstruction of the country it had so quickly taken down. Shocked by the celerity of the collapse of the Taliban regime and unable to perceive the evolution in strategy by Taliban and al Qaeda forces due to its perception of success in terms of conventional warfare, the U.S. declared a victory and changed its focus to the rebuilding of Afghanistan. Alfred von Clausewitz, in his, *On War*, states, “The first, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and most comprehensive.” (von Clausewitz, 1976, pp. 88-89). The failure of the U.S. to correctly identify the evolved threat facilitated the rapid growth of an underground insurgent movement. Once again confronted with an insurgent threat, the U.S. military reacted by adopting a Vietnam-era strategy of search and destroy aimed at the elimination of what military leadership believed were the finite remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda. U.S. military leadership, in failing to see the diminishing returns from their efforts, called for the deployment of several thousand more coalition troops to bolster conventional efforts to combat an increasingly unconventional enemy while attacks upon coalition and Afghan national infrastructure continued to rise (refer to Figure 2). Revolution, insurgency, regime change, and all movements culminating in a change of power depend upon the effective control of the population for their success. David Galula (1964) in his book, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, states, “In revolutionary warfare, strength is assessed by the extent of support from the population measured in terms of political organization at the grassroots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embodied in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by the population.” (p.79). The U.S. has neglected this aim and instead has focused solely upon the destruction of enemy combatants as an end in itself. While the Afghan government, unable to control its provincial warlords or generate sufficient funds to maintain an army, remains unable to extend its influence past Kabul. The inability of the central government to provide security for its population at the local level coupled with the U.S. focus on the destruction of insurgents rather than on their source of power has resulted in an absence of effective control at the local level, facilitating the seizure of power by local warlords, insurgents

and drug traffickers. Afghanistan faces a myriad of problems that impede its path to reconstruction. Social, political, and economic complications have produced a populace receptive to revolutionary change. The solution lies in the implementation of a synchronized plan of counterinsurgency and reconstruction aimed at establishing localized control over the population and a restructuring of the central authority thereby eliminating the influence of centripetal forces and projecting legitimacy and control from the center, creating stability from both the periphery and the core simultaneously. This goal remains unobtainable until U.S. and Afghan leadership correctly perceive and combat the threat as an insurgent movement.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the situation in Afghanistan as a form of insurgency using a modification of the systems approach as developed by Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf in, *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (refer to Figure 3). Using this analysis, I will develop a framework for stabilization based on elements of successful counterinsurgency strategies taken from the examination of the situations in Vietnam, Malaya, and the Philippines. I selected the Leites and Wolf systemic approach over the “hearts and minds” theory because it provides fundamental insight into the key mechanisms that drive the destabilization and loss of governmental control. The systemic approach views insurgency and other destabilizing movements as a “cost-push” process in which the costs and benefits of participation in the insurgent movement are weighed by a rational individual in relation to his or her local and immediate concerns. In contrast, the “hearts and minds” theory is described as a “demand-pull” process focused on the “preferences, attitudes, and sympathies of the population” in their perception of the need for change without regard for the costs incurred by that change (Leites and Wolf, 1970, pp. 28-29). Further, the systemic approach focuses on counterinsurgency as a continuous process that combats the conversion of inputs (resources) into outputs (actions) in a four-stage process (input-denial, conversion mechanism interruption, attacking outputs, and strengthening the state). Each stage provides fundamental insight into the mechanism for the generation and propagation of the insurgent movement and reveals the most fundamental elements of success and failure in the actions of both the government and the insurgent movement.

The first stage of the systemic approach of counterinsurgency (refer to Figure 3) is the denial of inputs or resources to the insurgent system. The term “input” encompasses resources such as recruits, information, shelter, food, etc. that provide the core of the organization with the resources required to propagate the system and conduct operations. The movement obtains resources through both endogenous (internal) and exogenous (external) sources, utilizing both the mechanisms of persuasion and coercion to obtain what it requires. Pre-existing conditions causing social divide (preconditions), a single traumatic event resulting in social upheaval (precipitating event), and/or the influence of a charismatic leader (political entrepreneur) contribute to the ability of the insurgent movement to mobilize the population in support of its efforts. Sir Robert Thompson (1966) in *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, states there are three types of individuals recruited by the guerrilla organization: the naturals, the converted, and the deceived (p.35). Thompson describes the naturals as consisting of “many elements ranging from the idealist to the criminal” while the converted include “those who join because of government excesses or abuses of power,”(Ibid, p. 35). Finally, he describes the deceived as elements from both of the prior categories as well as “those who joined the insurgent ranks for a legitimate reasons and subsequently found themselves committed to a communist cause, and youths abducted from their villages.” (Ibid, p. 35). Mao Tse-tung elaborates these sources stating,

The [guerrilla] unit may originate in any one of the following ways: a.) From the masses of the people, b.) From regular army units temporarily detailed for this purpose, c.) From regular army units permanently detailed, d.) From the combination of a regular army unit and a unit recruited from the people, e.) From the local militia, f.) From the ranks of the enemy, and g.) From former bandits and bandit groups, (Mao, 30 August 2003).

In addition to active participants, the insurgents rely upon the support of a portion of the populace to supply the movement with its required resources. Thompson (1966) states that there are two types of supporters: those who are willing to help and those who are forced to help (p. 145). Government forces must seek to deny the movement access to its sources of support and recruitment through the isolation of insurgent forces from the populace and the alleviation of social and political grievances that may provide the impetus for the willing participation of the population in the movement. David Galula

(1964) states, “In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause.” (pp. 75-76). He states that the role of the counterinsurgent in this stage is “To find the favorable minority, to organize it in order to mobilize the population against the insurgent minority.” (Ibid, p. 77). The primary focus of this stage must be not only the separation of the movement from its popular base of support, but also the active recruitment of the will of the people to resist the insurgent, thereby denying the insurgent access to present and future resources.

The next stage of the insurgent process is the conversion mechanism that produces action or outputs from the inputs procured in the first stage. The mechanisms by which the movement achieves this aim are indoctrination, training camps, logistic support, and other parts of the insurgent organization that transform the resources obtained in the first stage into social action in the last. In this stage, government forces must seek to reduce the movement’s productive efficiency. Psychological operations play a large part in this stage and are required to generate distrust and fractiousness within the insurgent organization. This is achieved through the dissemination of credible negative information regarding the movement’s leadership and attracting defectors through programs such as amnesty and the rewards for surrender program that proved highly effective in the Malay Emergency. Amnesty and surrender programs impinge on the guerrilla organization by “separating the hard-core guerrilla from the marginal or unwilling supporter, and sap the will for resistance prior to military operations.” (Cable, 1986, p. 63). The result of these programs is to reduce the insurgents’ conversion efficiency by causing a shift of focus from operations to internal security, causing the organization to reallocate its resources from production and operations to protection, thereby diminishing its overall activity.

The third stage of the insurgent cycle is the output stage or activity of the insurgent organization. Action serves a twofold purpose for the insurgents. It serves to de-legitimize the government by demonstrating its inefficacy in its ability to provide protection and control over its population, and it serves as further recruitment for the insurgent movement, whether directly through active recruitment or impressment or through the advertisement of the insurgent cause that results from the attention generated

by the actions of the movement. In this respect, the version of the Leites and Wolf approach utilized in this thesis differs from that of the original. An additional line is incorporated into the original Leites and Wolf model to account for actions by the movement that generate inputs from exogenous sources as well as from endogenous as can be seen in Afghanistan, where the insurgent movements have drawn funding, intelligence, and recruits from outside Afghanistan's borders. In this stage of the counterinsurgency effort, government forces directly engage the members of the insurgent movement in counterforce action. While this stage relies primarily upon military action, it is highly dependent on accurate intelligence to differentiate between the insurgent and the populace to avoid the repercussions from friendly fire incidents that serve to alienate the populace and strengthen the insurgent cause. Galula (1964) highlights the importance of intelligence and the dilemma involved in procuring it in, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, stating, "Intelligence is the principle source of information on guerrillas, and intelligence has to come from the population, but the population will not talk unless it feels safe, and it does not feel safe until the insurgent's power has been broken," (p. 72). This dilemma describes the classic paradox of counterinsurgency in that to differentiate the insurgents from the population the government forces require intelligence from the population. However, the population will not provide the intelligence until the insurgents and their influence are eliminated. The solution to this dilemma lies in continued presence by government forces in an effected area for the purposes of providing security, building rapport, and gaining influence. The benefits resulting from the occupation of a populated area by government forces are twofold: the presence off the government forces eliminates the coercive influence of the insurgents over the population, and the longer government forces remain in an area, the more familiar they become with the population and details of the area, facilitating the collection of intelligence.

The final stage in the systemic approach to counterinsurgency involves the hardening of the state against insurgent action thereby enabling the population to absorb the outputs of the insurgent movement. Leites and Wolf (1970) describe this stage as "analogous to passive and active defense in strategic analysis. Its passive-defensive aspects involve such measures as building village fortifications ('hardening'), and

relocating villagers so that they are less accessible to [insurgents] R (evacuation). Its active-defensive aspects involve creating or strengthening local paramilitary and police units with increased capacity to provide local defense against small unit actions by R” (pp. 36-37). Government forces in this stage must seek to establish security and control over the population while fostering an image of legitimacy and trust in the state. The 1962 Marine Corps Small Wars Manual states, “Every endeavor should be made to assure the civilian population of the friendliness of our forces. No effort should be spared to demonstrate the advantage of law and order and to secure their friendly cooperation.” (as cited in Cable, 1986, p. 164).

In addition to the physical measures of security, the strengthening of the state implies the restoration of what Chalmers Johnson refers to as social synchronization. Johnson (1982) defines social synchronization as a social homeostatic equilibrium in which the value structure and the environment “change in synchronization with each other.” (p. 57). The government ensures synchronization by adapting its social and political policies to meet the requirements of the changing environment. When the government or the populace fail to adapt their roles or values to the current environment, change will occur, either to the system (government) or to the role of the population (social change). It is this failure or inability to adapt that the insurgents exploit as their political cause. The political and social exclusion of the ethnic Chinese in post World War II Malaya represent an example of this dissynchronization. In this aspect of counterinsurgency, the government must seek to rob the insurgents of their political cause through political strengthening. Political strengthening involves generating popular support through “political participation (at least at the local level), public works (irrigation ditches, dams, wells), and social reform (land reform, religious toleration, and access to schools). These actions are designed to preempt the insurgent’s cause.” (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 12). The British in Malaya robbed the insurgents of their political cause by integrating the ethnic Chinese into the social and political infrastructure of Malaya and by promising national independence following the termination of the Emergency. In this respect, the strengthening of the state involves both physical and ideological steps aimed at denying the insurgent movement its base of support. Galula (1964) states,

A victory in counterinsurgency is the destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population. (p. 77).

The systems approach provides valuable insight into the proper form of counterinsurgency by focusing on the supply side of the insurgency to cripple its operations. Counterinsurgency is viewed as a process that raises the costs of producing insurgent action by limiting the available resources and decreasing the costs its internal or external supporters are willing to pay. In this respect the systems approach addresses the key aspects of what causes an insurgent or destabilizing movement to succeed or fail, and from this vantage, it becomes elementary to develop a strategy to wrest power from the insurgents that begins at the local level and results in the restoration of security, order, and control for the entire country.

In summary, Chapter I has established the context for the application of current U.S. military strategy. It has detailed the background of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan from the events immediately following the insertion of U.S. combat forces to the present day. It has provided a preliminary analysis of the ongoing situation as well as an introduction to the Leites and Wolf systemic approach. Chapter II will analyze the counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts in Vietnam, Malaya, and the Philippines using the Leites and Wolf systemic approach to isolate the key factors that led to success or failure in each situation. Chapter III will provide an in depth analysis of the problems confronting Afghanistan based on in-country research and extensive interviews with Afghans and U.S. military personnel at all levels of the chain of command. Chapter IV will examine current U.S. policy in Afghanistan, and compare it to events observed while in country. It will assess the effectiveness of that policy in dealing with the specific issues addressed in Chapter III. Chapter V will compile these elements to generate a framework for a successful counterinsurgency and stabilization strategy for Afghanistan and will conclude with specific recommendations tailored to the situation in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER II

While every insurgency remains a unique phenomenon, comprised of specific circumstances and a distinctive setting that facilitate the genesis and propagation of each insurgent movement, some factors and themes remain common between all internal struggles for control. The purpose of this chapter is to distill these common factors of success and failure from the analysis of three cases of counterinsurgency to produce a tailored strategy for counterinsurgency and stabilization applicable to the situation in Afghanistan. Each case was chosen for the specific insight it provides on what contributes or detracts from a successful counterinsurgency effort. Elements of success and failure will be derived through implementation of the Leites and Wolf systemic approach. These elements will then be analyzed to determine which are applicable to the specific problems facing Afghanistan that will be addressed in Chapter III. Each case study will include a brief background to establish the context in which specific tactics were employed, followed by an analysis of the specific elements of each counterinsurgency strategy, and concludes with a brief findings section to detail the overall conclusions drawn from each case.

A. MALAYA

Malaya represents the textbook example of a counterinsurgency strategy. The effort featured a combination of civil-military efforts under a unified command while focusing on the separation of the insurgents from their base of support. While many scholars contend that this achievement was made possible by the insurgent's lack of external support coupled with the fact that the insurgency was split along ethnic lines facilitating the separation of Chinese insurgents from the native Malaysians and immigrant Indians, the example still contains valuable tactics, techniques, and strategies that can translate success from one case to another. The Malayan emergency had its foundations in a 1920's anti-colonial movement inspired by the Russian revolution. From the beginning, the movement was almost entirely drawn from the Malayan ethnic Chinese minority. The movement took shape in 1925 and was touted as "the overseas branch of the Chinese Communist Party" (Komer, 1972, p. 1). In 1930, the party realigned itself as

the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and established a parallel labor union, the Malayan General Labor Union. Throughout the period 1936-1937, the party led a successful series of labor union strikes creating what was labeled the “most serious crisis to date in the colony’s history” (Komer, 1972, p. 1). Following deeper incursions of China by Japanese forces, the ethnic Chinese MCP became decisively anti-Japanese in focus and by 1940 began to openly support Britain in its aid to China. Opposition of the Japanese produced a rallying effect within the ethnic Chinese community, driving the membership of the MCP to an estimated 50,000 (Komer, 1972, p. 2).

In 1941, the Japanese invaded Malaya as part of their quest for dominance in Southeast Asia. In support of the anti-Japanese effort, the MCP received both arms and training from the British following the apprehensive approval of the Governor of Malaya. In 1942, the MCP formed the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) with the support of the British. By 1944, the British were conducting frequent airdrops of weapons and supplies into MPAJA camps in support of anti-Japanese operations. However, much of these arms and equipment were hidden for post-war use.

The war in Malaya ended on 5 September 1945 with the arrival of the British fleet in Singapore. Upon their arrival, the British discovered that the MPAJA had established de facto control over many areas. In a brilliant move, the British decided to award the guerrillas with official military status, placing them under military command, providing them with housing and uniforms, and paying them for their service in the war. In an equally strategic next move, the British began negotiations for disarmament and the disbandment of the MPAJA units, contending that the negotiated terms offered a better option than a return to guerrilla conflict. In a superficial move of compliance, the MPAJA turned in much of its old weaponry and officially disbanded. Despite appearances, the members of the MCP had kept the best weaponry received from the British during the war and stood up several communist front organizations.

In 1945, the MCP, once again set its sights on labor unions in their effort to topple the Malayan government. By 1948, the MCP had gained control of 117 of 289 registered labor unions and was in the position to economically cripple the country (Ibid, p. 5). In addition to its efforts at labor agitation, the MCP began its campaign of terror. Between

1945 and 1947, there were 191 abductions and murders by insurgents, and within the first six months of 1948, this rate nearly quadrupled (Thompson, 1966, p. 27). On 19 June 1948, the Federation of Malaya declared a “State of Emergency” (Komer, p. 6). R.W. Komer (1972) in the Rand study, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, describes the pre-conditions that laid the foundation for the insurgency,

Neither the government nor the economy had yet recovered from the harsh effects of wartime occupation. The political future of Malaya was uncertain, the administrative structure was still undermanned, the security forces were weak and understrength. Crime and banditry were rife, and some rural areas still under virtual MCP control. Equally important, the insurgents still had a popular base among Malaya’s large and unassimilated ethnic Chinese minority (some 38 percent of its population)... [who] were not even represented in Malaya’s exclusively Malayan political structure. (p. 6).

Additionally, the Malayan economy was in shambles. Its two chief sources of revenue: rubber and tin had been severely impacted by the war. The post war economic depression produced widespread food shortages and unemployment resulting in the creation of nearly half a million ethnic Chinese squatters who lived in the federal land on the fringes of the extensive jungle and grew their own food for survival. The seclusion of the Chinese squatters coupled with their ability to produce their own food facilitated the support and growth of the insurgent organization. To support of their effort, the guerrillas formed Min Yuen (People’s Movement) as the link between the guerrillas and the population. Min Yuen operated through coercion and extortion of the Chinese community to gain the supplies, recruits, and information in support of the MCP’s efforts. Komer (1972) states that, “eventually these support groups became larger than the guerrilla force itself... [and] had to be drained to stiffen up the former [guerrillas] so that the guerrillas might survive,” (p. 8).

Initially, the insurgents hoped to collapse Malaya’s economy through disruption of its key rubber and tin industries by slashing rubber trees, sabotaging mine equipment, and murdering planters and mine managers (Nagl, 2002, p. 64). When this technique proved ineffective, the MCP adopted a strategy more in line with Mao and “attempted to gain control of selected ‘liberated’ areas by destroying the local government structure

village by village through terrorism and attacks on local police posts. The people in these areas would then be used to flesh out an organized guerrilla army, which in the final phase would move out of the liberated areas to take over progressively the whole country” (Komer, 1972, p.9).

Following reduced efficiency in operations and receiving support, the MCP came to the realization the use of indiscriminate terrorist tactics against their base of support (the ethnic Chinese population) was providing diminishing returns and focused on selective targeting. In 1951, the movement reached its high point with the assassination of the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, resulting in an overwhelming UK/Government of Malaya (GOM) response of effective military action. By 1955, following the implementation of numerous policies aimed at the severing of the insurgent-population link, the MCP leader Chin Peng realized his hope of toppling the GOM was futile and sought peace. However, Peng’s adamant demand for the legal recognition of the MCP by the GOM resulted in a collapse of negotiations. In 1960, following a sharp decline in guerrilla activity, the Emergency was declared officially over.

The decline of the insurgent movement in Malaya was the result of a combined British civil-military effort that focused on the separation of the insurgent from its popular base of support. The British system, referred to as the Briggs system, underwent several revisions before its final form under the guidance of Sir Gerald Templer. However, before discussing this system it is necessary to highlight the aspects of Malaya that facilitated the implementation of this plan. Komer (1972) lists five key elements that contributed to the success and facilitated the implementation of the British system of counterinsurgency, without which, the insurgency would not have been successful (pp.12-13).

The first of these factors was the long history of the British in Malaya. The British had intimate knowledge of the country’s culture, its geography, and the inner workings of its administration, many of whom the British had trained. This knowledge and experience enabled the British to exert considerable influence and control over the GOM for the implementation of their plans. The second factor that facilitated the British

plan was the existence of a viable administrative structure. Despite being severely undermanned, the GOM was fairly well organized and jointly staffed with British and Malay permanent career officers, resulting in a great deal of institutional memory which the British were able to exploit in the formation and implementation of their plans. The third factor and potentially the most important, was the loyalty of the ethnic Malays to the GOM. Ethnic Malays composed 49 percent of the Malay population and firmly supported the GOM as was evident from the high enlistment rates in the security forces during the Emergency (Ibid, p. 13). In addition, Komer states that much anti-Chinese sentiment existed within the ethnic Malays, which further detracted from the insurgents' ability to gain support from the majority of the population. The fourth factor was an ingenious political move that robbed the insurgents of their political cause. Following World War II, the British had planned to grant Malaya its independence as part of its decolonization efforts. However, increased tensions resulting from the ethnic Malays' fear of political domination by the enfranchisement of ethnic minority groups (constituting 51 percent of the population) forced a return to the past system, but throughout the Emergency, the British continued to publicize the inevitable independence of Malaya. The final factor that contributed to British success was the role of economic constraints. Following WW II, Britain was nearly bankrupt and Malaya was facing an economic depression with high unemployment and food shortages. In 1950, the start of the Korean War caused a boom in the rubber industry (one of Malaya's chief exports), relieving unemployment and enabling the British to rely on indigenous sources to fund its efforts in Malaya. In addition to Komer's five factors, the MCP's lack of radios forced them to rely almost entirely upon couriers for communication, preventing the MCP from attaining the celerity of response that the British effort had attained through its highly efficient organization.

These factors provided a stable foundation on which the British could implement their plan to oust the guerrillas from their jungle refuge and break their hold over the populace, thereby returning stability and control to Malaya. The British plan was based on the programs devised by the British Director of Operations for Malaya, Sir Harold Briggs. The elements of the Briggs plan sought to achieve four goals: (a) the separation of the guerrillas from the population; (b) to formalize and strengthen the

counterinsurgency management system; (c) to strengthen intelligence collection; and (d) to deploy security forces on a territorial basis (Ibid, p. 19). The Briggs plan was not the panacea to the problems in Malaya and underwent some revision under the British Minister of Colonies, Oliver Littleton, in 1952. Littleton made six recommendations that completed the Briggs plan and facilitated the eventual demise of the MCP under the implementation of High Commissioner, Sir Gerald Templer. These six recommendations consisted of “(a) unified command of civil and military forces; (b) reorganization and training of the police; (c) increased educational effort, especially in the primary school, to help win the war of ideas; (e) an enlarged Home Guard, to include more Chinese; and (f) review of the Civil Service to insure that the best men were recruited.” (Komer, 1972, p. 20). Additionally, Littleton’s changes included an enhancement of the security forces, a resettlement of the ethnic Chinese squatters accompanied by focused population and food controls to eliminate the insurgents’ base of support, and numerous incentives to the population to assist in their avoidance of the insurgents. Overall, the combined British/GOM counterinsurgency effort proved highly effective due to its focus on the population rather than on the insurgent forces. While the specific preconditions outlined above favored the British and facilitated the implementation of their plan, the tactics and techniques employed by the British represent the fundamentals of a successful counterinsurgency effort.

1. Analysis

The final evolution of the Briggs plan represented a comprehensive and unified strategy that addressed the social, political, and economic disequilibria of post World War II Malaya. While there exists a great deal of overlap in the categorization of the programs under the Briggs plan due to their multi-faceted and mutually-reinforcing nature, I will categorize each technique by the primary effect of each program on the insurgents and their organization.

a. Input Denial

In this stage, the counterinsurgent seeks to deny the insurgent movement the crucial resources it needs to sustain and propagate its movement. Komer (1972) lists six mutually reinforcing programs that separated the insurgents from their popular base:

(1) registration, travel control, curfews, ID card checks; (2) resettlement of the great bulk of the squatter population in protected new villages; (3) pervasive food and drug controls in 'black' areas to deny guerrillas access to food supplies; (4) accelerated social and economic development; (5) steady movement towards self-government and independence; and (6) public information and psywar programs designed to keep the population fully informed of what was under way. (p. 53).

Of the six programs mentioned by Komer, the resettlement, food and drug control, and population control programs represent the core tactics of the input denial effort. However, information operations were crucial to the implementation of each of these programs. Public information programs served as a vital supplement to counterinsurgency techniques and tactics that otherwise served as a severe infringement on the rights of the population. Information was spread through leaflets, personal appearances of high-ranking defectors, government films, aircraft and jeep-mounted loudspeakers, playlets, and through the vernacular press (Nagl, 2002, p. 94). The campaign provided publicity for the government's successes and a rationale for its tactics. Additionally, the extensive information campaign robbed the insurgents of their anti-colonial political cause by publicizing British goal of national independence. The campaign targeted both the insurgents and the population and was highly successful in demonstrating the success of government programs and encouraging the surrender of insurgent forces.

The resettlement program proved highly effective in separating the insurgents from the population by relocating the Chinese squatters and their possessions from the jungle fringe and providing permanent security, thereby eliminating the access of the insurgents to their base of support. Sir Robert Thompson (1966) lists three main objects of the resettlement program: (1) the protection of the population, (2) to unite the people and involve them in positive action on the side of the government, and (3) development in the social, economic, and political fields (pp. 124-125). The program was extensively planned and prepared in advance and controlled by strong central management, ensuring that implementation did not occur before all aspects of the plan had been thoroughly prepared. Resettlement was conducted as a military operation that relied upon surprise and haste to prevent guerrilla interference. People were moved as short a distance as possible and immediately compensated for anything that could not be

moved. In addition, the government awarded the peasants titles to the land on which they were resettled --something they had not possessed in the “squatter communities” which were little more than illegal occupation of Malayan public lands. The new communities were led by resettlement officers, many of whom were educated young Chinese, who served as liaisons to the government and ensured that the program ran smoothly following its implementation. The communities represented a secure area, free from the control and influence of the insurgents and their agents. Thompson states,

In each village there was a police post and the police officer in charge of that post, in accordance with either his instructions or the needs of the situation could call on perhaps ten Home Guards one night and five the next or even none at all, out of a total of fifty in the village. This flexible use of the volunteers enabled a much larger portion of the population to be involved without preventing them earning a living. It also enabled all the necessary tasks to be done, including, if required, the call-up of the total number for special operations. (pp. 142-143).

In addition, local security was reinforced with a regional response force that was utilized to counter large-scale insurgent reprisals. Another feature of the resettlements was the improved security measures such as wire and gates supplemented with watchtowers and floodlights that enabled the police to enforce a curfew and strict entry and exit controls at each village. The resettlement program not only provided its inhabitants with security and law enforcement, but also provided better public services and educational facilities and served to integrate many of the ethnic Chinese communities into the governmental infrastructure of Malaya thereby providing immediate and tangible advantages as well as some long term benefits over their past situation. Finally, the British integrated the resettlement program with an extensive information operations program that provided the rationale for resettlement and focused resentment towards the MCP, claiming the insurgency as the impetus for the program’s implementation. The resettlement program was a large success for two reasons: it removed the population from the influence and control of the insurgents thereby cutting the insurgents sources of supply, recruits, and information; and it provided immediate improvements and benefits in the squatters’ way of life.

Population controls took the form of registration and ID cards, movement controls, and curfews supplemented by frequent police identity checks. The

administration implemented these programs to facilitate the identification and separation of the guerrillas from the population. Each person over the age of twelve was registered and issued an ID card. Government forces checked the cards upon entry and exit to villages and during frequent random ID checks to prevent the infiltration of the resettled areas by the insurgents. To prevent theft of the ID cards, security forces would collect the villagers' cards before they left for the fields during the day and would reissue them upon the villagers' return. In addition, the government integrated this program with the food and drug control/denial program to prevent the unauthorized procurement of food or medicine by the guerrillas. Dusk-to-dawn curfews were imposed outside of the hamlets and movement was forbidden in areas where there was no habitation or cultivation. While the British implemented the registration and ID card programs uniformly at the national level, the remaining programs were utilized as a flexible response to localized threats.

British and GOM forces implemented the food and drug control programs on a regional basis in areas labeled by the government as "black" or insurgent controlled. The basic premise behind this program was to deny the guerrillas the ability to exploit the populace for food and medicine thereby providing incentive for surrender. Actions such as strict accountability of food inventory, rationing, limited sales, central cooking, destruction of excess food stocks, and spot checks of villagers combined to interdict the guerrillas' ability to procure food. The program succeeded in forcing the insurgents to devote resources to survival thus, impairing their ability to continue operations. While the guerrillas inhabited the dense jungle regions of Malaya, the food that was attainable from either the land proved inadequate to meet their needs. Additionally, government forces easily discovered and destroyed guerrilla food plots in the jungle and mitigated the use of aborigines as a surrogate for the Chinese squatters by applying a similar strategy of denial. The food and drug control program was supplemented by an extensive information operations program implemented at each village affected by the program. Government forces employed a "carrot and stick" approach to this campaign. Government forces informed the affected population in advance as to their required actions, that the guerrilla presence caused the imposition of these controls, and that cooperation with the government forces would result in the removal of the controls. The programs proved highly effective in forcing the guerrillas to expose themselves to

government patrols and eventually surrender. In summary, the British input denial programs were effective in cutting the link between the guerrillas and their popular base of support; however, these tactics, techniques, and procedures applied only to endogenous sources of support whereas in a larger scenario additional programs would be needed to counter exogenous sources as well.

b. Conversion Mechanism Destruction

Leites and Wolf (1970) state that the goal of this stage is to “reduce the productivity of R’s [the insurgent] resources, as well as to force R to divert resources from producing offensive operations to more defensive, protective activities.” (p. 79). The British accomplished this task through an effective psychological operations program aimed at confronting the guerrilla with “military pressures and civil inducements” (Ibid, p. 80). Komer (1972) states, “The primary objective of the GOM psychological warfare was to increase the surrender rate,” while the “Secondary GOM aims were to increase the tensions between the MLRA’s leaders and its rank and file, and those between the MLRA and the MinYuen, its covert supporters in the villages.” (p. 71). The British achieved these aims through its ingenious amnesty and rewards for surrender program that offered a substantial reward for either the capture or surrender of a MCP member based on that member’s rank in the organization. This program was implemented using airdropped leaflets and aircraft broadcasting by SEPs (captured insurgents) to encourage surrender. John Nagl (2002), in *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, states “SEPs, in turn, often led army and Special Branch patrols on raids against their own recent comrades in Communist base camps, thus earning greater rewards.” (p. 92). Komer (1972) states, “Checks, controls, and inquisitions multiplied; sentries watched sentries; watchers watched everyone.” (p. 75). The success of this program resulted from the diversion of resources from operations to increased internal security –in effect the program tied up the MCP’s manpower with the duplication of effort minimizing its available manpower for operations. In addition to the psychological warfare campaign, the food control program and the destruction of MCP crops in the jungle also served the dual purpose of denying the insurgents valuable resources and forcing the guerrillas to focus many of their remaining resources on survival and not operations.

c. Counterforce

The purpose of this stage is to eliminate the insurgent's activity through the destruction or capture of their forces. The British and GOM accomplished this task through a combined effort of the police and the military. In August of 1948, the British employed the highly effective "Ferret Force" to conduct long duration deep penetrations of the dense Malayan jungles to locate and destroy guerrilla encampments. The force, composed of small teams of British, Gurkha, and Malay soldiers trained in jungle warfare, would locate guerrilla camps and then direct security forces to their location to destroy them. Despite the program's success, it was terminated within a few months of its inception by War Department traditionalists in favor of conventional tactics (Cable, 1986, p. 77).

In 1949, the police developed jungle squads, which later became the Police Field Force, to conduct jungle patrolling and ambushes. This force conducted up to one third of the entire counter-guerrilla operations and proved highly effective due to their regional affiliation and familiarity. (Komer, 1972, p. 39). The key facet of the overall military participation in the Emergency was that it served as a component of the overall plan not the focus of it. Military operations were coordinated and received direction from State and District War Executive Committees in response to intelligence and were guided the principle of minimal force. The military operated in small units, conducting systematic patrols and ambushes deep into the jungle. Soldiers were trained in patrolling, jungle craft, and marksmanship and remained in the country for multiple tours of duty resulting in "a high degree of coherence and operational competence predicated upon prolonged experience in the country." (Cable, 1986, p. 90). The resettlement and food control programs relied heavily on the military for support military demonstrating that the British effort was a combined endeavor focused on the overall plan and not singularly on the destruction of the insurgent forces. Artillery and combat airpower were kept to a minimum to minimize civilian casualties; however, aerial resupply, casualty evacuation, and troop insertion proved indispensable to the highly responsive and flexible operations conducted by ground forces operating in the dense, remote jungles of Malaya.

d. Strengthening the State

Leites and Wolf (1972) describe this aspect of counterinsurgency as seeking to “increase its [the state’s] capacity and that of the population to withstand or absorb R’s [the insurgent’s] actions.” (p. 82). The actions taken in this aspect are comparable to both active and passive defensive measures; however Leites and Wolf state that the “basic requirement for increasing absorptive capacity for R’s output is to strengthen A [the state] itself: its capacity to be informed, undertake programs, control, protect, punish, and act and react vigorously, quickly, and intelligently.” (Ibid, p. 83). The British achieved the strengthening of the GOM and its populace through an improved organizational structure and an enhanced intelligence collection network as well as the creation of a home guard and Special Constables that facilitated the self-defense of the population, freeing government forces to further pursue the insurgents.

Under the Briggs plan, a unique command structure was developed to manage the counterinsurgency effort that provided both flexibility and response to a highly evolving situation. Briggs developed the war executive committees that served as “operational nerve centers controlling and coordinating all facets of C-I (counterinsurgency) operations at the state and local level.” (Komer, 1970, p. 27). Each state and district had its own executive committee known respectively as State War Executive Committees (SWECs) and District War Executive Committees (DWECs). These committees were “action bodies, composed of commanders and executives, not staff officers.” (Ibid, p. 28). Each committee was headed by a civilian chairman who also served as the primary advisor to the local sultan. The committee was composed of the senior civil servant, the senior soldier, and the senior police officer for the district or state. Additionally, the primary members were supplemented by a group of specialists consisting of the Special Branch Chief (Intelligence), the senior Home Guard officer, propaganda, and food control officers. Cable (1986) states, “no intelligence product, regardless of substantial merit, has any utility unless it can be exploited quickly, vigorously, appropriately, and without interorganization jurisdictional disputes.” (p. 84). The committees mitigated this problem through the unification of the command of all counterinsurgency operations (both civil and military) within their area of control allowing actions to be coordinated instantly by the primary commanders in response to

the latest intelligence. In a final step of the unification of effort, General Sir Gerald Templer, combined the positions of High Commissioner and Director of Operations thereby unifying the civil and military authority at the top as well as the bottom creating a system of centralized authority but highly decentralized and responsive execution. The crowning achievement in this aspect of the counterinsurgency effort was the creation of the police Special Branch. This organization was responsible for all aspects of intelligence gathering, so much so that military intelligence was subordinated to this agency. The rationale behind this organization was to capitalize on the regional specialty and intimate knowledge of each area of the police that was acquired through daily contact with the civilian populace. All raw intelligence regardless of source was funneled through the Special Branch creating a central and single organization responsible for the collection, processing, and dissemination of all intelligence, eliminating duplication of effort and conflicting interpretations of the same intelligence.

The Home Guard program was designed to free the military and police forces from static defensive duties and to facilitate the self-defense of the newly formed resettlement villages. The government dispatched mobile instructor teams to conduct training and the gradual replacement of the military and police force with the Home Guard. Each village Home Guard was provided with uniforms and organized into 12-man units; however, only one in ten men was provided with a weapon to prevent arms from falling into the hands of the MCP. The program proved so successful that by the end of 1959 the program was discontinued due to the lack of insurgent activity and the improved conditions permeating Malaya.

In addition to the Home Guard, a special paramilitary unit was created to relieve the police of their industrial security role in the protection of tin mines and rubber plantations. This program later evolved into two separate forces: the Area Security Units who were responsible for enforcing the food control program, and the Police Special Squads which were responsible for conducting area reconnaissance for the Police Special Branch. The final aspect of strengthening the state pertains to the organization of the country along each region's status with respect to governmental control. The establishment of black (insurgent-controlled) and white (government-controlled) areas was an organizational technique designed to apply a systematic approach to clearing each

region based on its specific threat level. This system represented a carrot-and-stick approach in that compliance with the mandates of the program resulted in the removal of restrictions. Additionally, the program avoided causing undue hardship and resentment in those areas that had cooperated with the GOM and were free of insurgent influence. The system worked to generate a network of secure areas in an ever-expanding process that robbed the guerrillas of their popular base of support and eliminated their room for maneuver.

e. Failures

In addition to highlighting the tactics and techniques that proved effective, it is instructive to analyze those strategies that did not. The first errant program of the British was part of the 1949 Emergency Regulation that imposed the death penalty for consorting with terrorists. The British quickly repealed this regulation when it was realized that it was difficult for the Chinese to avoid interaction with the insurgents when government protection was insufficient. Another technique that proved ineffective was the imposition of collective punishment on an uncooperative village or town. The government abandoned this technique based on the realization that the measure served to alienate those members of the community who were cooperative, thereby diminishing their sources of available intelligence. Finally, the use of large-scale forces of battalion to brigade size to conduct jungle sweeps was abandoned for the use of systematic small unit patrols following diminishing returns on the heavy investment of manpower. Overall, the combined British/GOM effort represented a highly efficient system of counterinsurgency. While many of the programs have multiple categorizations within the Leites and Wolf framework, the focus on the population and its separation from the insurgents remained a key feature of all aspects of the British/GOM effort resulting in its overall success.

f. Findings

The primary feature of the Malayan counterinsurgency endeavor was the highly effective resettlement program that accomplished two aspects of the Leites and Wolf systemic approach simultaneously. The resettlement program cut off the insurgents from their base of support while strengthening the state and its population from further influence by the insurgent movement. The program was effective because it provided

both immediate and long-term benefits to the population. The program provided those resettled titles to their land, which the ethnic Chinese squatters did not possess while residing in the federal land that fringed the jungle, and the resettlement villages provided the Chinese with a sense of political efficacy and representation by a member of their own ethnic group. Despite the effectiveness of the resettlement program, its success would have been negligible without the remaining programs instituted by the British.

The unified civil-military approach created a single effort and minimized interorganizational squabbling and redundancy of effort. The formation of state and district War Executive Committees facilitated immediate response to the latest intelligence through the integration of operational commanders, civil administrators, and intelligence officers. The utilization of police forces with regional knowledge and experience provided accurate and efficient intelligence reporting. The designation of black and white zones prevented the alienation of the compliant populace while focusing pressure on the insurgent forces. Population controls facilitated the separation of the insurgents and their supporting organizations from the populace without the use of frequent and recurring searches. Finally, the information operations program that supplemented each of the tactics that affected the population provided the rationale for the program in advance, offered incentives for compliance, and focused the resentment of the population for the program toward the insurgents, facilitating the program's overall success. However, the primary factor that contributed the most to the success of the British/GOM counterinsurgency effort was its focus on the population as opposed to the insurgent forces as an end.

B. VIETNAM

The Vietnam case study was chosen because it illustrates two key points about a failed counterinsurgency effort: how institutionalized concepts can blind an organization to the nature of a threat, and how the transfer and misapplication of viable counterinsurgency techniques from one situation to another can produce failure. The U.S. effort in Vietnam focused on countering a partisan war in an insurgent conflict through conventional counterforce techniques while ignoring the growing influence of the insurgent movement over the population, thereby losing the country from within while

defending its exterior. Its failure not only existed in the misperception of the threat, but also in the misapplication of several appropriate techniques. Despite superficial references to counterinsurgency throughout the conflict, the period following 1965 followed a conventional strategy of attrition; therefore, in the interest of maintaining focus on the relevant counterinsurgency techniques employed in Vietnam, only the period 1945-1965 will be examined in detail.

The American involvement in Vietnam began shortly after the failure of the French to re-establish control over its colony of French Indochina following World War II. The insurgent movement grew out of the strong anti-colonial sentiment of the indigenous Vietnamese population spurred by the Communist leader Ho Chi Minh and his aspirations for a united Vietnam. Following the withdrawal of Japanese forces at the close of World War II, the Vietminh had consolidated power throughout Vietnam. On 2 September 1945, following the signing of the Japanese surrender marking the end of World War II, the leader of the Vietminh, Ho Chi Minh, issued the Vietnamese Declaration of Independence forming the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and naming himself president. (The Vietnam War, 4 September 2003). Minh had hoped that by modeling the Vietnamese declaration after the U.S. document that his fledgling nation would achieve international recognition beginning with the United States; however, this was not to be the case. At the 1945 Potsdam Conference the Allies decided to split the country under the temporary control of the British and Chinese until the arrival of the French who would then resume control of the country. In October, 35,000 French troops arrived to assume control of the southern half of Vietnam and by February had supplanted both British and Chinese control (The Vietnam War, 4 September 2003).

Throughout 1946, Minh worked tirelessly to negotiate for the reunification and independence of Vietnam, but despite his efforts, in June the French High Commissioner declared the creation of the Republic of Chochina under a separatist French government in South Vietnam (Ibid). The French began systematically clearing South Vietnam of the Vietminh influence and in November 1946, French forces seized Hanoi and bombed Haiphong harbor killing an estimated 6,000 people (Higgins, 1989, p. 31). Following the massacre, Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh retreated into the dense jungles of Vietnam. In

December of 1946, the Vietminh launched their first large-scale attack against the French colonial powers signaling the start of the First Indochina War.

In 1949, the French installed Prince Bao Dai as the head of state of South Vietnam and established the Vietnamese National Army (VNA) as a counter to Minh's appeals for unification. In October, the communist forces of Mao Ze-Dong defeated the nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek sparking the policy of the containment of communism in the White House. Following the communist consolidation of power in China, both China and the Soviet Union officially recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and began sending weapons and advisors to North Vietnam. In a parallel move, the U.S. and Britain recognized the rule of Bao Dai in South Vietnam and by July of 1950, the U.S. had begun sending military aid to the French. However, in June of 1950, following the incursion of communist North Korean troops into South Korea, the deployment of U.S. ground forces to the region diverted much of the focus from Vietnam.

By 1953, the Korean War had ended with an armistice that divided Korea at the 38th parallel. During this period, the U.S. had continued to supply the French with arms, equipment, and advisors including the creation of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in 1950. In March of 1954, North Vietnamese forces began an assault on the French position at Dien Bien Phu air base. The French, outnumbered nearly five-to-one, sent a desperate appeal to Washington for assistance (The Vietnam War, 2003). President Eisenhower considered several different options, but in the end decided to take no action. On 7 May 1954, nearly 10,000 French soldiers surrendered to the North Vietnamese forces under General Giap, marking the end of the First Indochina War (Ibid). Following the end of the war, France withdrew completely from Vietnam. In May of 1954, the Geneva Convention on Indochina convened to discuss a solution for Vietnam. The Convention divided Vietnam along the 17th parallel, awarding the North to Ho Chi Minh and the South to Bao Dai under the stipulation that free elections for the unification of Vietnam would be held within two years (The Vietnam War, 2003). Fearing a victory by Ho Chi Minh and his communist regime, neither the U.S. nor South Vietnam signed the treaty. Following the convention, Dai appointed Ngo Dinh Diem as his prime minister.

Diem, a devout Roman Catholic, encouraged the resettlement of Catholics in the North to South Vietnam during the 300 days allowed under the treaty for the North and South to reposition their people and forces. During this time nearly one million people crossed the border, however, 10,000 Vietminh remained in South Vietnam by order of Hanoi (The Vietnam War, 4 September 2003).

In January 1955, the U.S. began providing direct aid to the government of South Vietnam in the form of military equipment and training, while in a parallel move; the Soviet Union approved military aid for the North in July. On 23 October 1955, Diem defeated Bao Dai in a U.S-backed referendum and declared himself president of the Republic of South Vietnam (Ibid). Diem began his reign of South Vietnam by filling his top cabinet positions with friends and family to include his younger brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, who became Diem's principle advisor. In addition to Diem's nepotism, he resettled many of his fellow Catholics who fled from North Vietnam into the central highlands of South Vietnam, angering the native Montagnards. Additionally, Diem supplanted rural village officials elected by their local constituency with his loyal followers, alienating much of the rural populace and providing a political opening for a rural-based insurgency. In response to the perception of growing resentment among the rural populace Diem began a purge of suspected Vietminh, now known as Viet Cong, throughout the South. Diem's campaign led to the arrest, detention, and re-education of over 20,000 suspected Viet Cong (Ibid). Diem's campaign would last until 1957 and prompt the North Vietnamese to expand their efforts on the Ho Chi Minh trail (Higgins, 1989, p. 36). In addition to his growing paranoia regarding the threat from the North, Diem's mistrust extended to the political and military realms. Having survived a past military coup, Diem deeply mistrusted the military and appointed military leaders based on their loyalty rather than their military competency. As an additional reassurance, Diem assigned the control of both the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps to loyal provincial chiefs, to ensure the existence of a rival military force not under military control.

In July of 1956, Diem under the aegis of the United States refused to conduct the referendum for the reunification of Vietnam imposed under the Geneva Convention. In response to Diem's move, the Soviet Union proposed the permanent division of Vietnam

into the North and South along the 17th parallel. The U.S. refused this proposal fearing that the recognition of communist North Vietnam would contribute to the legitimization of communists movements elsewhere. Diem's paranoia diverted more of his funding an attention to matters of security than to the social welfare of his country generating resentment throughout rural Vietnam. Communist guerrillas, left behind from regroupment, capitalized on Diem's neglect and gained popular support through promises of land reform and a higher standard of living. Land reform had been a particularly sensitive issue among the Vietnamese populace following regroupment. Diem had initiated a land grant program, giving free land to Catholics displaced from North Vietnam following the division of the country. A privileged minority controlled the majority of the land in the South as absentee landlords, while the majority of the population paid rent. Diem's move created further divide among the populace, as well as fueled anti-Diem sentiment throughout the rural population.

In 1958, the Viet Cong began preparation for a people's war of liberation with the creation of a command structure and 37 companies in the Mekong River Delta (The Vietnam War, 2003). In March of 1959, Ho Chi Minh declared a "People's War to unite all of Vietnam" beginning the Second Indochina War. Minh validated his declaration in July with the deployment of 4,000 Viet Cong guerrillas into South Vietnam (Ibid). During the last four months of 1959, the Viet Cong assassinated over 110 local government leaders throughout the countryside (Nagl, 2002, p.121). John Nagl (2002), in *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, states the intent of these attacks was to fill the political vacuum in the countryside left open by the ineffectiveness of local militias and RF/PF forces, who were ineffective because of misplaced focus on conventional warfare of the ARVN instilled by the U.S. Army." (p. 121). By 1960, the population had grown weary of Diem's corrupt and inefficient nepotistic government. Responding to the growing public resentment of Diem's regime, several distinguished nationalists petitioned Diem for reform. Diem reacted by shutting down several opposition newspapers and arresting journalists and intellectuals.

Diem's corruption and implementation of violent reactionary tactics had come to characterize two aspects of social disequilibrium in what Chalmers Johnson (1982) refers to in his theory of revolutionary change as "power deflation" and a "loss of authority"

(pp. 93-94). Johnson states that power deflation occurs “during a period of change [when] the integration of a system depends increasingly on the deployment of force.” Additionally, Johnson defines the loss of authority as a situation in which society’s legitimate leaders are “unable to develop policies that will maintain the confidence of nondeviant actors in the system... When this happens the use of force by the elite is no longer considered legitimate. A revolution will not occur as long as the leaders can still use the army successfully to coerce social interaction; but the power deflation will increase, producing a police state.” (Ibid, p.94). Diem maintained his rule through his overt use of force and his reliance on divisive factors in civil-military relations to eliminate the rise of an overt alternative base of power. The populace had increasingly perceived his use power as abusive and self-serving, but had yet to take action.

In November 1960, Diem foiled a coup by disgruntled South Vietnamese Army officers and began a countrywide purge of all suspected enemies of the state. Diem’s purge resulted in the arrest of 50, 000 individuals, spurring thousands to flee to North Vietnam (The Vietnam War, 2003). In December 1960, the North Vietnamese effort transitioned to phase two of its operations in South Vietnam with the creation of the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF), and its support organization, the National Liberation Front (NLF) (Ibid).

In early 1961 Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, pledged his support for “wars of national liberation throughout the world,” encouraging the North Vietnamese to intensify their efforts in South Vietnam (The Vietnam War, 2003). Newly elected President John F. Kennedy retorted by stating, “...We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to insure the survival and the success of liberty,” and sent 400 Special Forces in the role of “special advisors” to aid in the training of the South Vietnamese Army (Ibid). The ongoing rhetoric between the two superpowers continued to lay the groundwork for a partisan war that would soon take place in South Vietnam.

On 16 September of 1961, in response to American requests for assistance in fighting the Viet Cong, the British sent the British Advisory Mission (BRIAM) to South Vietnam (Nagl, 2002, p. 130). BRIAM was composed of five British colonial civil

servants and policemen led by Sir Robert Thompson (Ibid, p. 130). Thompson, who served as the Minister of Defense in Malaya following the Emergency, advocated the use of population control strategies in favor of the U.S. military's reliance on search and destroy tactics and overwhelming firepower (Ibid, p. 130). Despite Thompson's extensive credential in counterinsurgency, his vision of a parallel program of resettlement failed due to Vietnamese corruption and poor implementation. Following the failure of the Strategic Hamlets program, Thompson, who remained unable to inspire U.S. counterinsurgency thought, closed the BRIAM mission in March of 1965 (Ibid, p131).

In November 1961, the Green Berets' expanded their training to include the members of indigenous tribal Vietnamese known as the Montagnards who inhabited the central highlands of South Vietnam. The resulting collaboration produced the paramilitary Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). The groups conducted operations to prevent the further infiltration of North Vietnamese troops and supplies into the south. While the program was initially based on classical counterinsurgency principles and demonstrated great success, it would later fall into ruin through hasty implementation and poor execution under the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) following Operation SWITCHBACK (Krepinevich, 1986, p.71).

In the fall of 1961, the North Vietnamese increased the tempo of their operations, launching several successful attacks on South Vietnamese troops prompting Diem to request further military assistance from the United States. Kennedy responded by sending U.S. helicopter units and additional military advisors to transport and direct South Vietnamese troops in battle, involving U.S. forces in combat operations for the first time. In early February, the Military Advisory Command Vietnam (MACV) was created to replace MAAG as the command structure for U.S. advisory efforts in Vietnam. The initial concept behind the creation of MACV was "to assist and support the RVN in defeating the communist insurgency." (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 64). Despite his complete lack of experience with counterinsurgency, the Army selected General Harkins, an armor officer, to run MACV. Harkins held to his belief that MACV's mission was to "kill VC pure and simple" thereby condemning counterinsurgency to the limited tactics of search and destroy (Ibid, p. 64).

In January 1962, President Kennedy authorized the use of defoliant known as agent orange, to counter the VC's use of the thick jungle cover for concealment and access to the rural population's food supply. While senior Army field commanders touted the program, code named RANCH HAND, as a success, it served to alienate the people it was designed to protect. The airborne dispersal of defoliant would frequently drift onto the crops of the indigenous population and destroy their harvest. Despite this adverse effect, the program continued until 1970.

On 27 February 1962, Diem's reign, again, came under attack as two renegade South Vietnamese pilots bombed the presidential palace using two World War II U.S. fighters. Both Diem and his brother escaped unharmed. In March, Diem began the strategic hamlets program based on the advice of Sir Richard Thompson, who played a major role in the British success in Malaya. The program was designed to parallel Malaya's resettlement program by removing and isolating the peasants from the guerrilla influence by focusing on the "security and stability of the populated rural areas" rather than on the destruction of VC forces (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 67). While the program was sound in design, it was poor in implementation. The program, which was run by Diem's brother, was fraught with corruption and the falsification of data focused on the exploitation of the peasants it was designed to help. Additionally, the program failed to account for Vietnamese traditions that bound each family to their ancestral land resulting in further resentment over the forced move. In the end, the program failed due to massive corruption, inadequate preparation that left many villages incomplete before occupation, and the absence of unity of command and effort that left gaps in the security of each area enabling the VC to operate and thrive in the uncontrolled areas. Eventually, the VC infiltrated many of these hamlets, prompting Diem to order the bombing of these suspected havens. The bombing, which was conducted by both U.S. and South Vietnamese bombers, produced numerous civilian casualties, generating further resentment and hostility towards the Diem regime and the United States.

By May of 1962, the VC had shifted into phase three of their operations and began to organize and operate in battalion-sized units throughout central Vietnam. Despite the shift in strategy by the VC indicative of their success, Secretary of Defense McNamara visited South Vietnam and announced, "we are winning the war" (The

Vietnam War, 2003). In May of 1963, Diem removed several Buddhists from key government positions, replacing them with Catholics, sparking riots throughout South Vietnam resulting in the deaths of one woman and eight children when South Vietnamese police and Army troops open fire to subdue the crowds (The Vietnam War, 2003). Buddhist demonstrations spread throughout the South. Diem responded by imposing martial law and dispatching South Vietnamese Special Forces to pacify several southern Buddhist sanctuaries. Diem's actions produced widespread anti-Diem demonstrations throughout the south. Kennedy's advisors warned him to dissociate himself from Diem and talks began in the administration on forcing Diem to reform.

On 4 July 1963, the CIA office in Saigon received information from a Buddhist South Vietnamese General regarding the potential overthrow of Diem. On 2 November 1963, government forces assassinated Diem and his brother, Nhu, resulting in a power vacuum that produced a series of unstable military and civilian governments (The Vietnam War, 2003). Years of oppression, religious discrimination, and corruption under the Diem regime had created social disequilibrium within South Vietnam, enabling the Viet Cong to increase their hold on the rural population. South Vietnam was now on the brink of caving in and totally reliant on the U.S. for support. In November, President Johnson vowed that he "will not lose Vietnam" and by the end of the year had raised the number of troops in Vietnam to over 16,000 (The Vietnam War, 2003).

In early 1964, a bloodless military coup by General Nguyen Khanh resulted in the removal from power of General Duong Van Minh. Minh was allowed to remain a figurehead within the Vietnamese government; however, General Khanh retained the true power. In March, the U.S. began a secret bombing campaign of the Ho Chi Minh trail inside of Laos, in an effort to interdict the perceived external source of the South Vietnamese insurgency; however, the campaign had little effect on the ability of the Viet Cong to operate within the South (The Vietnam War, 2003).

In August of 1964, the U.S. destroyer, U.S.S. Maddox, was attacked by three North Vietnamese patrol boats while supporting a South Vietnamese raid on two North Vietnamese bases in the Gulf of Tonkin. While no injuries or fatalities resulted from the attack, the Johnson Administration issued a stern warning to Hanoi that further

“unprovoked” attacks would result in “grave consequences” (The Vietnam War, 2003). Following questionable reports of a similar incident in the Gulf, Johnson launched a limited bombing raid against the North, resulting in the shoot down of two U.S. planes and the capture of the first U.S. prisoner of war. In response to the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, Congress passes the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, granting the president the authority to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression” without the formal declaration of war on North Vietnam (Vietnam online, 2003).

On 21 August, students and Buddhist militants in Saigon staged a series of protests against the militaristic rule of Khanh. General Khanh, in a superficial move of appeasement, responded by forming a triumvirate composed of Khanh, General Minh, and General Khiem. Despite Khanh’s response, the streets of Saigon descended into mob violence and rioting. In mid-September, two South Vietnamese Generals attempted an unsuccessful coup aimed at the overthrow of General Khanh, signaling continued instability in the government and widening the political gap for the insurgent cause (Ibid).

In October 1964, China tested its first atomic bomb and massed troops along its border with North Vietnam. The advent of Chinese nuclear capability combined with its perceived involvement in North Vietnam would generate a degree of restraint in the responses of U.S. decision makers to the perceived actions of the North. In November, the Viet Cong launched their first attack against U.S. forces at Bien Hoa Air Base utilizing mortars armed with U.S. mortar rounds. Despite the fact that numerous VC attacks had resulted in the capture of U.S. arms and equipment, U.S. leadership perceived the use of U.S. ammunition as further evidence of exogenous communist support. The perception of further involvement by communist forces resulted in the continuation of a “tit-for-tat” deterrence strategy by U.S. policy makers implemented against the North because in the words of General Westmoreland, “the United States knew of no Viet Cong targets within South Vietnam, ‘the attack of which would constitute appropriate reprisal.’” (Cable, 1986, p. 241).

In December of 1964, an estimated 10,000 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regulars infiltrated into the central highlands of South Vietnam, combining their numbers

with the Viet Cong to form battalion-sized elements (The Vietnam War, 2003). On 20 December, in yet another military coup, General Kahn and several younger Army officers dissolved the triumvirate, ousting General Minh and several other senior military officials from the Vietnamese government and seized control. By 27 January of 1965, Khanh had seized full control of the government.

In late January 1965, in a joint memorandum to the President, National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, and Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, concluded that “America’s limited involvement in Vietnam is not succeeding, and that the U.S. has reached a ‘fork in the road’ and must soon escalate or withdraw.”(Ibid). In early February, the Viet Cong attacked the American base at Pleiku, killing eight and wounding 126 Americans and destroying ten aircraft, prompting Johnson to retaliate by bombing the North Vietnamese army camp near Dong Hoi as part of the “tit-for-tat” strategy of deterrence favored by White House decision makers (Ibid). During a visit to Hanoi in February, the Soviet Prime Minister promised to aid North Vietnam against American aggression and within weeks Soviet Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) began arriving in Hanoi. On February 18, South Vietnamese political instability continued as another military coup resulted in the replacement of General Khanh with a civilian, Dr. Phan Huy Quat (Ibid).

In late February, General Westmoreland requested two battalions of Marines to defend the air base at Da Nang. While Johnson initially approved the request, he was cautioned by the U.S. ambassador in Vietnam who warned that the United States is about to repeat the same mistakes of the French by deploying large numbers of forces into a region where one could not differentiate between the population and the enemy. On 2 March 1965, the U.S. began Operation ROLLING THUNDER with the intent of increasing the pressure on Hanoi to stop the infiltration of troops and materiel into the South (The Vietnam War, 2003). In addition, Operation BARREL ROLL began as an armed reconnaissance mission along the Laotian border to directly interdict supplies moving along the Ho Chi Minh trail. North Vietnamese work crews repair the damage each night producing only a minor setback in the movement of materiel from the North. Continued bombing in the South resulted in the creation of an estimated 3 million refugees resulting from the inadvertent destruction of villages, while in the North the destruction of

factories resulted in the decentralization of North Vietnamese industry, minimizing their vulnerability to further U.S. attacks (Ibid).

On 8 March 1965, 3,500 Marines landed on China Beach, marking the arrival of the first conventional U.S. forces deployed to Vietnam to conduct combat operations (The Vietnam War, 2003). The Marines, originally tasked to provide security for airfields, would soon be engaged in full-scale offensive combat operations. At the end of March, the Viet Cong directed their use of terrorist tactics towards the United States with the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Saigon. By the end of 1965, Viet Cong terrorism had reached a pinnacle with 1,895 people assassinated and 12,778 kidnapped in an effort to further the political and social destabilization of the South (Nagl, 2002, p. 136). In mid May, the U.S. conducted its first bombing pause in Operation *ROLLING THUNDER* to facilitate negotiation with Hanoi. The North Vietnamese exploited the pause, using the time to repair air defenses and send more troops and equipment to South Vietnam. By May an additional 3,500 troops from the 173d Airborne Brigade arrived in Vietnam to conduct offensive airmobile operations against the VC in the South (The Vietnam War, 2003). As the United States gradually built up its combat forces in the South, the North Vietnamese stepped up operations against the South and U.S. forces. From 11 to 13 May the Viet Cong conducted operations in the Phuoc Long Province and in south central Vietnam, overrunning South Vietnamese troops and attacking a U.S. Special Forces firebase. By 19 May, the Johnson Administration, realizing the futility of the pause in bombing, resumed operations; however, six more pauses would occur during the conduct of Operation *ROLLING THUNDER* that allowed Hanoi to retain the strategic as well as the tactical initiative (Ibid). On 18 June, Nguyen Cao Ky seized control of the South Vietnamese government in the tenth change of power in the twenty months since the assassination of Diem. Near the end of July, President Johnson announced the deployment of 44 battalions to Vietnam for combat operations. Johnson's decision raised the total number of U.S. forces in Vietnam to 125,000, and began the transition to large-scale conventional operations by U.S. forces (The Vietnam War, 2003).

In August 1965, the U.S. Marines implemented an effective approach to counterinsurgency operations known as Combined Action Platoons (CAPs). The CAPs provided continual security to the villages in which they resided. The permanent presence

of the Marines generated rapport with the local villages and facilitated the unimpeded flow of intelligence by removing the influence of the insurgents. The CAPs proved highly effective in the ability to deny the area to the VC for continued operations and resourcing by relying on small unit operations to conduct nighttime patrolling and ambushes around the villages. Additionally, the CAPs trained local paramilitary forces (PFs) to gradually assume greater responsibility for their villages thereby freeing the Marines to spread the program to another village. Despite the success of the individual CAP villages, the program failed due to continuing Army pressure to conduct more offensive operations and the failure of the Marine leadership to “provide an interlocking network of units that would conform to the ‘oil spot’ principle.” (Krepinevich, 1986, p.173).

In August, the Marines began Operation Starlight, the first major U.S. ground offensive in a The operation consisted of a preemptive strike against the VC outside of Chu Lai airfield that resulted in the deaths of 163 of a suspected 1,500 VC and provided a large boost of morale for U.S. forces. In mid November, members of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) engaged in the first battle between U.S. forces and North Vietnamese regulars at the Battle of Ia Drang Valley. The battle resulted in the NVA retreating into the jungle following the loss of over 1,200 soldiers. Following the engagement, General Westmoreland stated, “the ability of the Americans to meet and defeat the best troops the enemy could put on the field was once more demonstrated beyond any possible doubt, as was the validity of the Army’s airmobile concept.” (Krepinevich, 1982, p. 169). The American victory served to validate the Army’s attrition strategy, leading the Army to the conclusion that “Standard operations were working; therefore, no alternative strategies need be explored,” signaling an end to U.S. counterinsurgency strategy (Krepinevich, 1982, p. 169).

The United States’ involvement in Vietnam would continue until 1975 ending with the fall of Saigon to North Vietnamese forces on 30 April 1975. Throughout the remaining years from 1965 until the fall of Saigon, U.S. military and political leadership would continue to apply a strategy of attrition composed of conventional search and destroy operations on the ground coupled with massive bombing campaigns. The strategy focused upon counterforce and input denial operations directed the overwhelming firepower of the U.S. military on the insurgent forces and the perceived

exogenous source of insurgent resources leaving the population vulnerable to the influence of the insurgents. The U.S. strategy of attrition produced a military victory but political defeat in a conflict in which the U.S. never lost a battle, but lost the war. In the words of Henry Kissinger, “We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the most critical maxims of guerrilla warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.” (Kissinger, 1969, p. 214). The failure of the U.S. to properly identify the type of threat it opposed in Vietnam coupled with the cognitive dissonance of U.S. leadership to the inefficacy of its strategy of attrition resulted in the political loss of South Vietnam to the insurgent forces of the North.

1. Analysis

The insurgency in Vietnam initially began in response to French colonialism prior to World War II. However, following the withdrawal of the French, the corrupt practices of the Diem regime continued to sow the seeds of discontent among the Vietnamese populace. Diem’s nepotism and preference towards his fellow Catholics combined with his inflammatory policies and interference in the traditional political structure of rural Vietnamese villages resulted in the alienation and resentment of the primarily Buddhist Vietnamese population. In addition, Diem’s mismanagement of the South Vietnamese armed forces combined with his apathy towards the conduct of counterinsurgency efforts allowed the insurgent movement to establish a strong foothold in the rural areas of the South.

The political vacuum created in the wake of Diem’s assassination produced a series of civil and military governments of equivalent instability expanding the political and strategic space of the Viet Cong. The U.S. military’s focus on conventional operations led to the creation of a South Vietnamese Army trained for large-scale operations against an external aggressor that was incapable of dealing with an internal threat, thereby solidifying the VC’s hold over the countryside. U.S. military organizational and conceptual rigidity combined with cognitive dissonance prevented the adaptation of U.S strategy to counter the threat despite the tactical successes of fledgling

counterinsurgency programs. U.S. military and political cognitive dissonance extended to two areas: the inability to perceive failure or ineffective techniques, and the refusal to accept the success of programs that lay outside the strategy of attrition. The Battle of Ap Bac, in which the U.S. claimed victory despite ARVN forces' failure to defeat the Viet Cong in spite of their inferiority in numbers, firepower, and mobility, highlights the Army's denial or inability to perceive the ineffectiveness of its techniques. Additionally, such programs as the CIDG or the U.S. Marines CAP programs which demonstrated a great deal of success, were either hastily driven into failure or bastardized to become more offensive oriented, breaking their link with the populace and condemning them to failure.

The U.S. perception of counterinsurgency as a purely defensive measure further hardened opposition to counterinsurgency concepts in an Army dominated by Jominian offensive, attrition-based strategy. In addition, the United States' focus on the North as the source of the conflict prevented U.S. leadership from correctly identifying the internal nature of the war despite intelligence reports showing that "80-90 percent of the VC were locally recruited, and their weapons coming from stocks captured from government forces."(Krepinevich, 1986, p. 60). Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Kennedy Administration's Special Group (Counterinsurgency) in a November 1961 report stated, "It is clear to me that the time has come in our relations to [sic] Southeast Asia when we must declare our intention to attack the source of guerrilla aggression in the North." (Ibid, p. 62).

The U.S. focus on the attrition of VC forces through large-scale sweep and clear operations created a degree of predictability in the military's response to VC presence. The Viet Cong exploited this predictability by luring U.S. and ARVN forces to remote engagements leaving the population unprotected. In an April 1967 report by the Systems Analysis section in the Office of Secretary of Defense, it was noted that, "fully 90 percent of all incidents in any given quarter were occurring in the 10 percent of the country that held over 80 percent of the population." (Ibid, p.188). Additionally, a U.S. Armed Combat Operations Vietnam (ARCOV) report in May of 1967 showed that 88 percent of all engagements were initiated by the Viet Cong, enabling the VC to dictate when and where U.S. forces would be employed (Ibid, p. 188). Based on these statistics, Andrew

Krepinevich (1986) concludes, “the insurgents would stick to their strategy of protracted conflict: drawing U.S. units away from the populated areas to allow continued access to their logistical base (the population),” (p. 178). In addition, Viet Cong would utilize the U.S. military’s liberal use of overwhelming and indiscriminate firepower as a weapon to alienate populace from U.S. and ARVN forces through an ingenious plan designed to generate friendly fire incidents. General Khuyen of the ARVN noted, “Hatred was our enemy’s major instrument to turn the people against us... Communist guerrillas usually drew retaliatory fire from our gunships and artillery by sniping at our aircraft, convoys, or outposts. More often than not, it was the local people who were exposed to our fire because by the time it came, the guerrillas had fled or taken shelter underground.” (as cited in Krepinevich, 1986, p. 199). Inevitably, the U.S. military focus on a strategy of attrition against a seemingly endless supply of insurgent forces coupled with the political and social instability resulting from the lack of a stable central government, allowed the VC to gain control of the populace, thereby winning the war. The misperception of the source of the threat in parallel with a focus on counterforce operations allowed the insurgents to continue their resourcing, production, and operations unimpeded by the efforts of the U.S. military.

One of the most notable features of the United States’ involvement in Vietnam was the absence of a comprehensive strategy of true counterinsurgency. Instead, U.S. military and political leadership chose to focus on the interdiction of men and equipment from a perceived exogenous source and the destruction of guerrilla forces leaving the population susceptible to insurgent influence. In light of this fact, I will focus the analysis on the counterinsurgency techniques applied at the operational and tactical levels, many of which were highly effective before they were corrupted by the Army’s focus on the offensive.

a. Input Denial

Input denial in the grand strategy of the Army in Vietnam centered on border security and the interdiction of supplies from the North. However, several smaller programs proved highly effective in the ability to deny the Viet Cong access to its primary source of men, food, and equipment (the population). Most notably, the Marine CAP and GOLDEN FLEECE programs, and the U.S. Army Special Forces CIDG program

proved highly effective before being corrupted by the Army's grand strategy of attrition. The primary thrust of the Government of Vietnam's (GVN) attempt at counterinsurgency was the Strategic Hamlets Program. The concept behind the strategic hamlet program, named Operation *SUNRISE*, directly paralleled that of the resettlement program in Malay; however, due to its failure it will be discussed in the section on ineffective strategies.

The Marine CAP Program established a direct correlation between the amount of time spent occupying a village and the degree of security attained in that village. The basic concept of the program was to provide security and eliminate the insurgents' influence on the population through the permanent occupation of a village. Marine units conducted systematic nighttime patrolling and ambushes while minimizing the use of firepower by employing small, well-disciplined units. In addition, the Marines relied on the same roads used by the villagers stating, "It was important that the roads be kept open for the people to use as well as for ourselves." (as cited in Krepinevich, 1986, p. 173). The Marines made extensive use of the villages' paramilitary Popular Forces (PFs), gradually allowing them to assume a greater role in the security of the village, thereby freeing the Marines from static defensive operations and allowing them to conduct more extensive patrolling near the village. In addition to its success in village security, the CAP program contributed to the economic development of the region, "Road traffic in the area has picked up noticeably, and hamlet markets now attract buyers and sellers from as far off as two kilometers, it may not sound like much, but is a lot with what the safe travel radius was six months ago." (as cited in Nagl, 2002, p.158). Finally, the CAP program contributed to the protection of the Marine unit itself, having "achieved a casualty rate lower than that found in units operating in search-and-destroy missions." (Krepinevich, 1986, p.174). The only weaknesses of the program resulted from the language barrier between the Marines and the Vietnamese villagers, and the failure of the Marine leadership to integrate the program into an expanding network of security and control.

Operation *GOLDEN FLEECE* was another Marine program designed to deny the Viet Cong a source of supply that achieved a great deal of success. The program centered on providing security and patrols to Vietnamese agricultural fields during harvest time "so that the farmers could harvest, store, and eventually sell their crop free

from VC taxation.” (Ibid, p. 174). Despite VC attempts to interdict the harvest, U.S. Marines augmented by local paramilitary PFs continued to confound their efforts. General Walt, commander of the Marines under the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, stated, “each catty of rice not going into Viet Cong bins meant that another catty had to be grown in North Vietnam and brought over the hundreds of miles of mountain trail by human bearers.” (as cited in Krepinevich, 1986, p. 174). Despite the effectiveness of both programs, their success was never capitalized upon by the Army due to their diversion of effort from the pursuit of the main body of insurgent forces.

The Army’s Civilian Irregular Defense group (CIDG) was a program described as “straight out of classical counterinsurgency doctrine” (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 70). The program directly focused on creating a self-reliant populace that could provide for their own defense as well as conduct local patrols to destroy the VC. Krepinevich (1986) states,

The Green Berets worked hand in hand with the people to fortify their village; they constructed shelters, and an early warning system and closely regulated the movement of people in and out of the area. A dispensary was built, and local volunteers were armed and trained to help protect the village from attack by guerrillas. A small group of men from the village were designated as a ‘strike force.’ (p. 70).

The strike force described by Krepinevich served as a permanent military force that served as a quick reaction force for other villages in the area, as well as patrolling and setting ambushes and training the defense forces of other villages. Village defenders were issued only small arms and a tactical radio of limited range to alert the response force and prevent the capture of military arms and equipment by the VC. Krepinevich (1986) states, “Once a cluster of villages had been prepared and defended, the perimeter, the Special Forces pushed the perimeter further out, embracing more villages in a slowly expanding ‘oil spot’” (p. 70). The program proved highly effective by employing indigenous people on territory with which they were familiar. However, on 15 August 1963, Lieutenant General Barksdale Hamlett, deputy chief of staff for operations instructed MACV that “We prefer to see Special Forces personnel used in conjunction with active and offensive operations, as opposed to support of static training activities,”

thus condemning the CIDG program to failure. (as cited in Nagl, 2002, p. 129). The return of the program from the CIA to the Army --dubbed Operation SWITCHBACK-- integrated the strike force with regular ARVN units, using it as a mobile strike forces away from their home ground, while the Special Forces were moved to more offensive operations and replaced with the less effective Vietnamese Special Forces. The net effect of this move was the alienation of the population and the eventual collapse of the program.

b. Conversion Mechanism Destruction

Leites and Wolf describe this stage of counterinsurgency in terms of tactics and techniques aimed at the reduction of the insurgents' production efficiency. Several techniques were applied to the situation in Vietnam with varying degrees of success; however, the overall focus remained on the counterforce aspect of the campaign. Operation GOLDEN FLEECE remains the most effective strategy applied to combat the production efficiency of VC units in this aspect of the U.S. military's counterinsurgency efforts. The operation focused on denying VC access to the peasants' crops and the revenue generated by their taxation, thereby forcing the VC to devote additional resources to producing food and generating funds to resource their operations.

In addition to Operation GOLDEN FLEECE, the military conducted Operation RANCH HAND, to deny the enemy access to the population's food supply and his use of the dense jungle foliage for cover and concealment. The operation consisted of the aerial spraying of a defoliant known as Agent Orange. While the Army viewed this program as successful in "denying the enemy local supplies of food" it had the adverse effect of alienating the populace its was implemented to protect, and will be detailed further in the section on ineffective tactics. (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 211). One of the most efficient ways to reduce the efficiency of the insurgents' productive capability is to target their infrastructure. However, to target the insurgents' infrastructure, government forces must be able to separate the members of the guerrilla movement from the populace. This cannot be achieved without the cooperation of the population in the identification of the guerrilla agents and sympathizers. The population will not provide this information while under the influence of the insurgent members. In order to gain this intelligence it is

necessary for the government forces to ensure the safety and security of the population from the influence and retribution of the insurgent forces. The best method to achieve this is through clear and *hold* operations such as the Marine CAP or the Army's CIDG program. However, this sense of security cannot be attained using search and clear operations in which the forces depart the area following the engagement of members of the guerrilla movement. Therefore, the Army, following the search and clear paradigm, was unable to isolate the insurgent infrastructure and reduce its productive capacity.

The traditional counterinsurgency role of combating the insurgent infrastructure belongs to the local police. Their familiarity with the populace and regional expertise lend themselves to the identification and separation of the insurgent agents and sympathizers from the populace. Additionally, the police provide security from insurgent coercion and reprisal thereby facilitating a greater degree of cooperation and intelligence from the populace. However, the national police in Vietnam proved both corrupt and ineffective. The police force faced several shortcomings that impaired its effectiveness. The police received little support or cooperation from the military, due to the belief of military commanders that the defeat of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) was a police problem. The police units were given a low priority for men and materiel, and their pay was low, hampering their ability to recruit quality men. Additionally, Krepinevich (1986) concludes, "Pervasive corruption of the police force, resulted in the GVN's failure to root out the insurgent's infrastructure." (p. 228). The failure of the police force to eliminate the VCI coupled with the Government of Vietnam's (GVN's) lack of focus on its internal problems facilitated the growth of the Viet Cong organization and eventually led to the political victory of the VC over South Vietnam.

c. Counterforce

Both the U.S. and South Vietnamese military focus on the attrition of Viet Cong forces through a policy of large-unit search and destroy operations augmented by overwhelming firepower proved highly ineffective in impairing the operating capability of the Viet Cong. The inability of both the U.S. military and the ARVN to secure the initiative from the Viet Cong was a direct consequence of the lack of focus by both forces on the population as a source of vital intelligence on the location and operations of the

Viet Cong. The use of artillery and other heavy weapons to saturate an area prior to conducting ground assaults eliminated any vestige of surprise enabling the Viet Cong to escape any follow up operations. However, several small programs such as the Marine CAP and the Army's CIDG program demonstrated a great deal of success in conducting counterforce operations. In both cases, small units conducted nighttime systematic patrolling and ambushes to counter VC patrols near the areas they had secured. Both programs demonstrated great deal of success: the CIDG forces had an almost unbroken record of success against the VC and the only one CAP settlement was ever overrun. (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 175).

d. Strengthening the State

Leites and Wolf (1970) contend, "The basic requirement for increasing the absorbtive capacity for R's [the insurgents'] output is to strengthen A [the state] itself: its capacity to be informed, undertake programs, control, protect, punish, and act and react vigorously, quickly, and intelligently." (p.83). The U.S. military and the GVN implemented several techniques aimed at increasing the ability of the state to absorb the insurgents' actions; however, none of these techniques met with much success due to poor execution and corruption within the Diem regime. While resettlement programs such as the strategic hamlet program represent a fundamental aspect of strengthening the state, the complete failure of the program in Vietnam will relegate its discussion to the section devoted to counterinsurgency programs that failed.

Another key aspect of strengthening the state is the ability of the government forces to collect intelligence. Intelligence is the essential element that allows the state to locate and assume the initiative over the insurgents. Intelligence collection is fundamentally linked to the security of the population. The lack of focus on the security and control of the population by both the U.S. military and the ARVN impeded the exploitation of a vital resource for the gathering of crucial intelligence. Additionally, the short tour lengths of U.S. military personnel combined with a lack of cultural familiarity stemming from cultural hubris, and a lack of focus on counterinsurgency in favor of locating conventional main enemy units, resulted in a lack of operational intelligence that enabled the Viet Cong to maintain the initiative. As was seen in the Malayan Emergency,

police units can serve as an excellent source of intelligence gathering due to their regional expertise and familiarity with the population. However, police were only stationed in towns with a population greater than 15,000 (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 25). The lack of adequate police in Vietnam served as a detriment to both physical security and intelligence collection. In addition to the role of the police, paramilitary groups function as an essential component of traditional counterinsurgency efforts.

Paramilitary groups serve as an economy of force measure by freeing the military to conduct other operations in support of the counterinsurgency effort. However, both paramilitary initiatives conducted by the GVN, the Civil Guard (CG) and the Self Defense Corps (SDC), “were poorly trained and equipped, miserably led, and incapable of coping with insurgents; they could scarcely defend themselves, much less the peasantry. Indeed, they proved to be an asset to the insurgents in two respects: they served as a source of weapons; and their brutality, petty thievery, and disorderliness induced innumerable villagers to join in open revolt against the GVN.” (as cited in Nagl, 2002, p. 121). The final aspects of the Vietnamese counterinsurgency effort of strengthening the state that will be analyzed are political and social reform. Diem’s corruption and overt bias towards his fellow Catholics led to his predisposition and nepotism in political appointments, unfair land distribution, and interference in the traditional leadership of rural Vietnamese villages. Diem had passed a land reform ordinance in 1956; however, by 1962 less than one third of the rural populace had benefited from these reforms. (Higgins, 2001, p. 68). Diem’s corruption resulted in the alienation and resentment of the rural populace, facilitating the influence and recruitment of the rural Vietnamese population by the Viet Cong. Additionally, actions such as defoliation efforts and friendly fire incidents by the U.S. military served to further strengthen the bonds between the VC and the population. Inevitably, the instability and corruption of the GVN combined with inflammatory actions of both the U.S. military and the GVN resulted in a political victory for Viet Cong among the rural populace of South Vietnam.

e. Failures

This section will highlight three failed programs that were intended to satisfy an aspect of the counterinsurgency effort. Despite this intent, each of these

programs proved ineffective due to poor implementation, corruption, or an inaccurate focus. While these programs in no way account for the entire failure of the Vietnam campaign, they do represent crucial elements in the overall inability of the United States and the GVN to defeat the Viet Cong. The resettlement program began in early 1962 under the name Operation *SUNRISE*. Diem implemented this program on the advice of Sir Robert Thompson who served as the Minister of Defense in Malaya following the close of the emergency. The program paralleled the concept employed successfully by the British during the Malayan Emergency; however, despite the foundation of success created by the Malayan model, the Vietnamese program would soon fail. The failure of the program is attributable to four main issues: the infiltration of the program by Viet Cong, the inappropriate placement of the new hamlets, the corruption and lack of unity of effort in the leadership of the program, and the failure to account for the peasants' ancestral ties to the land. The infiltration of the hamlets by Viet Cong insurgents was facilitated by the unpreparedness of the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps and the failure to complete the physical security measures and much of the construction of the hamlets prior to their occupation. These shortfalls combined with the lack of a supplemental ID card program and inadequate entry and exit controls allowed the insurgents to infiltrate the settlements and regain their influence and control over the population. The corruption and lack of unity of effort fostered by Diem's brother Nhu in his leadership of the program alienated the population by withholding money that was promised as an incentive to resettle and violated the oil spot principle by creating new hamlets in a random manner in highly VC infested areas. Major James Higgins (2001) in, *The Misapplication of the Malayan Counterinsurgency Model to the Strategic Hamlet Program*, states,

Bureaucrats not only generated false statistics and reports, they overlooked significant sources of peasant discontent that were undermining the program's legitimacy. Many peasants were not paid for this labor in the construction of the strategic hamlets. Also, Diem's government allocated 1,000-2,000 piasters for relocated peasants to build a new home when the actual cost was approximately 20,000 piasters. In many cases, local officials withheld this money. They did so either for their own profit or to pay the money in installments, as a means of encouraging the peasants to stay in the new hamlet. (p. 75)

Additionally, Nhu believed that maintaining the momentum of the program was more important than the details of its implementation. Slipshod construction left many hamlets unprepared and many physical security measures unfinished prior to the resettlement. Despite the recommendations of British advisor Sir Robert Thompson, the program began in a heavily VC-infested area north of Saigon that was close to their primary base areas (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 67). Additionally, many hamlets were constructed in a random manner that was inconsistent with the “oil spot” principle limiting the ability to capitalize on the few successes of the program. Finally, the lack of concern given to the peasants’ ties to the land where their ancestors were buried generated further resentment over the forced resettlement. Despite the administrative and operational problems involved in the program, forced resettlement remains an extreme measure that requires advanced planning and unity of effort to ensure the security of the population from the influence of then insurgent forces. In this respect the strategic hamlet program failed, compounding the resentment of the populace towards the GVN.

The U.S. conventional military effort of input denial focused upon the prevention of the movement of men and materiel from the North along the Ho Chi Minh trail while ignoring the use of the population as a source of recruiting and supply by the insurgents operating in the South. Several operations were conducted to interdict this flow of resources. Operation BARREL ROLL consisted of armed reconnaissance of the Ho Chi Minh trail inside of Laos and the Special Forces base at Khe San was established to interdict the flow of resources down the trail. Despite these efforts, the flow of men and materiel continued to supply the insurgents from both within South Vietnam as well as from without. Bomb damage was repaired overnight by female work crews and despite the existence of the base at Khe San over 35,000 North Vietnamese soldiers would infiltrate into the South by the end of 1965 (The Vietnam War, 2003). Both U.S. and GVN efforts in this respect would prove futile, as supplies from the North continued to flow the links between the VC and the population continued to flourish.

The defoliation program, dubbed Operation RANCH HAND, began in 1962 with the dual purpose of strengthening the state by denying the VC cover and concealment, and input denial by preventing the VC from gaining access to the rural

population's crops. The program resulted in the alienation and resentment of the rural populace due to the drifting of the defoliants over Vietnamese farmlands. A RAND Corporation report noted, "the civilian population seems to carry very nearly the full burden of the results of the crop destruction program; it is estimated that over 500 civilians experience crop loss for every ton of rice denied the VC." (as cited in Krepinevich, 1986, p. 212). Additionally, in a report by a South Vietnamese official, the rural population's grievances were met with an ultimatum by U.S. and GVN forces, "The attitude of some of our local officials was not calculated to win the hearts and minds of the people. Some of them would tell their people that if they wanted to be spared the effects of defoliation, they either had to rid themselves of the enemy, or had to leave their homes to settle in government controlled areas. How could these people chase the enemy from their areas?" (as cited in Krepinevich, 1986, p. 213). Despite the adverse affects of the program on the population and its limited effects on the insurgents, U.S. military leadership continued the program until 1970.

The majority of programs implemented in Vietnam failed due to a lack of focus on the population as the source of insurgent strength. Instead, U.S. leadership focused on the Jominian aim of attrition in the destruction of enemy forces. The lack of focus on the population denied the military access to a vital source of intelligence that would have facilitated the seizure of the initiative from the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong, by retaining the initiative, was able to dictate the time and place of their engagements with U.S. and ARVN forces, enabling them to lure military forces away from the populace, leaving the people susceptible to VC influence. The VC's undisputed access to the population enabled them to win a political victory against a military opponent; thus winning the war.

f. Findings

The programs that focused on the population and its protection from insurgent influence through the cohabitation of troops with the populace, that utilized the populace as a form of paramilitary, exploiting their regional knowledge and expertise, and focused on active aggressive defense using small-unit systematic patrolling and ambushes produced the best results. Programs such as the Marine CAPs and the Army's CIDG have unlimited transferability due to their flexibility in implementation and the

production of security and rapport with the civilian populace; thus, facilitating the separation of the insurgents and the gathering of intelligence. However, these programs require integration into a larger strategy that capitalizes upon success in following with the “oil spot” principle. Despite the grand concept of pacification and the emphasis on counterinsurgency pushed by the Kennedy Administration, the U.S. military refused to explore counterinsurgency as a valid strategy. Instead their conceptual hubris in the superiority of American technological and military might resulted in a cognitive dissonance that prevented U.S. leadership from perceiving the inefficacy of their strategy of attrition, costing the United States the war.

C. THE PHILIPPINES

The Hukbalahap Insurrection was selected as a case study because it emphasizes the role of military, social, political, and economic reforms in a successful counterinsurgency strategy. The case demonstrates the primacy of civil action over military offensive power in the ability to win the loyalty and support of the population. In addition, this case provides an excellent example of these reforms under a unified effort could reverse the damage incurred by policies that had taken the country to the brink of collapse. The Philippine case represents another example of a textbook counterinsurgency in which the tactics and techniques applied have potential transferability to the situation in Afghanistan. The Huk insurrection has its foundations in the economic, social, and political disparity and anti-colonial sentiment that existed since the time of the Spanish colonial rule in the late 1500’s. Conditions of social and political inequity based on near-feudal landlord-tenant relationships resulted in several peasant uprisings that persisted through the Spanish-American War.

Following the United States’ annexation of the Philippines, social grievances persisted despite U.S. attempts at alleviation through land reform. Widespread corruption within the Filipino government prevented the equitable distribution of land and served only to increase the holdings of the wealthy few and further aggravate an already tense social situation. In response to worsening social and economic conditions, Crisanto Evangelista and several other Filipino socialists formed the National Peasant’s Union (KPMP) in Nueva Ecija Province in May of 1924 (Greenberg, 1987 sect. 8). The

movement gained widespread support and utilized this momentum to infiltrate several labor unions and gain control of the Philippine Labor Congress. On 26 August 1930, Evangelista formed the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP) and established five guiding principles for the movement: to mobilize for complete national independence; to establish communism for the masses; to defend the masses against capitalist exploitation; to overthrow American imperialism in the Philippines; and to overthrow capitalism (Ibid, sect. 9).

In August of 1932, the Philippine Supreme Court ruled the PKP to be an illegal organization and charged its leaders with instigating several riots in the Philippine capital of Manila (Ibid, sect. 9). Evangelista and several of his lieutenants were arrested, driving the remainder of the PKP underground. The movement continued to fight for peasants' rights by implementing a strategy of terrorism against landlords in the Luzon Province. This campaign of terrorism spurred the government to adopt several minor land reform initiatives that limited the amount of harvest a landlord could demand from his tenants. However, these reforms proved to be token gestures of appeasement that were largely ignored by both the landlords and the government itself.

In 1934, the United States sought to address the issue of Filipinos independence with the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act. The act promised to grant the Philippines full independence by 4 July 1946 and established the Philippine Commonwealth that would govern the islands until that date (Ibid, sect. 5). Despite this initiative, violent communist-sponsored demonstrations continued in Manila, spurring President Quezon in 1938 to release the PKP leadership. Three members of the PKP leadership, Evangelista, Taruc, and de Los Reyes, were released on the condition that they pledge their loyalty to the Philippine government. However, upon their release, Evangelista merged the Philippine Socialist Party and the PKP to form the PKP coalition and continued to spread the communist doctrine (Ibid, sect. 10).

The Japanese invaded the Philippines in December of 1941 resulting in a temporary truce between Evangelista and President Quezon. During this time Evangelista offered the support of the PKP to defend the island against the invaders, however, Quezon's distrust of Evangelista and his organization resulted in the refusal of

the offer. Following Quezon's rejection, Evangelista and his followers fled to the mountains of Luzon and established a base of operations on Mount Arayat. Evangelista sought to build a nationalist force to oppose the Japanese occupation. From Mount Arayat, he and his followers launched numerous harassing attacks against the Japanese and succeeded in gaining arms, ammunition, and followers for his movement. Harsh and brutal reprisals by the Japanese secret police on the peasantry of Luzon resulted in driving many of the Filipino peasants to Evangelista's movement. On 29 March 1942, during a meeting of regional resistance groups, Evangelista united the remaining Filipino socialist groups with the PKP to form the Hukabalahap or Anti-Japanese Army (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 79). Luis Taruc, a CCP leader, was chosen to be the first Huk Commander (Ibid, p. 80).

The Huks relied upon ambushes of Japanese patrols, police deserters, and battlefields to gain vital arms and ammunition. In addition to difficulties in arming his forces, Taruc was confronted with a lagging source of recruits. The Huks faced direct competition with the U.S. Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) guerrilla units that capitalized on the same popular discontent with Japanese treatment to procure additional forces in the Luzon Province. In May of 1942, Huk representatives contacted USAFFE forces to negotiate for arms and equipment from the USAFFE forces (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 17). The negotiations failed due to the USAFFE representatives' inability to subordinate the members of the Huk movement to the control of USAFFE leadership. During the latter part of 1942 and early 1943, the Japanese launched two major anti-Huk offensives in the area surrounding Mount Arayat. While the second assault resulted in the capture of 100 Huk prisoners and several members of the Headquarters staff, the Huk organization continued to grow, relying upon recruits from the local villages subjected to harsh treatment by the Japanese in their search for Huk supporters (Ibid, sect. 20). By March of 1943, the Huk movement had over 10,000 active supporters (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 87).

In addition to anti-Japanese operations, Taruc developed two key pieces of infrastructure that facilitated the growth and development of the Huk movement. "Stalin University" was created with the assistance of Red Chinese instructors on the slopes of the Sierra Madres Mountains as a crucial conversion mechanism to facilitate the training

and indoctrination of newly acquired forces (Lansdale, 1972, p. 7). Perhaps the most crucial element of infrastructure generated by the Huk movement was the creation of the paramilitary Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC). The BUDC served a variety of purposes to aid the Huks in recruitment, intelligence, and logistics. The Huks formed the BUDCs under the auspices of protecting the population, providing law and order, fostering anti-Japanese sentiment, and denying the Japanese access to food and supplies, but the movement served the much larger purpose of winning the support of the population to the Huk cause (Greenberg, 1987, sects. 21-22). The BUDCs gained the support of the population through civil action programs designed to improve the life of the local villager. Programs such as education, sanitation, agriculture, and security directly addressed the local and immediate concerns of the populace, while the Huk indoctrination program and elections of local leaders ensured the population's continued support. The program's establishment of a parallel government and firm foothold in the popular base legitimized the Huk movement and solidified their influence over the population, which would prove later to be a large impediment to Philippine efforts to purge the islands of the Huk influence.

Following the U.S. invasion of the Philippines in October of 1944, the Huks began to intensify their efforts to secure the countryside in the wake of the Japanese retreat. Huk units reoccupied towns, declaring liberation, filling the political vacuum in the hope of attaining post-war dominance in the independent Philippine government promised under the Tydings-McDuffie Act. In April of 1945, Taruc and the Huks joined the PKP to form the Democratic Alliance in the hope of creating a legitimate political party to exploit their popular support in the post-war government (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 27). However, enmity and distrust fostered by conflicts with the USAFFE during the Japanese occupation prevented the legitimization of the Huk movement due to opposition by General MacArthur and the new Philippine government.

Following the war, the Philippines were devastated. The economy had collapsed, unemployment was rampant, food production was at a standstill, and the export industry had buckled under the intense wartime pressures. President Quezon had died in exile in the United States in October 1944 and was replaced by Sergio Osmena. Osmena, who had served as Quezon's vice-president, assumed control of the Philippine Commonwealth

on 27 February 1945 (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 28). To offset many of the post-war hardships faced by the Filipinos, the United States passed several acts of legislation aimed at relieving some of the economic burden on the Philippines. In October, the Tydings bill gave \$520 million in emergency economic aid to the Philippines and established several programs aimed at the economic recovery of the post-war islands (Ibid, sect. 29). Within a year over 200 million tons of food and aid had been shipped to Manila to relieve the shortages caused by the collapse of Philippine agriculture production (Ibid, sect. 32). In addition, the United States donated military equipment and heavy machinery to speed the recovery and stabilization of the Philippines. However, much of this aid fell prey to black marketeering and governmental corruption once it reached the Philippine shores.

Following liberation from the Japanese, MacArthur ordered the Huks disbanded and dispersed, denying them both official recognition and veteran's benefits. The U.S. forces regarded the Huks as nothing more than armed civilians. In mid-February 1946, U.S. troops arrested Taruc, Alejandro, and several other members of the Huk headquarters, generating a wave of resentment among the populace who viewed the Huks as national liberators (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 33). Following several mass demonstrations in central Luzon, U.S. and Philippine government officials released both Taruc and Alejandro, hoping that they would convince the Huks to surrender their arms. However, upon their release, Taruc resumed the leadership of the Huks vowing to continue his fight against the government and the United States. In April, Taruc was arrested, again, shortly after his initial release (Ibid, sect. 33).

The restoration of control by the Philippine government was further impeded by the administrative structures and local governments set up by the Huk BUDCs during the Japanese occupation. Huk elected officials and administrative structures had become legitimized over time due to their efficient operation in comparison to the corrupt and inefficient administration of the central government. President Osmena declared these local governments invalid and replaced them with his own appointees. Both the Philippine and U.S. governments had failed to perceive the Huks and their popular base of support as a legitimate threat to stability and control in the Philippines. The perception of the Huks as a common group of bandits severely underestimated the capability of the

movement given the trying social and economic conditions prevalent in the Philippines at that time. Little was done to address the concerns of the people while government forces continued to employ their repressive tactics, serving to strengthen the influence and hold over the population by the Huks.

In 1946, the U.S. Congress passed two resolutions that further damaged U.S.-Philippine relations and added additional momentum to the Huk's political cause. In February, Congress passed legislation initially denying the Filipino military veteran's benefits (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 35). In addition the Philippine Trade Act of 1946, designed to aid in the Philippine economic recovery, froze pre-war economic trading patterns, fixed the Philippine peso to the U.S. dollar, and instituted a 28 year extension for duty-free trade between the U.S. and the Philippines, giving the U.S. hegemony over the country (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 35). The Huks capitalized on the popular perception of U.S. neo-colonialism to further organize support for their movement, and following several large uprisings in Manila, secured the release of Taruc and Alejandro (Ibid, sect. 38). Taruc resumed command of military operations while Jose Lava managed the political campaign in preparation for the upcoming elections.

On 4 July 1946, the United States granted the Philippines its independence, establishing the Republic of the Philippines. Within four months of independence, the Philippines held their first election. Taruc and Alejandro were released from prison in September and had formed the Democratic Alliance to capitalize on the Huk movement's popular support in the upcoming elections. The ruling Philippine Nationalist Party was split between two contenders: President Osmena and Manuel Roxas. The chief difference between the two candidates was the issue of how to handle the Huks. Osmena favored negotiation while Roxas sought extermination, vowing to eliminate the Huks within sixty days if elected (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 189). Adding to the controversy was Roxas' past collaboration with the Japanese occupation forces. Roxas had been imprisoned by the U.S. military for collaboration with the Japanese following their retreat from the Philippines (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 38). Although he was released by President Osmena and General MacArthur based on evidence that he only collaborated to minimize the violence directed against the Filipinos, the stigma of collaboration still remained and was heavily exploited by Huk propagandists. Osmena secured the presidential

nomination for the Nationalist Party, prompting Roxas to form the Liberal Party, which nominated him as their presidential candidate. Fearing that a three-way split for the presidency would result in a victory for Roxas, the Huks decided to back Osmena. The elections of 1946 were marred by campaigns of terror and intimidation between the supporters of Roxas and those of the Huk that trapped the peasantry in between. Despite the opposition of the Huks, Roxas won the election, and in early 1947 he set about to fulfill his promise of eliminating the Huks. In spite of the U.S. and Philippine governments' categorization of the Huks as mere organized bandits, the Democratic Alliance won six seats in the Philippine legislature, including one seat that was to be held by Taruc (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 150).

Roxas' first move against the Huks was to deny them their seats in the Congress (Ibid, p. 150). This move was quickly followed by a nationwide campaign to eliminate all Huks and their supporters referred to by Roxas as his "mailed fist" policy. Roxas dispatched the Philippine Military Police Command and the local paramilitary Civil Guards to sweep the countryside in search of the Huks. The sweeps resulted in the mass alienation of the populace as government forces employed terror and intimidation to gain the information and supplies they needed to pursue their mission. In a letter from the National Peasant's Union (PKM) to President Roxas, the PKM stated, "In two months alone, MPs and civilian guards had killed over five hundred peasants and peasant leaders. Three times that number had been imprisoned, tortured, or were missing." (as cited in Kirkvliet, 1987, p. 151). In addition, the Civil Guards, who were more loyal to the local municipality and landowners than the government were described as "local gangsters, goons, people of bad reputations" who used their position to "take out personal grudges against innocent people by pointing them out as HMB or HMB sympathizers whether they were or not... using terror tactics which local PC could not stop even if they had wanted to." (As cited in Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 196). Taruc capitalized on these oppressive techniques and issues such as agrarian reform, governmental reform, and self-defense (against government forces) to gain the support of the populace for the Huk movement. However, Greenberg (1987) suggests that the central issue to most Filipinos was that of land tenure, "The one overriding factor that seemed to be central for Huk supporters and converts was the issue of land tenure. They wanted to own the land they had worked for

generations.” However, Luis Taruc stated, “Land redistribution and ending tenancy were not central for most people [in the rebellion]. People just wanted small changes—a bigger share of the crop so they and their families could live easier.” (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 171). Taruc’s statement highlights a fundamental truth concerning the population in an insurgency—that many social grievances stem from local and immediate concerns and must be addressed by the government at that level to build a popular base of support, thereby defeating the insurgents locally before they can be attacked as a movement

During the first half of 1946, the Huks continued operations against government forces, winning several engagements against the Philippine military and capturing the town of Nueva Ecija. With each victory against the oppressive government forces, the Huk movement gained momentum with the populace as government forces, unable to locate the Huks, took out their frustrations on the population. In June of 1946 during an HMB meeting in Candaba, Pampanga, Taruc decided to focus on the defensive rather than on an offensive and proactive strategy, “We decided that if assaults on the people continued we would reassemble on a purely defensive basis, avoid encounters and fight only when cornered and attacked, or when the people were being persecuted to the point where they would ask protection from the squadrons.” (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 172).

Following the brief period of inactivity by the Huks, President Roxas declared the situation solved in January of 1947. Roxas’ declaration was met by a resurgence in Huk activity. In response to a successful Huk raid on the military garrison at Laur, Nueva Ecija, Roxas ordered the military to conduct an assault on the Huk stronghold at Mount Arayat. Operation ARAYAT involved two thousand government forces and lasted two weeks, but resulted in the capture of only twenty-one Huks and a small amount of weapons and supplies (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 58). The majority of the Huks had escaped due to the extensive Huk intelligence network that had permeated the military and government forces. In mid 1947, Taruc laid out his five “minimum terms for peace” during an interview with a journalist. He demanded immediate enforcement of the bill of rights; amnesty for all actions occurring in the last five months and the release all political prisoners; replacement of “fascist-minded” police and government officials in central Luzon; restoration of the six Democratic Alliance congressmen elected in 1946; and institution of President Roxas’ land reform program beginning with the 70-30 crop

distribution law leading toward the eventual abolition of land tenancy. (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 171). Taruc established these conditions as part of his political offensive of which HMB operations served as “a military defense in order to protect ourselves while doing political organizing.” (Ibid, p. 172).

In November of 1947, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Joint United States Military Assistance Group-Philippines (JUSMAG) to oversee its military assistance programs and promote Philippine development as a subordinate element under the control of the Commander-in Chief Far East (CINCFE) (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 98). JUSMAG would later play a pivotal role in assisting the reform and reconstruction of the Philippine government.

In April of 1948, Roxas died unexpectedly of a heart attack (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 59). Upon assumption of the office of President, Roxas’ replacement, Elpidio Quirino, declared a temporary truce with the Huks to facilitate negotiations for the surrender of Huk weapons (Ibid, sect. 60). The negotiations collapsed in August after numerous violations of the cease-fire by both sides. Throughout 1948, tensions had been building between the political wing (Politburo) of the Huk movement led by Jose Lava and the military wing led by Taruc. Lava sought to pursue the Russian model of class struggle by focusing on urban areas to incite a class struggle resulting in a communist overthrow of the government. Taruc sought the Maoist approach by expanding the rural base of the insurrection throughout the countryside in a protracted war. While this rift in the movement did not produce fission, it did influence the effectiveness of operations. In November 1948, Taruc renamed his forces the People’s Liberation Army (HMB) and began a new series of raids on government forces (Ibid, sect. 61).

In April of 1949, the Huk commander Alexander Viernes, using information gained through a captured government radio, set an ambush for the wife of former President Quezon, Senora Aurora Quezon (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 61). While the ambush succeeded in killing Senora Quezon, her daughter, and several government officials, it was one of the greatest mistakes made by the Huks in their campaign to win the support of the population. Filipinos had viewed both President Quezon and his wife as symbols

of Philippine nationalism and resistance. While Taruc claimed that the operation had been conducted without HMB approval, the damage to the popular support of the Huks had been done (Ibid, sects. 61-62).

In 1949, general elections were held for the office of the president. Jose Laurel, who had served as president under the Japanese occupation represented the Nationalist Party while President Quirino maintained the nomination from the Liberal Party. The 1949 elections were, again, fraught with violence, electoral fraud, and corruption. Filipino villager Tomas Basa recalls the elections as “the most vicious campaign I can remember. It was so bloody. Quirino’s men would even kill people who had only spoken against him or in favor of Laurel.” (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 205). During the election, both sides conducted voter fraud and ballot stuffing, however, in the end Quirino emerged victorious. The Huks exploited the violence and fraud surrounding the election to further de legitimize the new administration under Quirino. Perceiving the widespread dissatisfaction with the government in the populace, Jose Lava, leader of the Philippine Communist Party (PKP) declared a “revolution situation” and decided to advance the timetable for the overthrow of the Philippine government stating, “Our military strategic offensive must be relatively short and speedily victorious. It must in other words, have an insurrectionary character.” (Ibid, pp. 219-220). Numerous internal conflicts stemming from the PKP’s perception of the HMB as “too undisciplined” and “untrained in military and political matters” resulting from incidents of criminal exploitation of the populace by the HMB had deepened the rift between the PKP and the HMB. Further, ideological divides between the two organizations regarding the Marxist-Leninist class struggle goals of the PKP and the Maoist insurgency strategy pursued by Taruc and the HMB generated further tension. Despite interorganizational differences, the HMB increased their attacks on the Filipino military and infrastructure. Raids, ambushes, murders, and kidnappings increased throughout the Philippines, sparking a military response from Quirino. President Quirino ordered the military and the Police Constabulary not to return to garrison until they had killed or captured all the Huks responsible for the assassination of Senora Quezon (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 61). By the close of the operation, government forces had captured two Huk camps (to include Stalin University); killed 146 Huks, including Viernes; and destroyed an entire regional command (Ibid, sect.74). Despite

this victory, subsequent military operations returned to the ineffective sweeps that produced the alienation and resentment of the population.

In April of 1950, government oppression continued as army forces massacred 100 men, women, and children in Bacalor in retaliation for the death of one of their officers (Ibid, sect. 75). Later that month government violence continued as fifty farmers in Laguna were summarily executed as suspected Huks (Ibid, sect. 75). Government corruption and violence were rampant. Soldiers utilized checkpoints to extort money from travelers and coercion and torture to obtain information and supplies from the populace. The Philippine military and police constabulary lacked both direction and purpose as part of an overall strategy. Their continued use of violence had driven the population to the Huks, weakening the very state they were entrusted to defend.

In April of 1950 Ramon Magsaysay, Chairman of the Philippine Armed Forces Committee, journeyed to Washington D.C. to seek emergency financial aid for the Philippine government. Magsaysay's trip secured \$10 million to pay the Philippine military and fund a reward for information program to defeat the insurgency (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 80). It was during this trip that Magsaysay met Air Force LTC Edward Lansdale, who later became Magsaysay's personal advisor under JUSMAG. Upon his return in September of 1950, Magsaysay was appointed as the new Secretary of Philippine National Defense (Ibid, sect. 81). Magsaysay conducted sweeping reforms of the Philippine military and Police Constabulary that altered the course of the insurgency through the reunion of the populace with the government. Magsaysay sought to utilize the military and the police as vital instruments in his plan of civic action and reform.

His first move was to remove the ineffective leadership of both the military Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Police Constabulary as well as eliminate those implicated in graft and corruption. Magsaysay would frequently venture into the field to conduct spot inspections of government forces. His forays enabled him to form a bond with the men of the military and the police as well as with the populace. Within his first twenty days, Magsaysay increased the average soldier's pay from 30 centavos to a full peso enabling him to purchase rather than steal his meal from the local peasants (Ibid, sect. 84). In addition, Magsaysay equipped each patrol leader with a camera to document enemy

casualties enabling the government to accurately track the identities and verify the combat statistics involved with each military operation (Ibid, sect. 84). Magsaysay eliminated the military oppression of the populace through a bold move that empowered the population to report corruption and abuse directly to his staff. In addition, Army JAG officers were appointed to civilians free of charge to address legal issues between peasants and landlords. Magsaysay also changed the manner in which the military operated. He aligned the Police Constabulary under the military for the duration of the Huk conflict and instructed them that their role was to protect and assist the populace.

In late December, Magsaysay reorganized the army into four regional Military Area Commands (MAC), placing a Battalion Combat Team (BCT) in each region (Cable, 1986, p. 54). Magsaysay formed the BCTs to “gain public trust and cooperation, engage in defensive operations to protect the population against acts of terror or raids, generate exploitable combat information for limited offensive operations and encourage the development of local self-defense volunteer formations.” (Ibid, p. 55). In addition, Civil Affairs officers who were experienced in psychological operations were attached to the BCTs to reverse the previous perception of government oppression. Military operations were supplemented by medical, engineering, and transportation projects to reinforce the perception of change. Magsaysay’s efforts worked to restore the link between the government and the populace through security and civic action to free the populace from the influence of the insurgents and demonstrate the capability of the government to better their lives. While these programs targeted the population, Magsaysay implemented others that targeted the membership of the insurgent movement.

In October of 1950, in response to information received by Philippine Army Intelligence, government officials launched a series of raids against Politburo members in Manila. The Huks retaliated by launching a campaign of violence that culminated in the massacre of the entire population of the town of Agalo despite the absence of or affiliation with government troops (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 128). The massacre resulted in widespread discontent throughout Luzon, diminishing the Huk hold over the population.

In December 1950, Magsaysay began the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) as a means to introduce economic stability and induce surrender in the Huk movement. The program targeted “soft-core” Huks who surrendered or were captured and were not wanted for criminal activities. The program resettled the former Huks, awarded them title to a parcel of land, educated them on how to farm, and indoctrinated them to become productive members of society. Further, the program provided those resettled with free transportation, schooling, medical care, electricity, and water and provided avenues for the purchase of seed and fertilizer on credit from EDCOR under Magsaysay’s supervision (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 89). As a final condition, peasants signed an agreement to repay the government for the start-up costs and promised not to sell or sub-divide the land thereby avoiding the land tenancy issue. The program was a major success and by November 1951 had to be expanded to include a second EDCOR site (Ibid, sect. 90). The EDCOR program robbed the Huk insurgency of its primary ideological cause by addressing their promise of “Land for the Landless.” Magsaysay’s reforms continued to rebuild the bond between the government and the populace through social action programs designed to eliminate the perception of corruption and inefficacy of the government. In the zero sum game of political control, as the government regained its image of legitimacy, the Huks gradually lost their hold over the populace, thereby reducing their ability to operate, and signaling their inevitable demise.

In 1949, Magsaysay had promised the Filipino population an honest election and in November 1951, he held true to his word. Magsaysay utilized the Army reserve and ROTC cadets to ensure the safety and orderliness of the polls while JUSMAG assigned 25 of its officers as poll watchers to eliminate voter fraud and intimidation. Magsaysay’s efforts resulted in an orderly election in which four million Filipinos voted (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 131). Magsaysay’s success in both his efforts against the Huks and the ability to produce an orderly election had began the restoration of public confidence in the government as well as bolstered their perception of the ability of Magsaysay to effectively lead the Philippines.

From early spring into the fall of 1952, government forces conducted offensive operations against Huk units resulting in the capture of a Huk regional command. The success of AFP operations in 1952 prompted the Huks to call for a truce prior to

Christmas. The truce broke down shortly after New Year's Day, but the Huks had gained a vital tactical pause, which they exploited to recover from the continuous advance of successful government operations.

In February of 1953, Magsaysay resigned his position as Secretary of Defense and began preparation for his Presidential campaign. His platform addressed the issues pertinent to the people –corruption, neglect, poverty, and land reform. Magsaysay visited over 1,100 barrios, taking his message to the people and on 10 November, he was elected president over the incumbent Quirino by the largest margin in Philippine history (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 137). Magsaysay instituted numerous reforms in the in the latter part of 1953 and early 1954. His administration distributed a quarter of a million hectares of public land to over 3,000 farmers, 400 kilometers of new road were constructed while over 500 kilometers of old road were repaired (Ibid, sect, 138). The Philippine Congress passed the Elementary Education Act of 1953 providing for seven years of free, but compulsory education. In addition, the Liberty Wells Association dug wells in villages throughout Luzon (Ibid, sect. 138). Magsaysay's civic action programs and reforms had addressed the needs of the population eliminating the political influence of the Huks over the population while his security initiatives had broken the ties between the Huks and the rural population and dwindled their numbers from both within and without through surrender programs and several highly effective offensive campaigns.

By 1954, the Huks numbered less than 2,000 active members and Magsaysay's security and civic action programs had severed their ties to the population eliminating their ability to recruit and gather additional supplies (Greenberg, 1987, sect.139). In February, the Army began the largest anti-Huk operation to date to clear the remaining members of the organization from the area near Mount Arayat. Operation THUNDER-LIGHTNING lasted for 211 days and involved over 5,000 men (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 139). The operation resulted in the deaths of forty-three, the capture of eighty-eight, and the surrender of fifty-four Huks in addition to the ninety-nine production bases and 500 enemy huts destroyed (Ibid, sect 139). On 17 May 1954, Louis Taruc, leader of the HMB, surrendered to government forces. Starting a cascading effect within the Huk leadership. Despite the mass surrender, government forces continued operations to sweep up the remaining elements of the Huks. By 1955, it is estimated that less than 1,000 Huks

remained at large (Ibid, sect. 140). The Huk movement had disintegrated into nothing more than roving bands of bandits fighting to survive—the insurrection was over.

1. Analysis

The conflict in the Philippines began with the rise of Philippine nationalism following the Spanish-American War and the social and economic disparity stemming from corrupt government practices concerning land tenure. The local peasants, desiring to shirk the perceived yoke of colonialism were attracted to political movements aimed at social and economic reform regardless of the communist inclinations of the movements. The onset of World War II and the subsequent Japanese invasion swelled the ranks of the Huk, while the Huk nationalistic stance in opposition to the invaders provided legitimacy to their movement.

Following the end of the Second World War, the resumption of U.S. control brought a resurgence of anti-colonial sentiment. Despite numerous attempts by the United States to remedy the underlying situation, the corrupt practices of the Philippine government in its administration of aid programs continued to foster resentment and alienation within the population. The oppressive tactics employed by the government in its initial attempts to eliminate the insurgents further reinforced their ties to the population. With the Philippine government on the verge of collapse, the appointment of Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of Defense began a reversal of governmental oppression through a series of reforms and civic action.

Magsaysay's programs redirected the efforts of the government from a strategy of attrition aimed at the insurgent forces to a plan focused on reforging the ties between the government and the population. Magsaysay's success highlights the fundamental nature of gaining and securing the support and control of the population as an end in conflicts for internal control. In contrast, the past efforts of the Philippine government to achieve victory solely through the destruction of enemy forces proved futile as well as detrimental to the overall success of the conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to address the underlying social, economic, and political foundations of the grievance that supplies an insurgent movement with the cause that links it to the popular base from which it draws

its existence. In addition, to the overarching conditions generating the ideological aspect of the insurgent movement, it is of fundamental importance to secure the loyalty and cooperation of the populace at the local level. This is achieved through security and civic action designed to address local and immediate concerns, producing tangible benefits and resolution to current difficulties, generating the popular perception of efficacy and legitimacy in the government. This point is evident when viewed from the perspective of the guerrilla which can be drawn from this statement by Louis Taruc concerning the issue of land reform, “Land redistribution and ending tenancy were not central for most people [in the rebellion]. People just wanted small changes—a bigger share of the crop so they and their families could live easier.” (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 171).

Magsaysay made extensive use of local programs to engender the support of the population as is evident from this statement by a major peasant leader in the Huk movement, “All the reforms that were promised and partially implemented, even though small and showcase in nature were encouraging for the people. Many people believed the government; they believed Magsaysay.” (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 238). Therefore, Magsaysay in his successful resolution of the insurrection relied upon local action and reform to generate a popular base of support for his programs, which he then capitalized on to institute national reforms following his election as President of the Philippines.

a. Input Denial

When Ramon Magsaysay assumed the office of Secretary of Defense under President Quirino in 1950, the Huk had already thoroughly infiltrated the rural population of the Luzon Province and established an infrastructure to facilitate the gathering of resources and recruits. The Huks relied the social and political programs created under the Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC) to provide the vital link between their maneuver units and the population. The corrupt and oppressive tactics of the Philippine government and their forces served to reinforce the Huk influence over the population. The Huk influence had become so pervasive that many villages were governed by parallel Huk administrations. To effectively sever the insurgent influence from the population Magsaysay adopted a two-part program which involved a public relations campaign (or white psychological operations) and the active defense of the

population. Both of these measures were realized through the various reforms Magsaysay conducted within the military. The primary facet of Magsaysay's input denial strategy was the creation of the Battalion Combat Teams (BCTs). These units were regionally-assigned augmented battalions formed to "gain the public trust and cooperation, engage in defensive activities to protect the population against acts of terror or raids, generate exploitable combat information for limited offensive operations, and encourage the development of local self-defense volunteer formations." (Cable, 1986, p. 55). Each BCT was accompanied by a Civil Affairs Team that provided medical, engineering, and transportation resources for civil projects to reinforce the reawakening of trust in the government. In addition, Magsaysay employed "white" psychological operations to erase the past perception of government oppression and corruption. Civil Affairs officers were dispatched to each village to explain the procedures by which a citizen could seek compensation from the government for damage inflicted by the Army or take legal action against a member of the armed forces for a past transgression.

The Philippine input denial strategy proved extremely effective by providing a permanent defense force integrated with civil actions programs to ensure the betterment of life for the villagers while incorporating a psychological operations program that demonstrated the resolve of the government to redress past wrongdoings and resolve existing social grievances. The plan was successful because it eliminated the physical presence of the guerrillas while severing the guerrilla's influence by mitigating their cause through programs that addressed the local and immediate concerns of the population in a "demand-pull" process.

b. Conversion Mechanism Destruction

The primary conversion mechanism employed by the Huk insurgents was Stalin University. Stalin University was a large camp located on the Sierra Madres Mountains used for the training and indoctrination of new recruits by Chinese Red Army instructors. While Stalin University was not directly targeted by the Philippine government other programs served to interrupt and confound the conversion process. The central feature of the Philippine counter conversion mechanism was the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR).

EDCOR was a resettlement program designed to induce surrender in a segment of the insurgent forces by robbing the movement of its “land for the landless” cause. Larry Cable (1986) states, “The goal of the program was twofold: separate the hard-core guerrilla from the marginal or unwilling supporter, and sap the will for resistance prior to military operations.” (p. 63). The lure of the program lay in its ability to address the central social issue of rural discontent –land tenure, and in its ability to provide amnesty and a better life than that offered as a guerrilla or a tenant farmer living in Luzon. The program offered surrendered Huks the title to land and the chance at a better life through numerous civic action programs integrated into the EDCOR project. The resettlement areas provided access to free education, transportation, medical care, electricity, and water. In addition, the government granted loans for start-up items such as seed, farm animals, and other initial supplies on the condition that the loans be repaid and the land not be subdivided. The initial EDCOR site was located on the island of Mindanao, which insured that newly surrendered Huks would be free from the repercussions from their former comrades. The program proved so successful that in less than a year a second EDCOR site had to be constructed. Magsaysay capitalized on this success by using the testimony of former Huk EDCOR residents as propaganda to disseminate the advantages of the program and induce further surrender in the Huk movement. By 1955, it was estimated that 1,500 Huks had surrendered to take advantage of the EDCOR project (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 91).

In order to target those members of the Huk movement not susceptible to the lures of the EDCOR project, the Philippine military made extensive use of “black” psychological operations on the insurgents. When government forces discovered a Huk weapons and ammunition cache, rather than destroy it, select weapons and ammunition were replaced with exploding duplicates. This had the effect of either causing the Huk to abandon their previous weapons stores (some of which were unaltered) or risking the lives of their soldiers. In another psychological operation known as the “eye of God,” light aircraft would circle above a battle and a crew member utilizing a bullhorn would call out the names of certain Huks involved in the battle, thanking them for the intelligence that led government forces to their comrades (Lansdale, 1972, pp. 74-75).

Numerous other psychological operations were conducted against the Huks and their supporters, undermining intraorganizational trust thereby reducing operational effectiveness.

Another aspect of the Philippine counter conversion strategy was crop destruction. Government forces used aerial reconnaissance to spot agricultural fields at Huk production bases, however, crops were not destroyed until just before they were ready for harvest in an effort to maximize the loss of time and effort expended by the Huks. Magsaysay's success in this aspect of counterinsurgency lay in his ability to address the local and immediate concerns of the populace as well as the underlying grievance of land tenure to offer a better life for the Huks insurgents in a "demand-pull" process. Jose Lava, leader of the PKP stated,

When Magsaysay started making reforms in the Philippine army and in the government generally it had an impact not only on the movement's mass support but on the armed [Huk] soldiers as well. Many left because repression was ending, and they were not ideologically committed enough to stay in the movement, especially as things grew worse for the Huks. (Kerkvliet, 1977, p. 238).

In addition, the role of psychological operations proved essential in undermining the Huk's ability to fight by attacking the roots of the organization through the elimination of the conditions creating its political purpose and causing the Huks to question the loyalty of their own troops as well as the functionality of their equipment. The overall purpose achieved by these efforts was to divert Huk resources away from operations and make them more vulnerable to counterforce techniques.

c. Counterforce

Following the military reorganization and reforms instituted by Magsaysay in 1950, the military focus shifted from large conventional sweeps to small-unit operations involving long-term, deep jungle patrols. However, large-scale sweeps were not eliminated, they were employed as the situation dictated, but with a fundamental difference. Large sweeps such as the operation conducted in the Zambales Province, left behind several platoon-sized elements to continue the search and prevent the Huks from

returning to reclaim the area. This practice was the fundamental difference that differentiated success with a clear and hold strategy from failure with sweep and clear tactics.

Possibly one of the most effective counterforce strategies employed by the Philippine military was the Force X concept. Force X was a combination of special operations counterforce tactics combined with psychological operations to maximize the damage inflicted and intelligence gained on the Huk organization. While the Force X concept was originally employed prior to Magsaysay's control it was abandoned shortly after its inception. However, the Force X concept was revived and employed extensively under the Magsaysay administration following 1951. The concept behind Force X was to disguise an element of the BCT as a Huk squadron and infiltrate the Huk base camp areas to gather intelligence and disrupt operations. The men received training in Huk customs and courtesies from captured Huk guerrillas, dressed as Huks, and carried Huk weapons. The men were then set loose to roam Huk controlled territory until they encountered a Huk unit, at which time they would return with the unit to its base camp, gather intelligence, and then destroy the camp and capture its leaders. The operations proved so successful that following several uses of the concept two Huk units, mistaking each other for Force X, attacked each other, resulting in numerous casualties (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 72). In addition, Force X was responsible for sabotaging enemy arms caches and capturing members of the Huk infrastructure in support of the overall psyops campaign.

d. Strengthening the State

The Philippine strategy to strengthen the state involved numerous simultaneous strategies employed to both provide physical security and engender the loyalty of the population. The first aspect of the Philippine strategy encompasses the wide array of reforms aimed at securing the loyalty of the populace to the national government. Magsaysay's first reforms began during his tenure as the Philippine Secretary of Defense. He initiated his campaign of reform by removing those elements of corruption that fostered a negative image of the government from his organization. He reduced governmental oppression by the military and Police Constabulary by raising the daily wage of the average soldier to enable them to pay for food and supplies rather than

demand it from the villagers. Magsaysay refocused the army on the defense of the population rather than on the search and destroy operations of the “iron fist” policy. In addition, he empowered the population with the ability to redress past and present instances of oppression through legal recourse administered by military lawyers under the supervision of Magsaysay’s staff. Military reforms were accompanied by civic action programs to further engender popular support while “white” psyops and image building were conducted to focus the population on the progress achieved and the legitimacy of the government. Projects such as cash credit for peasants, barrio health clinics, irrigation canals, and new bridges were implemented to generate the perception of progress and the betterment of living conditions under Magsaysay’s guidance (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 239). To supplement his image building campaign, Magsaysay would frequently visit the population and military posts to ensure his plans were implemented as he desired. Magsaysay’s frequent forays to the local villages fostered the perception of government concern in the plight of the population and assisted Magsaysay in winning the election of 1953.

Another technique employed by Magsaysay to foster the perception of legitimacy and control in the government was that of electoral reform and security. During both the 1951 and 1953 elections, Magsaysay utilized the military, ROTC cadets, and members of JUSMAG to perform poll watching and security to eliminate voter fraud, corruption, coercion, and violence. Benedict J. Kirkvliet (1977) in *The Huk Rebellion* quotes PKP leadership in their observations that the “peaceful, clean election [of 1951] had caused people to doubt “the immediate need of armed struggle... That is why the moment they sense any reason not to lose faith and confidence in elections, they adhere to it immediately” (p. 238). By the 1953 election, electoral fraud and violence had been eliminated, enabling over 4 million Filipinos to cast their votes. Following his election to the office of Philippine President, Magsaysay instituted several reforms to mitigate the Huks political cause of “land for the landless.” Magsaysay’s EDCOR project, agrarian courts which provided peasants with legal representation at government expense, and legislation to limit the amount of rent a landlord could charge his tenants served to diffuse

past concerns over the land tenure issue. In addition, Magsaysay's administration distributed over a quarter of a million hectares of public land to 3,000 farmers (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 138).

The final aspect of the Philippine effort to strengthen the state that will be covered in this section is the improvements in intelligence collection implemented under the military reforms of Magsaysay. The most important aspect of this reform was the focus on continuity. Each battalion was responsible for producing a file that contained information on the people, intelligence networks, and Huk activities in their area of operation. Additionally, a camera was issued to each patrol to document Huk casualties in an effort to maximize the accuracy of information and statistics collected on the Huk movement. While battalions rotated in and out of each area over time, the rotation of the intelligence section was staggered to ensure continuity of intelligence which was based on the information contained in the file created by the initial battalion. Although these tactics, techniques, and procedures contributed to the overall effort of defeating the Huk insurrection, they occurred after a series of failed attempts to defeat the insurgency by directly attacking its military component.

e. Failures

Two of the most significant failures of the pre-Magsaysay regime were the inability identify social grievances and initiate reform and the use of the Philippine armed forces under the "iron fist" policy of President Manuel Roxas. Corruption and repression were rampant under both the Roxas and Quirino regimes and would have resulted in the inevitable collapse from within of the Philippine government were it not for the efforts of Ramon Magsaysay. Both Roxas and Quirino were unable to perceive the plight of the average peasant in rural central Luzon due to their interest in maintaining the status quo and apathy towards those not in their social class. Roxas' inability to perceive the source of the insurgency led to his adoption of the "iron fist" policy to destroy the Huk movement. This policy, which was described by Philippine Representative Felixberto Serrano as "a policy of madness" motivated "by a spirit of revenge," served to further aggravate an already tense situation between government forces and the population (Kirkvliet, 1977, p.194). The iron fist policy began in August 1946 with the deployment

of Police Constabulary troops utilizing heavy artillery, armored cars, tanks, and airplanes to attack insurgents armed with only rifles in the Luzon province (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 189). The series of operations resulted in the destruction of several villages and deaths of numerous civilians. In support of these operations, Roxas imposed martial law on the population, resulting in the imposition of movement controls on the local villagers. Local government officials exploited this situation by charging recurring fees for the issuance of movement passes, some of which required renewal on a weekly basis. In addition to the corrupt practices of governmental officials and an increasing number of friendly fire incidents, government forces engaged in oppressive tactics to gain information and resources from the local population. Under the Roxas administration's policy, troops were forced to live off the land, which led to further exploitation of the villagers to attain food and equipment. Magsaysay alleviated this problem through a military reform in which the average soldier's pay was raised from 30 Centavos to a full peso a day allowing the troops to purchase food from the villagers as well as stimulate the local economy (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 84). Finally, the use of large conventional sweep operations under the iron fist policy produced little results and served to further weaken the ties between the Constabulary and the local population in their efforts to procure intelligence on the location of Huk units and sympathizers. Military reforms instituted under Magsaysay served to eliminate these abusive tactics by eliminating corruption through frequent inspections by Magsaysay, increased military pay, and a shift in focus from offensive operations focused on the guerrillas to defensive operations focused on defending the population.

f. Findings

The Philippine case demonstrates the primacy of the role of the population in defeating the insurgency. Social, military, political, and economic reforms proved crucial to the resolution of the conflict. By identifying the underlying cause of the insurrection and instituting reforms and by eliminating the local and immediate concerns of the populace through social action, Magsaysay's government undermined the political cause of the insurgency and re-established the legitimacy of the central government. Magsaysay's military reforms prevented government oppression by refocusing military

operations on the defense of the local populace rather than the destruction of enemy forces. The shift in focus resulted in an increased rapport between the population and the military facilitating the collection of intelligence thereby increasing the military's ability to locate and destroy the insurgent forces. Therefore, two lessons can be taken from the Philippine case. First, the underlying cause of the insurgency must be identified and resolved through reform (if possible) beginning at the local level, and second, the initial focus of the military must be on the defense of the population to inhibit the insurgent forces' ability to gather resources and expand their operations

D. CONCLUSION

The conclusion drawn from these cases is clear: the end state of any conflict must be to attain the control and allegiance of the population instead of the defeat of the military component of the opposition. This is accomplished through three basic tasks. The first task is to identify the primary social grievance of the population that provides the movement with its cause and to institute reforms at the local level to address these issues. This robs the insurgency of its ability to politically mobilize the population for its cause, thereby limiting its ability to gather resources and expand. The second task is to focus on the defense of the population by providing security on a static basis in contested areas to separate the insurgents from the population. Larry Cable (1986) states that this is necessary "to convince the peasants that their most basic need, to be secure and safe in their own persons, homes and fields was best met by the government forces and the peasants' best course of action was to cooperate with the security personnel in achieving this goal." (p. 63). The permanent security created by static defensive forces provides physical security as well as freedom from the coercion of the insurgent movement. In addition, daily contact between government forces creates rapport with the civilian populace enabling the government to obtain accurate intelligence and more easily locate and destroy the insurgent forces. The final aspect of this strategy is to exploit the intelligence gained from the civilian populace to locate and destroy the insurgent forces.

All three cases have demonstrated that the most effective counterforce technique is to employ small, tactical units that rely on systematic patrolling and ambushes to destroy the guerrillas. In addition, it is necessary to supplement these techniques with

civic action programs, population control measures, and an effective psyops campaign consisting of both image building operations focused on the populace amnesty programs to induce surrender among the insurgent forces. In conclusion, the primary focus of any conflict for the internal control of a nation from a group of politically motivated insurgents must be to attain the loyalty and control of the population.

CHAPTER III

Afghanistan faces a myriad of problems that stem from underlying factors such as ethnic and tribal divides as well as those created by a history of disunity and recurring war. However, the overarching commonality further eroding present-day political unity originates from historical political norms buttressed by an acephalous religion and its guidelines that have facilitated the exploitation of Islam. Insurgents and terrorists have exploited Islam as a vehicle for the unification and mobilization of various ethnic and tribal groups under the call of jihad to prevent the consolidation of authority in a central secular political institution.

The threat to stability in Afghanistan cannot be perceived in terms of a single insurgency, but rather as a variety of centrifugal factors pulling legitimacy from the central government. Numerous groups and factions contend for power in a variety of diverse settings that confound categorization. Each threat manifests itself in its own regional context, capitalizing on that region's weaknesses and separation from the central government. Widespread poverty coupled with the mismanagement of aid organizations has fostered a revival in the opium trade, providing warlords and insurgents with a renewable source of capital and stifling the development of a legitimate economic infrastructure. In addition, the central government faces multiple difficulties that mirror those confronted at the provincial level. Internal ethnic and political divides, corruption, and lack of efficacy stemming from an inability to gather adequate funding and resources tear at the government from within, diminishing its ability to unite and heal a country that everyday totters on the brink of collapse. Further, external factions have spread the call for opposition to a central authority in Afghanistan throughout the Muslim world, casting Afghanistan as the new crusade of Western imperialism and dominance in the land of the crescent moon.

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the impediments to unification and stabilization confronting coalition and Afghan leadership, and, in doing so, establish the context surrounding U.S. counterinsurgency and stabilization strategies. I will examine regional and local issues as well as those within the central government to illustrate how

they coalesce to detract from stabilization and unification to create an environment conducive to insurgency. Further, I will demonstrate how both Islam and poppy production serve as unifying factors and an underlying support infrastructure that facilitates the spread of insurgent movements and detracts from the legitimacy and control of the central government, condemning Afghanistan to repeat the mistakes of its past.

A. ETHNIC DIVIDES

Two of the oldest factors underlying disunity in Afghan society are those of ethnic and tribal divides. Afghanistan is a fragmented country composed of six major ethnic groups, speaking three languages and composed of numerous tribes (Afghanistan: A Country Study, 2001, p. 212). Pashtuns, the largest group, comprise 40 percent of the population while Tajiks comprise 25.3 percent; Hazaras, 18 percent; Uzbeks, 6.3 percent; Turkmen, 2.5 percent; the Quizilbash 1.0 percent; and other, at 6.9 percent (Ibid, p. 104). Despite attempts at ethnic integration in the government, fissures continue to form along ethnic and tribal lines. Warlord militias, divided by ethnic bids for local dominance such as the conflict between ethnic Uzbek Gen. Abdurrashid Dostum and his Tajik rival, Gen. Attah Mohammad continue to plague stability in the north (Herman, 2003, p. 15). Political divides between Tajiks and majority Pashtuns continue to impair government efficacy resulting from Pashtun perceptions of ethnic marginalization and disenfranchisement in a government dominated by ethnic Tajiks appointed during the 2002 loya jirga (Johnson, 27 October 2003). The Afghan National Army, once believed to be a model for ethnic integration and a symbol of Afghanistan's future, has become mired in allegations of the ethnic bias of the Tajik Minister of Defense, Fahim Kahn in his appointments of senior ranking officers (Guistozzi, A., 2003, pp. 20-21). Finally, intra-Pashtun dissention over the exclusion of former Afghan king Mohammed Zahir Shah from a role in the new administration has eroded Karzai's support within his own ethnic group (Johnson, 27 October 2003).

While coalition forces have attempted to maintain separation from internal ethnic divides in Afghanistan, tribes and militias have sought to exploit the coalition's zeal for the destruction of Taliban and al Qaeda forces to manipulate the military to serve as an a

tool to eliminate their opposition. Ethnic and tribal leaders frequently claim their opposition to be members of the Taliban or al Qaeda and substantiate these claims by firing on coalition forces from the vicinity of their enemies' compounds to initiate hostilities. Interior Minister Ali Jalali, a leading pro-Western moderate in President Hamid Karzai's administration, said, "There are always complaints that, particularly the interpreters with the coalition forces, sometimes give false information to the coalition forces. Sometimes they try to implicate some of their enemies and some of the people they don't like." (Watson, 2003, p. 1). While there is no record of how often this tactic has been attempted or has succeeded, members of 3rd Special Forces Group contend that the technique was widely used. Additionally, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Non-Governmental Aid Organizations (NGOs) rely on local ethnic militias for security, potentially interjecting coalition forces into ethnic fights, inadvertently projecting ethnic or tribal bias in their attempts to defend themselves.

In addition, members of insurgent groups have exploited ethnic and tribal ties under the Pashtun code of Pushtunwali. The Afghanistan Country Study of 2001 states,

The Pashtun culture rests on Pushtunwali, a legal and moral code that determines social order and responsibilities. It contains sets of values pertaining to honor (*namuz*), solidarity (*nang*), hospitality, mutual support, shame, and revenge which determine social order and individual responsibility. The defense of *namuz*, even unto death is obligatory for every Pashtun. (Afghanistan: A Country Study, 2001, pp. 105-106).

The relevance of Pushtunwali exists in its detractor from the stability of the country. Blood feuds serve to expand conflicts to include an ever-increasing number of associates and relatives while insurgents capitalize on ethnic and tribal ties to demand hospitality and sanctuary from the pursuit by coalition forces.

The disunity fostered by ethnic and tribal divides will continue to split Afghanistan and engender instability until such a time that the population perceives their adequate political representation and efficacy in determining the course of the government. However, this goal remains elusive due to the lack of governmental control at the local level, which has led to the resurgence of warlords and factional fighting for local power, inhibiting stabilization and skewing political loyalties. A former Afghan army general and an ethnic Pashtun stated, "The warlords were finished, but now they are

being revived with American help. The Americans wanted to use them in the fight against terrorism, but they have failed to capture the Taliban or al Qaeda leaders, while alienating the populace by making the warlords stronger.” (Constable, 2003, p. A1).

B. WARLORDS

Warlords and local militia commanders represent an impediment to the successful unification and stabilization of Afghanistan by supplanting the authority of the central government with that of their own. Their actions propagate the drug trade, heighten ethnic tensions, and stifle legitimate economic development at the local level, while their private armies and military operations displace and factionalize the community, preventing the cooperation and stability necessary for the development of an economic infrastructure. The population, often trapped between competing factions vying for regional dominance, must contend with threats of extortion, forcible recruitment, fighting and the displacement of families, and the denial of access to land or water (Waldman, 24 September 2003).

Warlords use their influence to extort the population through illegal tolls, taxes, and graft, demanding money for the use of public roads and for protection against rival factions and warlords. Private armies funded by the taxation of drug trafficking and production and other illicit actions such as roadside extortion and the illegal seizure and monopolization of businesses, stifle commerce and the development of a free-market economy outside the control of the warlord. Warlords demand *osher* — an Islamic tax given as a portion of a crop from farmers and collect taxes meant for the central government (Waldman, 24 September 2003). They encourage the growth of poppies to expand the drug trade and the revenue collected from its taxation to increase their influence at the expense of the legitimacy of the central government.

Rival warlords and military commanders continue to clash over control of territory that is allegedly part of a united Afghanistan. In an effort to secure the loyalty of provincial warlords to the central government, President Harmid Karzai appointed many warlords and militia commanders to positions within the government following the fall of the Taliban. However, warlords, realizing the impotence of the central government

beyond the confines of Kabul, have continued to pursue personal agendas based on ethnic tensions and the desire for regional dominance regardless of their role in the new government. In a clash in October 2003, former Assistant Secretary of Defense and ethnic Uzbek General Abdul Rashid Dostam's forces engaged those of General Attah Mohammad in a battle employing tanks, mortars, and artillery outside the city of Mazar-i-Sharif (Gall, 10 October 2003). While this conflict ended in a successful negotiation between the two warlords, it is illustrative of the underlying motivations of the preponderance of warlords and militia commanders, who in their pursuit of local dominance, place little faith in the successful unification and control of the country by the central government. Recent legislation within Afghanistan has prohibited warlords (those with personal armies) from holding positions within the Afghan government. However, while many warlords have superficially relinquished control of their militias, they retain control of sizeable forces within their respective provinces and continue to exert their regional dominance.

Warlords and militia commanders are the embodiment of ethnic and tribal divides, their private armies, formed along these social fissures, perpetuate tribal and ethnic rivalry in their competition for the control of territory allegedly under the administration of a provincial governor and the central government. Each attack involves a greater portion of the population in a downward spiral in which the death of a family member or friend must be avenged through blood vengeance demanded under tribal codes such as Pushtunwali. Forcible recruitment along ethnic and tribal lines further adds to the conflicts, swelling the ranks of the warlords' militias and detracting from the ability of the community to develop an economic infrastructure. In addition, the surplus of young males without craft or vocation other than basic military skills created by the demobilization of the Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) has generated a willing pool of volunteers to man the warlords' armies. The lack of economic infrastructure created by the continual unrest has generated a self-reinforcing condition in that the continued fighting prevents the formation of a stable economic infrastructure resulting in fewer employment opportunities for young males driving them to seek a livelihood in the employ of a warlord or militia leader thereby perpetuating the cycle. Local and regional police forces are unable to contend with the armament and numbers of the warlords'

militias and frequently succumb to bribery due to the inability of the government to provide adequate equipment and manning or even salary. (Dixon, 2003, p.1). Despite attempts to unify competing ethnic and tribal factions under the common banner of the Afghan National Army, this entity has yet to exert itself at the local and regional levels beyond the provinces neighboring Kabul. The lack of governmental control and pervasion of corruption within the government ranks has served only to heighten ethnic divides, allowing them to fester beyond the reach of the central government, detracting from plans to unify and stabilize the country.

Despite the efforts of the central government and coalition forces, warlord conflicts referred to as “green on green” have continued to destabilize the rural areas of Afghanistan. The government, unable to fill the power vacuum created by the fall of the Taliban, faces a dilemma in which the absence of control fosters continuing conflict through local bids for power whereas the presence of a dominant warlord in the region can create stability and regional control, but entails the risk of questionable loyalty to the central government and the existence of a rival power base. This is evident in the case of Ishmael Kahn who has achieved a great deal of stability and control over the province of Herat. However, Kahn’s personal army and independent links to Iran combined with report by the 3rd Special Forces Group describing him as “not pro-Karzai” detract from the legitimacy and control of the central government (Kandahar Interview 31 May 2003). Colonel Joseph D. Celeski, commander of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF), states, Warlords are needed to maintain stability in their provinces to allow Kabul –the essential center of gravity—to continue building power.” (Celeski interview, 31 May 2003). However, warlords and provincial governors frequently play both sides to further their self-interests.

Further hindering stabilization efforts, the U.S. military has maintained its focus on the destruction of the military component of the insurgent forces and has chosen to take a “hands off approach” to green on green fighting (Interview 11 September 2003). Lt. General John R. Vines, commander of Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180) in Afghanistan stated, “Militias are part of the existing reality, some are legitimate, and some are predators. We need to work aggressively to disestablish militias who are not legitimate, but the challenge is, if you disestablish a militia, who provides security? The

vacuum can be filled by anarchy.” (Constable, 2003, p. 17). Despite this statement, U.S. forces are still instructed to avoid involvement in supporting Afghan government attempts to quell green on green conflicts, and unless provoked, do not initiate conflicts with local or regional warlords or militia commanders (Interview 11 September 2003). Lt. General Dan K. McNeill, former commander of the U.S. CJTF-180 stated, “We do not, in our lexicon, interject ourselves into disputes that we call green on green. Those are Afghan problems to solve.” (Kaufman, 2003, p. 16). Despite Lt General McNeill’s comments, the Afghan government has not yet attained sufficient strength to counter warlord infighting or eliminate those warlords who pose a threat to security and stability. In addition, recently formed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) rely on Afghan militias for security. Former Afghan General Rahim Wardak, highlights the problem presented by U.S. leadership’s desire to remain impartial to green on green fighting, stating, “Those local leaders almost always have enemies and rivals, and it's very easy to imagine how American personnel will get in the middle of their feuds.” (Kaufman, 2003, p. 16). Further compounding this problem, AMF acting under the auspices of the central government and employed by the coalition military as local guides have been accused of corruption and the abuse of local villagers similar to the circumstances involving the constabulary in the Philippines prior to the administration of Ramon Magsaysay. Brad Adams, Asia executive director for Human Rights Watch in an open letter to Bush on Sept. 19 wrote, “Violence and intimidation at the hands of soldiers, militia and police under the control of warlords have created a generalized sense of insecurity. Even gains in education for school-age girls are now at risk as many parents are afraid to send their daughters out of their homes to go to school.” (Watson, 2003, p. 1) Sultan Mohammed, Dai Chopan village elder stated, “These people are robbing us, torturing us and beating us. They are also taking innocent people to jail. They stand with the Americans, and when Americans leave an area, then the militias go by another route and rob the houses.” (Watson 2003, p. 1). Continued abuse of the population inflicted by local militias serving under the auspices of both the central government and coalition forces serves to further attrit the legitimacy of both, driving the population to seek resolution and authority from an alternative source. Despite the comments of Lt General Mc Neill, coalition forces have a stake in resolving this issue despite perceptions of this as an “Afghan problem to

solve.” The weakening of the popular perception of coalition legitimacy will allow warlords and insurgents to supplant the authority of the central government thereby impeding progress towards the successful unification of the country.

The continued existence of warlords and regional powers outside the control of the central government demonstrates the inefficacy of the government to enforce its dictates beyond the reach of ISAF and coalition forces. Additionally, government efforts to appease warlords through political and military appointments have failed to curtail bids for regional dominance. Until such a time as the government can address the underlying issues of regional control and enforcement, secure the loyalty and compliance of regionally dominant warlords, and provide gainful employ or job skills for “demobilized” young males, the problem of regional instability will perpetuate as warlords continue to pursue regional dominance independent of the central government.

C. OPIUM PRODUCTION

Opium production is a problem that underlies the majority of the issues confronting the stabilization of Afghanistan. It presents a dilemma for the central government in that the drug trade provides the necessary resources and funding for those elements that detract from unification, yet it alleviates the abject poverty of the rural Afghan farmer who must contend with a crippling climate as well as the high costs of labor and deflated agricultural market caused by the post-war influx of aid organizations and relief efforts. Local warlords and corrupt government officials have capitalized on the absence of central government authority at the local level to profit from the taxation of the production and trafficking of opium, rebuilding their armies and supplanting the authority of the central government. Opium production is a destabilizing factor that the central government and coalition forces must address before the stabilization of Afghanistan can occur.

On 18 January 2002, Afghan President Harmid Karzai declared the production of opium to be illegal. Despite this ban, poppy production has again flourished in Afghanistan facilitating the growth of insurgent movements, the rise of local powerbrokers, and the weakening of the rule of the central government. While the

Taliban ban on production in July 2000 had reduced the flow of opium from Afghanistan, the temporary decline in supply resulted in a spike in price of the drug on the world market thereby increasing the lure of its production to impoverished Afghan farmers. Nearly two decades of fighting that had destroyed Afghanistan's agricultural infrastructure, several years of drought, and the absence of local authority created in the wake of the fall of the Taliban has led farmers back to the cultivation of poppy. Rural Afghans remain oblivious to the repercussions of perpetuating the drug trade, viewing it as a short-term solution to their immediate problems. However, this short sightedness has blinded many to such long-term solutions as the resuscitation of the agricultural infrastructure, the development of job skills, and the creation of self-sustaining industry, which would eventually end widespread poverty and lead to the stabilization of the country.

The lucrative market engendered by the Taliban ban on opium production coupled with the end of several years of drought has produced one of the largest poppy harvests to date reestablishing Afghanistan's dominance as the world's leading producer of opium (Tohid, 2003, p.6). Poppy cultivation represents a more economically viable product for impoverished Afghan farmers who must contend with both the inflated costs of labor to harvest their crops as well as the limited resource of water in Afghanistan's arid climate. The massive post-war influx of aid organizations and relief workers, oblivious to local economic norms and traditional labor costs, has resulted in the rise in the rate of basic labor leaving many farmers unable to afford to pay workers to harvest their traditional crops. In addition, the massive influx of food aid into rural areas has devalued the market on traditional agricultural produce. A report by the Non-Governmental Aid Organization (NGO) Christian Aid noted that the greatest cultivation of poppy occurred in the regions where U.N. workers have been distributing most of their food aid (Ibid). This trend suggests food aid has undermined efforts to spur the development of a legitimate agriculture-based local economy founded on the production of traditional foodstuffs.

The massive quantities of food aid introduced into rural areas has undermined the market on traditional produce such as wheat and enabled rural Afghans to rely on food aid to survive, freeing them to pursue the production of the more economically viable cash crop of poppy. This alarming fact comes on the advent of the U.N. decision to

distribute food aid to over 6 million people in Afghanistan in 2003 (Ibid). In addition, the cultivation of poppy requires less water than agricultural produce such as wheat and can generate a harvest worth twelve times as much, providing little incentive for local farmers to accept central government and coalition crop substitution and subsidization plans that offer only \$500 (U.S.) per acre (Manning, 13 October 2003). Susana Rico, Director of the United Nations' World Food Program for Afghanistan, stated, "Even taking the average prices and yield of wheat and poppy, the returns to a hectare of land for the latter far outweigh that of wheat, by approximately 4,000 per cent." (Nutt, 15 September 2003). In addition to the absence of a lucrative incentive for Afghan farmers to cease the cultivation of poppy, warlords and local government officials have encouraged opium production and trafficking to expand their influence and control despite the central government's efforts to curtail the growing drug trade within its borders.

Local and regional powerbrokers have exploited the lack of influence of the central government beyond the confines of Kabul to gain revenue from the taxation of the drug trade to fund their private armies and expand their personal influence. Warlords involved in the drug trade oppose the formation of a stable government capable of adversely affecting opium production. These actions result in a centripetal effect that pulls power and legitimacy from the central government to those who have achieved regional dominance. Local warlords and governmental officials propagate this system through incentives in which the compliant population is rewarded through protection and increased economic rewards and activity fostered by the money generated through the production and trafficking of opium. Government officials in Kabul fear that the local influence achieved by these drug traffickers and warlords will adversely influence the elections scheduled for 2004 turning Afghanistan into a form of narco-mafia state. Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani views drug trafficking as a "threat to democracy" stating, "the liquid funds from drugs, in the absence of solid institutions, could corrupt voting practices and turn them into a nightmare instead of a realization of public will." (Manning, August 2003).

While warlords and local political officials have relied on profits gained through the taxation of the poppy trade to fund their personal armies and extend their influence, terrorists have used profits from opium to fund their resurgence and activity. Antonio

Maria Costa, executive director of the Vienna-based United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime relates, “The terrorists and traffickers are the same people.” (Gall, 2003). Further illustrating this point, in July 2003, Maj. General Franklin Hagenbeck, acting commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan stated, “[the] Taliban and its allies have regrouped in Pakistan and are recruiting fighters from madrassas in Quetta in a campaign funded by drug-trafficking,” (de Borchgrave, 2003, p. 15). Insurgent factions such as the Taliban and Hizib-i-Islami/Gulbuddin (HIG) have legitimized the production of opium, once prohibited under Muslim law, as a form of jihad against the Western world. Afghan anti-narcotics official, Khaure Ghualm Zai, quoted a villager stating, “We have been approached by the Taliban clerics urging us to grow more poppy to destroy future generations in America and other Western countries” (Tohid, 24 July 2003). An opium smuggler and former Taliban member stated, “Immoral Western culture destroys the minds of our children, so it’s only just that we export opium and heroin to destroy Western youths.” (As cited in Manning, August 2003). Further complicating matters, Costa estimates that the revenue generated from poppy cultivation brought \$1.2 billion to farmers and traders last year (2002), nearly equaling the amount of international aid and doubling the legitimate revenue gained by the central government (Gall, 2003, p. 5). With the amount of money generated through the illicit production of opium, government officials face grim prospects of defeating either regional warlords or national insurgent movements.

Opium production exists as an underlying matter that buttresses the majority of impediments to the stabilization and unification of Afghanistan through a self-propagating dilemma in which the government is caught between the need to alleviate local poverty and the impediments to stabilization thriving from the revenue generated by the drug trade. The allure of quick profits generated through the cultivation of poppy combined with the restrictive environment and excessive food aid have produced an Afghan farmer unwilling to return to the cultivation of traditional agriculture despite the dictates of the central government. Warlords and local political officials have compounded this problem by encouraging the production of opium to further their personal gain and influence while insurgent groups have used profits from the production to fund their resurgence. Further, insurgent groups have given opium production

religious legitimacy by claiming it as a weapon against the West. While coalition and Afghan governmental forces have approached this problem through policies of eradication, substitution, and subsidization, they cannot match the benefits of the remunerative alternative provided by opium production. Therefore, until the central government can extend its authority to the local level, provide a lucrative alternative or eliminate the incentives for the cultivation of poppy, and eliminate the corruption from within its ranks, it will be unable to halt the flow of money and resources to those elements which detract from Kabul's efforts to unify Afghanistan.

D. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

The central government of Afghanistan faces numerous problems preventing the successful stabilization and administration of the country. Corruption, inefficiency, and political divides fueled by ethnic rivalries and personal interests are pandemic throughout the Karzai regime and have eroded popular support in the administration. The absence of security and control at the local level coupled with the lack of tangible progress from popular viewpoint has resulted in a return to reliance on local powers for security and administration in the absence of a legitimate government alternative. In addition, U.S. efforts have failed to provide the necessary security to break the hold and influence of regional powers, allowing the continued attrition of governmental legitimacy. Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf (1970) in *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* contend, "From A's [the state's] standpoint, effective politics requires the A demonstrate a growing capacity to govern—by adhering to and enforcing law and order; by maintaining discipline within and between its agencies; and by completing announced programs visibly and expeditiously. Demonstrating competence and acquiring a reputation for effective action constitute A's political task" (p. 73). The lack of focus by the central government and coalition forces on the population has produced a shift of support from the central government to regional and local powers that cannot be remedied without a clear focus on reversing the popular perceptions of government inefficacy through demonstrated progress.

Public support of the central government has dwindled as abuse by local militias and reports of governmental corruption, senior official infighting, and allegations of

conspiracy have filtered down to the village level from Kabul. Allegations of conspiracy surrounding the assassination of Vice President Abdul Haji Qadir in July of 2002, frequent ethnic clashes between powerful warlords within the government, and a reported split between Karzai and Defense Minister Fahim Kahn have eroded international as well as national faith in the Karzai regime. Further compounding the problem, the Afghan National Army, once held as an organization to transcend the barriers of ethnic divide, has fallen into inefficacy through administrative delays and over bureaucratization that have stymied its utility (Bryant, interview, 11 September 2003). The popular perception of governmental inefficacy and lack of control is founded on the lack of progress on projects such as the national highway, the government's inability to curtail rampant crime and banditry, and the prevalent extortion and graft imposed by domineering warlords. Dr. Dad Mohammed, an internist stated, "Americans are here for a good reason. But they have been here a year, and what have they done? They have brought people to power who have always been thieves." (Kraul, 26 October 2003).

The lack of sufficient capital represents a major impediment to the reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan. While financial inadequacy is not the root cause motivating the loss of popular support, it remains a significant factor detracting from the overall efficacy and legitimacy of the central government. Afghanistan lacks the natural resources and economic infrastructure necessary to fund its own reconstruction. Its industry and agriculture have been decimated by years of continual war and recent drought. Afghans remain unable to resurrect local industry and legitimate agricultural pursuits due to the lack of security and stability resulting from the absence of control by the central government. In addition, Afghanistan has received inadequate international monetary aid, receiving only \$4.5 billion of the United Nations Development Program and World Bank's estimates of the \$10 billion over five years it would take to facilitate the reconstruction of the country (Margesson, 2002). Further complicating matters, allegations by Afghan Planning Minister, Mohamed Mohaqeq suggest the misappropriation of international aid funds by members of the Karzai regime diminishing both the effectiveness of international aid and the Afghan government (Afghan Minister Attacks Aid 'Abuse', 2002). A report by the Center of International Cooperation at New York University states "from the \$5.2 billion pledged by the international donor

community in the early months of the recovery, to date [May 2003] only \$947 million has been activated towards reconstruction activities on the ground in Afghanistan.” (Hamidzada, Rubin, & Stoddard, 2003, p. 11). Instead, money is focused on immediate relief projects and relief organization infrastructure, detracting from projects that would contribute to the long-term stabilization of the country (Interview, 27 May 2003).

Yet another problem impeding the government’s financial stability remains its inability to collect taxes or compel provincial warlords to relinquish monies they have collected under the pretext of governmental taxation. Colonel Celeski suggests that provincial warlords will not relinquish these funds until the government can provide a return on the money in terms of security, funding, and assistance (Celeski interview, 31 May 2003). However, this position creates a self-compounding dilemma in which the government cannot demonstrate efficacy or provide assistance without adequate funding which the warlords will not provide without the manifestation of governmental assistance and control.

The lack of financial resources has resulted in the inability of the government to fund those in its employment leaving many public officials susceptible to bribery or without the necessary equipment and supplies to effectively enforce the rulings of the central government. Many police and border guards have gone up to four months without salary, motivated only by the promise of a stable future. General Haji Abdul Khaliq of a southern anti-Taliban militia stated, “The Taliban rebels offer local people good salaries—more than \$100 a month—to fight, while Khaliq and his men are not being paid at all.” (Dixon, 2003, p. 1). Efforts to distribute government salaries have met with mid-level corruption by local and regional officials who frequently keep this money to fund local private militias or secure the loyalty of the local police (Kandahar Interview, 23 May 2003). The absence of authority has allowed criminals and insurgents to exert their dominance and supplant the legitimate authority of the government with that of their own based on regional power. Zabul Police Chief, Mahammed Ayub stated, “The Taliban actually ruled like a government in Dai Chupan. People went to the Taliban with their problems, not [to] the government.” (Maykuth, 2003, p. 1). Additionally, the lack of government progress on stated improvements has driven many Afghans back to their reliance on the Taliban. Haji Abdul Khaliq, stated, “From what we can see they didn’t

spend more than a dollar. There are no paved roads, no reconstruction of government buildings, no help for the people, and no government salaries.” (Dixon, 2003, p. 1).

The ascendancy of local criminals and insurgents to legitimacy in the absence of governmental authority and control has facilitated their unimpeded operations evolving from cross-border raids on coalition forces to the establishment of parallel administrative structures over a population with no recourse but submission. While U.S. commanders boast that “the coalition enjoys freedom of movement” and that they “have the capability and tools to do actions at the time and place of our choosing,” U.S. efforts have done little to remedy local security concerns allowing insurgents to return after coalition forces have departed the area (Maykuth, 2003, p. 1). The absence of security at the local level has allowed insurgents and local powerbrokers to maintain and expand their hold over the population, creating the reliance of the populace on the regional authority which detracts from the legitimacy and authority of the government while imperiling prospects for a free, open election in 2004.

The Afghan National Army (ANA), once believed to be the first step towards Afghan self-sufficiency, has fallen prey to the over bureaucratization that stymies many U.S. and coalition operations. While the central government has dispatched the ANA to the areas surrounding Kabul in an attempt to enforce its dictates and foster stability, reports from members of 3rd Special Forces Group state that the ANA has become mired in bureaucracy, and unable to act without approval from several levels of the government and coalition forces (Interview, 11 September 2003). This lack of operational flexibility and response has allowed bandits and insurgents to maintain the initiative and retain dominance over the countryside while the ANA waits in its compound for approval to act. Despite this impediment, the presence of the ANA has a psychological impact on the population in the areas surrounding their compounds. The multi-ethnic composition of the force as well as the deterrence of insurgent activity in its immediate vicinity has restored some confidence in the central government. However, this effect decreases exponentially with distance as the influence and security provided by the ANA compound extend only as far as they are allowed to operate without prior approval. The government faces many problems that detract from its ability to bring stability and control to the country; however, until such a time that emphasis is placed on securing the

populace and developing the necessary infrastructure to foster long-term growth and stability the countryside will remain under the influence and control of bandits and insurgents.

E. INSURGENCY

Insurgency remains the most significant factor detracting from stability in Afghanistan. While numerous problems confront the successful stabilization of the country, insurgents have capitalized on the lack of governmental security and control and exploited national and local issues to unite a diverse populace under the common banner of jihad in a religious struggle funded by the drug trade. Although there are numerous insurgent groups in the country, each acting in its own local context and playing upon that regions' specific weaknesses and distance from the influence and security of Kabul, three groups stand out as the most significant and credible threats to the Karzai regime due to their support, organization, and capability (de Borchgrave, 2003, p. 15). The Taliban, Hizib-i-Islami/Gulbuddin (HIG), and al Qaeda have formed a loose coalition sharing support and intelligence to facilitate greater operations and capability, significantly increasing their ability to wrest power from the Karzai regime and expel coalition forces from Afghanistan. (Baldauf and Tohid, 2003, p. 7).

Pervasive social and economic issues combined with the absence of local security and control have facilitated the resurgence and growth of insurgent movements. The absence of local control and open borders have allowed these movements to exploit exogenous resources and utilize opium production and trafficking to fund their efforts while relying on the remote tribal areas of Pakistan as a refuge to organize and avoid coalition assaults. In addition, the groups have exploited the acephalous nature of Islam to employ it as a vehicle for their message, unifying diverse social elements and mobilizing them under a religious mandate. Insurgency in Afghanistan represents a direct impediment to the stabilization and reconstruction of the country. The growth of these movements, left unchecked, will result in the return to power of the Taliban regime creating a sanctuary for global terrorism and a threat to the global community that will resonate for years to come.

U.S. Army Field Manual 90-8: Counterguerrilla Operations defines Phase I – Latent and incipient insurgency as ranging from

Subversive activity that is only a potential threat, latent or incipient, to situations in which frequent subversive incidents and activities occur in an organized pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgency activity. (FM 90-8, 1986, p. 3-19).

Additionally, FM 90-8 describes phase II –Guerrilla Warfare as

Reached when the subversive movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the government. (FM 90-8, 1986, p. 3-27).

The insurgent movements in Afghanistan have evolved since the fall of the Taliban in December of 2001. Their efforts have shifted from the hit and run tactics characteristic of a Phase I: Latent and incipient insurgency to successively larger and more organized cross-border raids targeting government institutions indicative of Phase II: Guerrilla warfare (FM 90-8, 2003, p. 1-7). Just as Mao Tse-tung traded space for time in China, Afghan insurgents have capitalized on the same principle, trading the control of Afghanistan for time, waiting for U.S. popular sentiment to wane and forces to pull out. “The mantra they use is that the Americans and the international community will leave someday, and we will come back.” (Rhode, 2003, p. 1). U.S. and coalition leadership have misperceived this shift as the weakening of the movements. Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, commander of CJTF-180 asserted that the Taliban is showing “signs of desperation” by carrying out terrorist attacks against civilian targets (Constable, 2003, p.17).

While overt regional trends in insurgent activity against coalition forces may be construed in terms of the decline of a movement, Field Manual (FM) 90-8 states, “depending on the lack of success of the movement, there may also be a reversion from Phase III to Phase II or even back to Phase I.” (p. 1-3). U.S. forces remain unable to locate or differentiate insurgent members from the local populace. This inability stems from the lack of operational human intelligence (HUMINT) produced by overly aggressive force protection measures that have all but eliminated the interaction between U.S. forces and indigenous Afghans. This cascading effect has allowed the insurgent groups to remain indistinguishable from the indigenous population and maintain the

initiative. Therefore, the lack of attacks on coalition forces by insurgents who retain the initiative can by no means be used as a metric for the overall decline of the movement. An alternative view would be to perceive this shift as a conscious effort to avoid waging a pitched battle against superior coalition forces in favor of achieving the maximum psychological effect by focusing on the vulnerable population thereby achieving victory from within as in Vietnam.

Following the fall of Kandahar in December of 2001, many Taliban forces shifted from conventional warfare to Phase I: Latent and incipient insurgency as defined by FM 90-8, in order to regroup and reorganize. Zalmay Rassoul, Afghanistan's national security adviser stated, "When the Taliban was first defeated, they were on the run, but they have had time in Pakistan to get a rest and reorganize themselves. And now they are being incited and encouraged to come back." (Haven, 24 September 2003). These movements have since progressed and in many cases resumed Phase II operations such as the mass unit cross-border raids that have targeted police outposts and border guard stations and the establishment of a parallel administration in the Zabul province. The insurgent movements operating in Afghanistan represent a flexible threat, able to adapt their strategy to coalition response. Past experiences in Vietnam, Malaya, and the Philippines have demonstrated that strategies based on pure attrition such as that employed in Afghanistan have led to failure. However, efforts such as those undertaken by Magsaysay in the Philippines, aimed at severing the influence of the insurgent organization over the population and eliminating the movement's underlying political cause have proved most effective. The ongoing resurgence of insurgent movements and the corresponding increase in activity has evidenced the inadequacy of the current coalition strategy of attrition based on overwhelming mass, firepower, and reliance on advanced technology, demanding both a reassessment of the current threat as well as a revision of the current strategy.

In order to establish the context for a thorough analysis of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, I will conduct an analysis of the three most prominent insurgent groups: the Taliban, Hizib-i-Islami/Gulbuddin, and al Qaeda, focusing primarily on the Taliban to limit the scope of the study. Additionally, I will approach these groups from a collective standpoint based on the knowledge of their collaboration and their common interest in the

return of Taliban authority to Afghanistan that will produce a sanctuary for al Qaeda as well an opportunity for the return to power of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Further, I will analyze only those actions pertaining to Afghanistan. In order to facilitate a comprehensive analysis of the current threat I will employ the Leites and Wolf systemic approach to dissect the broad category of Afghan insurgency into its component elements of inputs (resourcing), conversion mechanisms, and activity.

1. Inputs

Insurgent groups have extensively capitalized on the inability of U.S. and coalition forces to cross or operate within the borders of Pakistan and have used the uncontested border areas as a sanctuary for recruitment and organization. The freedom of movement engendered by the political and religious support of these cross-border areas has allowed groups to procure additional resources to facilitate a wider array of operations. Vehicle dealers in the Quetta region say that the Taliban has purchased over 900 motorcycles enabling a greater range of operating capability with unprecedented speed and flexibility (Rashid, 2003, p. 1). In addition, the religious façade portrayed by Afghan insurgent groups has broadened their appeal with Islamic fundamentalists throughout the world, enabling the insurgents to draw funding and resources from a variety of exogenous sources. The porous border has facilitated the unimpeded operations of insurgent movements allowing them to conduct cross-border raids and recruitment with impunity. Zahir, a Pashtun tribesman and self-proclaimed Taliban recruiter living in Qila Abdullah, relates, “It’s no problem at all to cross back and forth.” A former Baluchistan provincial cabinet minister substantiates Zahir’s claim stating, “It is fair to say that at present no immigration control exists between the two countries. Since forever, Afghans have been crossing the border into Pakistan without passport or visa.” (Lancaster, 2003, p. 1). However, there is increasing indication that the Taliban have developed sufficient support within Afghanistan to limit their reliance on cross-border activity. General Nazar Mohammed Nikzad, head of crime investigation at the Afghan Ministry of Interior stated, “We have Afghan mullahs who are accepting the financial support of the Pakistanis and assisting them in undermining the Karzai government” (Kazem, 2003, p. 7). A Taliban political worker in Baluchistan, Pakistan stated “[the

Taliban] used to hide in the borderlands, but now they have established good contacts with the tribal chiefs and warlords in Afghanistan, so they provide them with shelter now.” (Lancaster, 2003, p. 1). Khalid Pushtun of President Hamid Karzai's Kandahar office stated, “The Taliban were always in Afghanistan. They stayed in their houses, in their villages. They were just waiting for some kind of green light to start fighting the American and Afghan authorities.” (Ozernoy, 2003, p. 16). Reports of a parallel Taliban administration and infrastructure within the province of Zabul substantiate these claims (Maykuth, 2003, p. 1). Despite recent coalition success in dissolving the overt political structures and support of the insurgents in Zabul, the existence of these institutions is indicative of the continuing resurgence and success of the Taliban movement and their ability to garner support from the Afghan population.

David Galula (1964) contends, “The insurgent cannot seriously embark on an insurgency unless he has a well-grounded cause with which to attract supporters among the population.” (p. 13). In an article by the *London Times* a veteran Taliban fighter stated, “Our main purpose is to destabilize the US-backed regime and evict the foreign forces from Afghanistan.” (Hussain, 26 October 2003). Leites and Wolf (1970) state, “To obtain inputs from the local environment, R [the insurgents] relies on various persuasive as well as coercive (damage-threatening or damage-inflicting) techniques.” (p. 33). The Taliban have employed both inducements and coercion to obtain recruits for its cause. Their members frequent social gatherings such as weddings and services at mosques and madrassas citing the poor economic conditions, rampant crime, Islamic moral degradation, and the inability of the government to pay its civil servants to attract followers to its campaign. Galula (1964) postulates, “The insurgent, having no responsibility, is free to use every trick; if necessary, he can lie cheat, exaggerate. He is not obliged to prove; he is judged by what he promises, not by what he does.” (p. 14). In the village of Girishk, two hours from Kandahar, Shir Ali, a member of the Taliban stated, “Everywhere there is insecurity and there is no reconstruction that's why people support us. The Taliban recruit by reminding people of the time when there was no murder, there were no attacks, and there was a real presence of Islam.” (Ozernoy, 2003, pp. 16-17). Villagers, facing widespread poverty and a government unable to pay those in its employ, are offered up to \$100 a month to join the Taliban against coalition forces

and the Karzai regime (Maykuth, 2003, p. 1). A former provincial cabinet minister, speaking on the condition of anonymity stated, “They [the Taliban] are offering money and motorcycles to anyone who will go with them for 15 days up to three months.” (Ibid, p. 1). The Taliban have capitalized on local resistance to the government’s poppy eradication program by telling farmers that the government plans to destroy their harvest and their livelihood, thereby returning them to a life of poverty (Wolfe interview, 25 May 2003). In addition, Maj. General F.L. Hagenbeck, Commander of the U.S. 10th Mountain Division stated, “The Taliban and al-Qa'eda are offering monetary incentives to kill or capture a United States soldier in order to undermine the Afghan government. Militants are being offered between \$5000 to \$100,000 depending on the target.” (Rashid, 21 July 2003). The Taliban have exploited the cultural insensitivity and inadvertent killing of Afghan villagers by coalition forces to generate hostility among the population towards the coalition. The Taliban and other insurgent groups have adapted their strategy for recruitment and softened their approach to appeal to a wider array of prospective supporters. Zahir relates that the Taliban have offered several options to potential recruits stating, “There are different jobs. You can fight at the front line. You can cook. You can be a male nurse. You can give money. Everything is welcome because jihad has started.” (Lancaster, 2003, p. 1).

In addition to material incentives, the Taliban have relied on religious motivators to induce or coerce followers to support their cause. Mawlawee Sahib Khalik Daad, head mullah of the Central Madrassa of Shah Joi District in Zabul Province, captured the Taliban sentiment in what he refers to as the “evils of the Western world in Afghanistan” stating, “Women in Ghazni city and Kabul are working in offices and walking around without proper cover; this is not how an Islamic country should be.” (Kazem, 2003, p. 7). The Taliban have capitalized on deviations from traditional Muslim values to cast coalition forces as an invaders of Western corruption, in an effort to sway traditional Muslim sentiment. Additionally, insurgent groups have used the formal declaration of jihad to compel others to support their operations. In an interview by the *Washington Times*, an Afghan villagers stated, “The Taliban come to our dwellings, beat us and tell us that the jihad against Americans is a religious obligation and we should join them in their fight and must not spy on Taliban fighters.” (de Borchgrave, 2003, p.15).

Insurgent groups such as the Taliban and al Qaeda have exploited the socio-religious organization generated by the unifying call to prayer and Friday service of Islam to serve as a vehicle for mobilization and unification of the various and frequently opposing social and ethnic groups under the call of jihad. The insurgency has used the pre-existing social organization within local mosques to create an environment in which their message can be framed as a religious mandate and delivered by a civil-religious authority (the mullah) to a captive audience unopposed. Mosques and madrassas serve as a central points for the dissemination of information in a community comprised of a largely illiterate population with limited ties to the outside world. In addition, the use of religious and civic leadership (mullahs) provides the message and the movement with legitimacy through an institution that crosscuts both ethnic and social divides. Michael Taylor in *Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action* explains the ability of the insurgency to capitalize on pre-existing social structures in a parallel example. He states, “The peasants’ collective action was made possible in the first place by the pre-existing framework of village communities, which provided a foundation of long experience of reciprocity and acting together in the collective control of their agricultural and pastoral activities and of their common property and public facilities... This unity was further enhanced by a measure of communal self-government, exercised through the assembly of the community’s heads of households, which met in the church (parish and community usually coinciding) and was assisted by the local priest (Taylor, 1988, pp. 70-71).

While Taylor refers to this unifying effect in terms of a western society it is perhaps more relevant to an Islamic community in which the call to prayer is more frequent, the tribal elders comprise the local authority or shura, and the status of the religious authority more elevated due to the dominance of Islam in all aspects of a Muslim’s life. To prevent the de-legitimization of their movement and message, the insurgents have employed terror tactics to quash any dissent from amongst the population and the religious leadership. The Taliban have bombed several mosques and assassinated three Islamic clerics in the vicinity of Kandahar for statements delegitimizing the religious foundations of the Taliban jihad and for their advocacy of the Karzai government. Maulavi Muhammad Haq Khattib, deputy head of the Kandahar

Cleric's Council stated, "According to the villagers and local elders, they had no enemies. It was because of their support for the government." (Gall, 2003, p. 3).

The ability of the insurgent movements to utilize Islam to further their cause has facilitated exogenous as well as endogenous support in the form of manning, materiel, and financial resources throughout the global Muslim community. While the Taliban's fight against perceived Western domination has remained largely confined to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the insurgent movements have exploited the global ties of Islam to extend the fight beyond conventional conceptions of conflict to prey upon the indulgent weaknesses of Western society through the production and trafficking of opium. Insurgent groups have capitalized on the current boom in opium production and trafficking to fund their endeavors. They have given the drug trade religious legitimacy as an extension of the jihad against the West. Abdul Ghaus Rasoolzai, head of Eastern Afghanistan's anti-narcotics department stated, "Al Qaeda is using drugs as a weapon against America and other Western countries." (Tohid, 2003, p. 6). The insurgent movements' connections to the drug trade have tied them into the economic interest of the local Afghan farmer as well as provided additional ties to global criminal and terrorist organizations facilitating a global network of support for a regional conflict that truly can be called the frontline in the war on terror.

The escalation of insurgent activity has shown that current techniques for obtaining resources have been highly effective in generating support for the resurgence and continued operations of all three movements. While the continued escalation of insurgent activity is highly indicative of this success, the increasing influx of additional recruits to both Pakistani and Afghan madrassas further substantiates theories predicting the continued growth of these movements. "The chief of Shah Joi, Haji Zabeet, says he knows of at least 25 Taliban madrassahs and mosques operating in his district." (Kazem, 2003, p. 7). Hafiz Hameedullah, head of a madrassa in Chaman, Pakistan stated, "there is a constant stream of them [recruits]. It is hard to find accommodation for the newcomers." (Cooper, Hussain, Jaffe, 6 October 2003). The report by Cooper et al. estimates more than 8,000 new students have enrolled in madrassas in the border areas alone (Ibid). Despite the existence of mosques and madrassas known to be part of the Taliban infrastructure, local leaders are unable to curtail their operations due to the

perceived religious legitimacy of these institutions. Haji Zabeet, stated, “It would be sacrilegious to remove a mullah or shut down any mosque, even if it is a Taliban mosque. The public would rise against me.” (Kazem, 2003, p. 7). Continued coverage of insurgent operations by the global media continues to reinforce the draw of these movements to both hard-line Muslim extremists as well as idealistic young Muslims throughout the world. Madrassas throughout the Middle East have served as the focal points for the insurgent movements, providing fertile ground for recruiting, ideological training, indoctrination, and military instruction, thereby serving not only as a source of inputs, but as a conversion mechanism as well.

2. Conversion Mechanisms

Madrassas serve as the most significant mechanism for the conversion of resources into operations in the Afghanistan conflict due to their pre-existing organization and religious legitimacy. The relative security produced by their location and alleged ties to regional governmental support within Pakistan have allowed their unimpeded operations producing an increase in insurgent activity. Madrassas serve as focal points within the insurgent movement providing recruits, materiel, and financing as well as ideological indoctrination and military training. In addition, political and religious support in cross-border areas such as Quetta, Pakistan have enabled increased coordination and planning for future operations among members of the Taliban, al Qaeda, and HIG facilitating greater cooperation and expanded operational capability. Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia correspondent for the *London Daily Telegraph* and author of the book *Taliban* wrote, “According to President Karzai, the headquarters for Taliban planning is the Shaldara madrassa in Quetta run by Maulana Nur Mohammed, who is a JUI [Jamiat-e-Ullema Islam religious party] member of parliament.” (Rashid, 2003, p. 1). Insurgent movements continue to flourish within the protected cross-border tribal regions, thriving on the protection fostered by the political and religious support of hardline Muslims within the political institutions of Pakistan. Maulana Abdul Qadir, the deputy to Nur Mohammed, said, “We are proud that the Taliban are made and helped here. Our job is to make sure that the whole Pakistani nation supports the Taliban.” (Ibid, p. 1). Maulana Hafiz Hussain Sharodi, Baluchistan's

information minister, stated, “Only the Taliban can constitute the real government in Afghanistan,” confirming reports of support for the ousted Taliban regime within the political institutions of Pakistan (Ibid, p. 1).

The movements have expanded their operations from the tribal borderlands of Pakistan into Afghanistan and have established formal administrative and logistical infrastructure to facilitate their continued growth and operations. Gen. Nazar Mohammed Nikzad, head of crime investigation at the Afghan Ministry of Interior stated, “We have Afghan mullahs who are accepting the financial support of the Pakistanis and assisting them in undermining the Karzai government.” (Kazem, 2003, p. 7). Insurgent groups have established administrative and logistical infrastructure within Afghanistan, filling the void left by the fall of the Taliban regime or supplanting the ineffective, hastily implemented institutions of the Karzai regime to facilitate their operations. FM 90-8 lists one of the activities characteristic of Phase II guerrilla warfare as the establishment of an insurgent government in insurgent dominated areas. Zabul Police Chief Mohammed Ayub stated, “The Taliban ruled like a government in Dai Chupan.” (Maykuth, 2003, p. 1). In the article containing comments by Mohammed Ayub, Andrew Maykuth, staff writer for the Philadelphia Inquirer, wrote, “In villages such as Dai Chupan, in northern Zabul, the Taliban built bakeries to feed their forces and held town hall meetings to denounce Karzai and his administration” (Ibid, p. 1). Additionally, information received from military members within Afghanistan indicate that the Taliban have used mobile training teams composed of international terrorists to provide training for its new recruits throughout the country (Deh Rawod Interview, 26 May 2003). As the Taliban and other insurgent organization continue to gather support and organize their forces in relative security, their operations have expanded and evolved from hit-and-run terrorist tactics into organized raids on government facilities and forces designed to achieve maximum psychological impact.

3. Activity

Field Manual 90-8 lists six goals that insurgents seek to achieve through their actions: (1.) Support the overall goal of the insurgent movement, (2.) Gain support for the insurgent movement, (3.) Increase the population’s vulnerability, (4.) Lessen government

control, (5.) Provide psychological victories, and (6.) Tie up government resources. (FM 90-8, 1986, p. 2-1). To accomplish these goals FM 90-8 states, “These tactics in the early phases can be divided into terrorism and harassment.” (Ibid, p. 2-5). The insurgents in Afghanistan have maintained an operational flexibility in their pursuit of these aims. They have exploited the absence of government control to influence a vulnerable population, utilizing poor social and economic conditions and religious propaganda to further attrit government legitimacy and control thereby advancing their cause. They have adapted their tactics to counter a strategically stagnant opposition that continues to fail to perceive the insurgent’s intent, thereby surrendering the initiative. The insurgents in Afghanistan have tailored their strategy to counter the overwhelming strength of coalition forces. Their actions have shifted from the hit-and-run tactics characteristic of Phase I insurgency to the organized mass assaults and raids on numerically inferior government forces characteristic of Phase II guerrilla warfare as defined by FM 90-8.

Insurgent operations in early January of 2002 consisted of terrorism and harassment tactics such as the highly inaccurate time-launched rocket attacks, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mines, and small ambushes of coalition troops (refer to Figure 1). While many of the standoff attacks were highly ineffective and served merely as harassment, the attacks served to heighten U.S. security posture and increase force protection measures, limiting contact between coalition forces and local Afghans, thereby inhibiting coalition efforts to gather essential intelligence. Additionally, intelligence sources within Afghanistan suggest that insurgents had exploited the poverty of local Afghans by paying them to set up many of these remote detonated attacks. Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Lefforge of CJTF-180 in Bagram, Afghanistan stated, “Afghan civilians...have told coalition forces that they have been 'approached' by Taliban to launch rockets at coalition targets in exchange for money.” (Agence France Presse, 6 August 2003).

Throughout 2002 and into 2003, insurgent attacks continued to evolve, increasing in frequency while expanding and becoming more organized in their execution. Insurgent actions have developed into complex operations aimed at achieving the maximum psychological impact on the population and the international community through the integration of terrorism, information operations, and coercion. Their actions

have consisted of the assassination of local and provincial politicians, religious leadership, and aid organization workers as well as massed, cross-border raids on government facilities and forces. They have exploited their success through an information operations campaign designed to intimidate local Afghans and demonstrate the inability of the Karzai regime to guarantee security or fulfill many of its pre-election promises for improvement. On 1 September 2003, insurgents killed six workers that were part of a crew rebuilding the road from Kabul to Kandahar to prevent its completion (Maykuth, 2003, p. 1). Captain Tim Wolfe, Intelligence officer for 2nd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group operating out of Kandahar Air Base stated, “The Taliban are targeting U.N. workers, NGOs, and friendly Afghans to show that nothing has changed to better their lives.” (Wolfe interview, 25 May 2003).

On 10 September 2003, insurgents killed four Danish aid workers on the road from Kandahar to Kabul raising the total number of aid workers killed during 2003 to seven, forcing many aid agencies to withdraw their support from regions in need of assistance. In response to the latest attacks Sten Andreassen, program coordinator for the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees, (DACAAR) stated, “Because this fits into a pattern that we have seen lately, unfortunately, we now will have to reconsider the security situation. As an immediate consequence we must stop working in the eastern part of the country.” (Khan, 26 October 2003). Taliban efforts have created a self-fulfilling prophecy in which information operations used to proclaim the lack of progress under the Karzai regime are reinforced by action to ensure the projects remain incomplete. In addition, Wolfe relates that the insurgents have engaged in an intimidation campaign designed to deter Afghans from accepting help from aid agencies and coalition forces by seizing supplies, destroying projects such as schools, threatening those who benefited, and warning others not to cooperate (Wolfe interview, 26 May 2003). Insurgent groups have posted “wanted” posters of coalition forces, utilized night letters to convey threats and warnings, and utilized murder to coerce Afghans to comply with their dictates and cease support of coalition forces.

In addition to overt physical violence, insurgents have exploited the dependence of coalition forces on local Afghans to gain intelligence on coalition, NGO, and government operations. Members of 3rd Special Forces Group, operating out of a

firebase near Deh Rawod, suggest that criminals and insurgents have used workers and interpreters employed by the coalition and NGO's to gather intelligence. The lack of language capability and local knowledge on the part of coalition forces represents a major impediment to both legitimacy and security and creates a vulnerability that has been exploited by the insurgents allowing them to retain the initiative.

The continued evolution of insurgent tactics fostered by the inability of the government to exercise control over the countryside has enabled the insurgents to establish a latent foothold within Afghanistan and directly attrit the legitimacy of the Karzai regime unopposed. U.S. forces, in their relentless pursuit of victory through attrition, have ignored the lessons of Vietnam, allowing the insurgents unimpeded access to the true source of victory –the control of the population. The conflict in Afghanistan will continue its slow progress toward an insurgent victory until such a time that the underlying problems plaguing Afghanistan are mitigated or resolved.

Afghanistan faces many problems that impede its stabilization and unification. The government and population remain split along ethnic and tribal lines, unable to perceive the benefits of integration. Warlord infighting has divided the government and detracted from its legitimacy and control of the population allowing opium production and trafficking to flourish throughout the countryside. Widespread poverty and the mismanagement of aid programs have pushed rural Afghans back to the short-term solution of poppy production facilitating the resurgence of criminal warlords and insurgents. Insurgents have capitalized on the lack of government control and worsening political and economic conditions as motivation to unite diverse members of the population under a religious mandate. While many of these factors existed during the rule of the Taliban and did not produce insurgency, the current insurgent movements have capitalized on these issues, and through a campaign of propaganda have attributed their causation to the presence of coalition forces and the Karzai regime. Current coalition efforts to eliminate the insurgent influence through a strategy of attrition have proved ineffective, and through the careless application of force, have resulted in the alienation of the populace, furthering the insurgent's cause. History has shown that the true end state of war is to attain control of the population, yet it appears that the U.S. military has chosen to ignore this lesson once again. Afghanistan will continue as a country divided,

until such a time that the proper focus is given to the resolution of the underlying factors, security is returned to the population and control of the populace is earned and not demanded.

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CHAPTER IV

Some have said that the strategy of attrition was not a strategy at all but actually reflected the absence of one. The sheer weight of American materiel and resources seemed sufficient to the military leadership to wear down the North Vietnamese and their VC allies; thus, strategy was not necessary. All that was needed was the sufficient application of firepower. It had worked against the Japanese and the Germans in World War II and against the Chinese in Korea. It would be tried again in Vietnam. (Krepinevich, 1986, p.165).

Andrew Krepinevich's statement taken from *The Army and Vietnam* that once held true in Vietnam seems more relevant today when applied to the situation in Afghanistan. The coalition has relied on its overwhelming mass and superiority of firepower and technology to supplant a comprehensive and unified strategy for Afghanistan. In addition, differing perceptions on the nature and status of the conflict have resulted in an overall disjointed effort among government and military organizations producing redundancy and neglect of the fundamental aspects of counterinsurgency. While efforts at a unified approach to reconstruction began in mid 2003 with the introduction of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), this effort has yet to be applied as part of a systematic approach that expands upon its success, condemning it to irrelevance despite its isolated benefit. The military effort in Afghanistan remains disjointed and unfocused, dominated by a partial strategy that addresses a single aspect of the spectrum of counterinsurgency, resulting in a slow defeat from within as the insurgents expand their hold over an increasingly frustrated population.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze U.S. strategy in Afghanistan through a counterinsurgency framework using the systemic approach developed by Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf. I will accomplish this task by categorizing U.S. and coalition actions into the four aspects of counterinsurgency described in the systemic approach: Input Denial, Counter-Conversion, Counterforce, and Strengthening the State. Additionally, I will compare stated coalition objectives to the actions and responses observed in the country by military members, civilians, political officials, and the press. I will reinforce this analysis with counterinsurgency theory and U.S. doctrine to identify inconsistencies

leading to failure. I will utilize these findings to establish the context for conclusions and recommendations, which will be presented in Chapter V.

A. ANALYSIS

On 20 March 2002, George Tenet, director of the CIA, warned the Armed Services Committee of the impending shift in strategy by Taliban and al Qaeda forces operating within Afghanistan: “You’re entering into another phase here that actually is more difficult, because you’re probably looking at smaller units who intend to operate against you in a classic insurgency format.” (Evans, 30 October 2003). However, less than three weeks earlier, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced, “[We] have concluded we’re at a point where we clearly have moved from major combat activity to a period of stability and stabilization and reconstruction activities. The bulk of this country today is permissive, it’s secure.” (Rumsfeld: Major Combat Over in Afghanistan, 1 May 2003). Differing perceptions on the nature of the threat as well as the phase of conflict have come to characterize the thinking among senior leaders in the U.S. government. These differing perceptions have created disjointed policies that cascade downward into conflicting and overlapping efforts stemming from the overall lack of a single unified and comprehensive plan for Afghanistan. As a result, government agencies have pursued individual agendas independent of the operations of other forces operating in the same theater. The absence of a comprehensive plan is no more evident than in military operations in which the sole pursuit has been the counterforce aspect of counterinsurgency dominated by the strategy of attrition.

This singular focus on the attrition of enemy forces has inhibited the successful conduct of operations in Afghanistan in three ways. First, the successful use of force has been constrained by the lack of intelligence. Force is utilized as a reflexive action rather than a proactive measure or as a deterrence allowing the insurgents to retain the initiative. Sun Tzu highlights the danger in the reliance on a reflexive strategy in response to an enemy that cannot be located except by their choosing stating, “If I am able to determine the enemy’s disposition, while at the same time I conceal my own then I can concentrate and he must divide. And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his.” (As cited in Taber, 2002, p. 155). The Taliban have capitalized

on this lesson by targeting smaller government outposts and forces as well as undefended aid workers to achieve maximum psychological impact on the population and the international community. Secondly, this singular, reflexive pursuit of the insurgents reinforced by its relatively minor successes has dominated the focus of coalition commanders, preventing the systematic application of forces and effort and making commanders oblivious to other aspects of counterinsurgency. Leites and Wolf (1970) contend, “A capability to prevent R [the insurgents]—that is a deterrence capability—requires a highly developed intelligence system, enlarged and improved paramilitary and police forces, and expanded engineering and medical units for civic action in remote areas, rather than conventionally armed and trained military units with heavy firepower and armor.” (p. 74). The lack of focus on the security of the population produced by this pursuit has allowed the insurgents to retain their hold over the population, detracting from the coalition’s ability to move and operate freely among the population as well as gather the intelligence essential to the overall success of operations. Finally, the focus on attrition, the lack of security, and the overriding force protection concerns have severed the link between coalition forces and the indigenous population, eliminating the most valuable source of operational intelligence (the population) and inhibiting the ability of the coalition to locate and destroy the insurgents. David Galula (1964) states, “Intelligence is the principle source of information on guerrillas, and intelligence comes from the population, but the population will not talk unless it feels safe, and it does not feel safe until the insurgent’s power has been broken.” (p. 72).

The continued efforts of coalition forces to procure information on the insurgents from an unwilling or incapable population has resulted in a growing resentment and alienation stemming from the cultural insensitivity, mistakes, and the duplication of effort of coalition forces. In a letter of protest to the United Nations’ mission in Afghanistan, the villagers of Lejay wrote, “The Americans searched our province. They did not find Mullah Omar, they did not find Osama bin Laden, and they did not find any Taliban. They arrested old men, drivers, and shopkeepers, and they injured women and children.” (Gall, 2003, p. A1). The building resentment of the Afghan populace, reinforced by mounting civilian casualties and cultural insensibility has shifted the Afghan popular perception of the coalition from that of a liberator to one of an invader.

The lack of unity of effort among government agencies further compounds this problem. Competing actions among government and military organizations in the strategy of attrition have fostered a lack of cooperation among agencies operating within Afghanistan resulting in a lack of intelligence sharing and conflicting actions further diminishing the capability of the coalition to achieve its ends. The duplication of effort has resulted in additional burden placed on the population of Afghanistan as wave after wave of coalition forces from different units and organizations invade their villages and towns in pursuit of the same objectives. Finally, reconstruction actions remain independent of military operations creating a fundamental disconnect between aid and security that allows insurgents to capitalize on relief efforts that occur in areas the insurgents control. Additionally, relief and reconstruction operations are conducted in a distributed manner without regard for capitalizing on previous success, producing limited, isolated effects. Coalition operations in Afghanistan are characterized by the lack of a unified effort, a disproportionate focus on the counterforce aspect of counterinsurgency, and neglect of local security and control. These defining characteristics have stymied coalition efforts in what can only be referred to as an operational quagmire that will eventually lead to the collapse of the Afghan government through the relentless attrition of stability, control, and legitimacy by insurgent forces.

1. Input Denial

In a memo dated 16 October 2003 to senior members of the Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote:

Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us? Does the US need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The US is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' costs of millions. How do we stop those who are financing the radical madrassa schools? (Rumsfeld, 16 October 2003).

While the United States Government has done much to curtail the financing, recruitment, and support of insurgents and terrorists in Islamic nations, the questions posed by the Secretary of Defense are indicative of the absence of policy regarding the input denial and counter-conversion aspects of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Despite the lack of an overarching policy and an associated military strategy, the compilation of those individual programs that have the effect of denying the insurgent access to recruits and resources will be analyzed as aspects of input denial. The intent of this analysis is not to construe these tactics as part of an overall strategy, but rather to evaluate their effectiveness in the context of Afghanistan.

Leites and Wolf (1970) contend, “Reducing R’s [the insurgent’s] access to inputs requires the interdiction of external sources by border surveillance, barriers, or coercive measures applied directly against the external source of supply, and the interdiction of internal sources by control of domestic resources and population. (p. 78). Insurgent movements in Afghanistan rely upon both endogenous as well as exogenous sources of support, creating a difficult impediment to counterinsurgency efforts which must retain focus both on within as well as outside the country. While known sources of support remain active within the borders of Pakistan, political constraints have eliminated the direct targeting of these exogenous mechanisms by coalition forces allowing the insurgents to continue gathering recruits and supplies as well as maintaining a sanctuary for the conversion of resources and organization of efforts.

Pakistani operations aimed at eliminating support within the tribal areas of Pakistan have done little to curb the flow of resources into Afghanistan and have produced further resentment of the West within the tribal leadership. Haji Malik Mirza Alam Khan, the chief of the Ahmedzai Wazir tribe located in the cross border tribal region of Pakistan claimed in response to Pakistani commando raids into tribal lands in October of 2003, “It is a conspiracy against the tribesmen by the US, because it wants to control the tribal areas as it does Afghanistan.” (Tohid, 20 October 2003). In addition, operations by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to locate al Qaeda High Value Targets (HVTs) in Pakistan have contributed to the growing anti-Western sentiment in the region. An unnamed Western diplomat stated in a report by *Time* magazine, “You get these hotshot CIA guys who come in on a six-month rotation, and they want to tear up

everything—mosques, villages—to get bin Laden. Well, the Pakistani army has to live with the fallout. “ (Calbresi and McGuirk, 2003, p. 34). The resentment among the Waziri tribes generated by the numerous incursions into their tribal areas has the potential for producing further polarization resulting in an increase in the support of cross border Afghan insurgent operations.

a. *Border Security*

Coalition efforts to curtail cross border activity are impeded by increasingly restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE) prohibiting coalition forces from pursuing or engaging insurgents once they have crossed the border. Additionally, reports of U.S. forces receiving fire from Pakistani border guards in support of fleeing insurgents as well as the capture of three Pakistani Army officers on a Taliban cross border raid have led coalition officials to question the loyalty of many of Pakistan’s lower echelon forces (Calbresi and McGuirk, 2003, p. 34). Coalition efforts on the Afghan side of the border have proven equally ineffective in stemming the flow of insurgent forces and supplies. While several firebases have been established at high volume crossing points to support extensive patrolling of the border, the rugged terrain along 2,430 kilometers of porous mountain border conceal an immeasurable number of traditional tribal access points into Afghanistan allowing insurgent forces to continue their operations unseen and unimpeded (Afghanistan: A Country Study, 2001, p. 208). Despite the coalition’s possession of surveillance aircraft, the pursuit of HVT’s has dominated the majority of aircraft and the entire inventory of manned and unmanned aerial surveillance assets further impeding the interdiction capability of coalition forces. Exogenous support represents a significant portion of the insurgents’ capability to sustain and increase their operations; however, the insurgent movements have developed an extensive infrastructure within Afghanistan to facilitate an endogenous source for continued operations.

b. *Counternarcotics Operations*

Opium production provides insurgent forces with an endogenous resource used to obtain exogenous funding through the international drug trade. The U.S. Department of State’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau (INL) in a joint endeavor with the U.N. Drug Control Program (UNDCP) has taken the

lead on counter-narcotics within Afghanistan. Ranjeet Singh, INL program officer for narcotics within Afghanistan related that the Department of State has spent an estimated \$60 million in 2003 on counter narcotics efforts within the country (Singh interview, 3 November 2003). This money has been divided among programs for police training, interdiction, and developmental assistance. The program seeks to offer alternatives for the cultivation of poppies through developmental assistance, and to enforce the mandates of the central government through the development of a police and drug interdiction force. Developmental assistance programs consist of crop substitution, irrigation projects, vocational training, and schooling. The crop substitution program has provided flexible alternatives to poppy cultivation by offering local communities projects and programs that address local and immediate needs (Ibid). Program coordinators have focused on substituting agriforestry to replace poppy crops for the difficulty in removing this type of agriculture to replant poppies. However, this requires an enormous up-front investment in the preparation of harvest-ready agriforestry in numerous locations to minimize transitional difficulties.

Irrigation projects to facilitate the transition to a more water intensive crop and road improvement programs to aid in the delivery of the harvest to local markets have supplemented the substitution program to address the economic and environmental resource disparities between poppies and traditional agricultural foodstuffs. Vocational training and cash for work programs have focused on providing skills and equipment suited to the development of an agricultural infrastructure. Cotton gins, canning factories, and wheat mills serve to reinforce the reliance on traditional agriculture as well as providing employment and job skills training for local inhabitants. Singh relates that schooling has eliminated child labor as cheap resource for harvesting the poppy crop. Despite these efforts, little is done to follow up on these programs to ensure compliance. The INL has relied on NGO reporting and local law enforcement to ensure established programs continue as originally intended and to prevent the replanting of poppies. However, recent insurgent activity has eliminated much of the NGO presence throughout the country and the Karzai administration remains unable to adequately pay its civil servants, leaving many susceptible to bribery by drug traffickers and insurgents. While this program is not flawless, it represents a valid effort at curbing opium production by

mitigating its underlying incentives. However, until adequate local security and control are established, the program will remain unable to counter the influence of local powerbrokers in their attempts to sustain opium production and trafficking for their monetary gain.

c. Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR)

On 22 October 2003, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) launched its New Beginnings program in the province of Konduz as part of an effort to implement Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). The program seeks to address the underlying causes behind local instability by removing weapons and providing vocational training as alternative to continued service in local militias, thereby undermining warlord's and local powerbroker's continued usurpation of governmental authority. The program exchanges weapons for an identification card, which entitles its bearer to "\$200, a change of civilian clothes, a box of food, and vocational training and employment counseling in such fields as land mine clearance, road construction and factory work" (Constable, 2003, p. 1). While the program's implementation represents a step in the right direction, it is confronted with many obstacles impeding its success. Hastily verified identities and incomplete background checks have allowed many criminals and past human rights violators to infiltrate the program. The absence of accurate identification has allowed many exploit the program by exchanging multiple weapons. Further, the program coordinators were faced with obsolete or unusable weapons and last minute haggling over money or jobs offered (Constable, 2003, p. 1). Sergei Illarionov, the chief U.N. political adviser for the program in Konduz stated, "Everyone knows this is a pilot project, and everyone is testing it. Our main concern is that people with bad backgrounds, criminals and human rights abusers, don't get included. But there have been so many delays; everything is happening at the last minute. We don't really have time to verify, but we can't delay the launching any further." (Constable, 2003, p. 1).

In addition to the local problems encountered during implementation, program coordinators are concerned with the potential for its implementation throughout the country. Afghans living in provinces with security conditions worse than Konduz will have little incentive to turn in the weapons that remain their only form of self defense in

the absence of government forces or police. Stability and security must be attained in the areas targeted by this program prior to its implementation to eliminate the need for self-defense and fill the power vacuum created by the demobilization of local militias. Additionally, paying jobs must be immediately available to provide an alternative income and prevent the return of the Afghan men to their former employment. Sidiq Chakari, a senior aide in Jamiat-i-Islami, the dominant political party in the Northern Alliance warned, "Before we even think about disarming, the government needs to find jobs for people. If you make all those freedom fighters disarm by force, they may escape to the mountains and join the [Taliban] opposition to take revenge. Premature disarmament could be very dangerous." (Constable, 2003, p. 19). A report by the United Nations Development Program in September 2003 stated,

The main obstacles to DDR stem from the weak commitment of local commanders to the new central government, animosity among armed groups, and a lack of public confidence in the availability of productive and sustainable alternatives to soldiering. Many in the Afghan population view the Ministry of Defense as representing one political faction, and the Ministry currently lacks a civilian mechanism for administration and budget management. Armed groups are unlikely to hand in their weapons until the Ministry demonstrates greater political and ethnic representation of Afghan society. The need to address the fundamental problems associated with the operation of warlords-rather than disarming only their lower-level troops-presents a complicated political challenge for the Government. A related risk is the potential for DDR to leave a security vacuum. At present, neither the Afghan National Army nor the National Police have the capacity to fulfill security needs in the provinces. (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, 5 November 2003).

On 13 October 2003, the United Nations voted unanimously to expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond the confines of Kabul to "pave the way for the increased security in Afghanistan upon which nearly everything else is dependent." (Associated Press, 2003, p. A17). While this move will not resolve the majority of security issues confronting the country, it has the potential for creating the necessary stability required to implement the DDR program in the areas where ISAF assumes control. The program represents an excellent single tactic to develop stability; however, in order to facilitate the success of this concept, it is necessary to integrate this

program with initiatives designed to establish and sustain local security, economic development and growth, and governmental control under an integrated and comprehensive plan.

The inability of coalition forces to curtail cross border insurgent operations or impact infrastructure within Pakistan has allowed the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda to regroup and gather further support in the refuge provided by the Pakistani tribal lands. The ability of the insurgents to operate with impunity has facilitated the expansion of their actions and the establishment of infrastructure within Afghanistan, increasing both the range and scale of insurgent capability. Additionally, the inability of coalition and international forces to provide adequate incentives or sufficient risk to curtail the opium trade has detracted from the legitimacy and control of the central government by providing warlords and insurgents the necessary financing to sustain and expand their operations. While programs such as the United Nations' New Beginnings directly target some of the underlying issues generating instability, they remain discrete tactics, unable to expand upon their progress due to the lack of an overall plan that would allocate the resources necessary to capitalize on this success. Until such a time that International aid and assistance efforts are integrated with coalition military operations, the effects of such programs will remain isolated and irrelevant to the overall stability of the country due to their limited impact.

2. Conversion Mechanism Destruction

Leites and Wolf (1970) define counter conversion as those processes "to reduce R's [the insurgent's] efficiency in converting acquired inputs into the outputs of the insurgent system." (p.79). Additionally they postulate, "To this end, A [the state] can use various measures to reduce the productivity of R's resources, as well as to force R to divert resources from producing offensive operations to more defensive, protective activities." (p. 79). The difficulty posed by the situation in Afghanistan lies in the fact that coalition forces are prohibited from conducting operations within the borders of Pakistan where the majority of insurgents are recruited and trained in madrassas which serve as the insurgent's primary conversion mechanism. While some operations targeting these mechanisms may exist under the auspices of the CIA, these operations are beyond the security classification of this thesis. Additionally, due to the perceived religious

legitimacy of these institutions throughout the Middle East, both Pakistani and Afghan governments remain unwilling or unable to act upon this overt recruitment and support due to fears of generating popular perception of religious persecution thereby rallying further support to the insurgent cause.

Efforts to reform madrassas by Pakistani President Musharraf that began in January of 2002 have shown some progress. Pakistani Education Minister Zubaida Jalal stated, the government already has registered and “mainstreamed” some 1,200 madrassas in less than two years, with a \$100 million, three-year program on target to bring in another 8,000 schools (Sands, 2003, p. 18). The effort seeks to “ensure that students in the schools get a balanced curriculum including math, science and computer studies, that questionable funding sources are cut off, and that there is local oversight and regulation on a continuing basis.” (Sands, 2003, p. 18). The program represents an effective tool to combat the recruitment and conversion of insurgent resources into operations by eliminating one of the movements’ primary sources of indoctrination. This program requires massive oversight and represents only a fraction of the 1.5 million students in 15,000 to 20,000 madrassas across the country of which, only half are registered with the Islamic educational foundations (Sands, 2003, p. 18).

a. Amnesty

One of the most efficient methods for diverting the insurgent’s focus from operations is to attract defectors from within its ranks through programs such as amnesty, psychological operations, and rewards. Leites and Wolf (1970) contend, “Another way of impairing R’s efficiency, at once diverting resources and directly lowering productivity, is to attract defectors from R. If defectors can be attracted from (especially) the middle and higher levels in R’s organization, the effects in reducing morale, increasing internal conflicts, and increasing R’s anxiety and precautions against penetration of its system can be a major impairment to R’s production processes.” (p. 80).

In October 2003, the Afghan government aided by coalition leadership initiated a strategy to induce the surrender and cooperation of “moderate Taliban.” The central government has sought to induce defection through offers of participation in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and in the upcoming elections of 2004. Khalid Pushtun, a spokesman for Kandahar Governor Yusuf Pashtun stated, “We are in favor of negotiating

with moderate Taliban. We will try to encourage them to participate in the elections. They are citizens of Afghanistan, and we have similar rights that all Afghan people have.” (Watson, 2003, p. A3). The government’s strategy began with the release of former Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Mutawakel to allow him to pursue talks with other Taliban officials with the intent of utilizing a former high-ranking member of the insurgents to induce the surrender and cooperation of middle and lower echelon forces (Watson, 2003, p. A3). Haroon Amin, the spokesman for the Afghan Embassy in Washington stated, “We want to make those who are neutral our friends and those who are our enemies neutral. If Afghanistan is not to be a breeding ground for terrorism again, we have to use the energies, the abilities, of anyone we can.” (Iqbal and Waterman, 6 November 2003). The government sought to separate Taliban moderates from extremists for the purpose of the reintegration of moderates back into Afghan society and to produce a rift within the Taliban organization. Foreign Ministry spokesman Omar Samad stated, “It is definitely not an attempt to talk to the Taliban as we have known them, as a militant terrorist group. There are no attempts to talk to people who have been involved in the past with terrorism, or alleged major violations in this country, and those who are still waging war.” (Watson, 2003, p. A3).

In addition to addressing the Taliban, the majority of which are ethnic Pashtuns, Karzai has sought to lessen the rift that has developed between his administration and ethnic Pashtuns living in Central Afghanistan. Karzai has extended an invitation to the leader of the Pashtun separatist movement, the Awami National Party, Wallikhan Abdul Ghafar Khan to Kabul to curtail the ethnic Pashtun support of the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Iqbal and Waterman, 6 November 2003). While the effects of this effort will not be known during the writing of this thesis, this program has the potential to succeed by addressing the underlying grievance of ethnic Pashtuns and causing a rift within the Taliban organization between moderates and extremists.

b. Rewards

A rewards program, which was used effectively in Malaya to induce surrender and defection among the insurgents as well as provide incentive for the elimination of insurgents from among the population, has proved largely ineffective in Afghanistan. Indigenous Afghans have exploited the program to achieve their own ends

by providing false “intelligence” on their ethnic or tribal rivals in an attempt to procure the reward and utilize coalition assets to eliminate their enemies. Additionally, the insurgents exploit the program by spreading disinformation. The largest impediments to the successful implementation of this program lie in the lack of local security, the religious nature of the insurgent organization, and the family and tribal ties of the members of the organizations to the population that are reinforced by tribal codes such as Pushtunwali. The lack of local security prevents the population from revealing information out of fear of the repercussions from the insurgents who retain dominance after coalition forces leave the area. Additionally, the religious aspect of the insurgency coupled with the family ties of the insurgents to the populace reinforced by a cultural code demanding solidarity and mutual support mitigate the perceived benefit of the reward.

c. Psychological and Information Operations

David Galula (1964) observes, “The counterinsurgent is tied to his responsibilities and to his past, and for him, facts speak louder than words. He is judged on what he does, not on what he says.” (p. 14). While what Galula states is true, it is imperative that the government informs the population of its successes to demonstrate to the population that “[it] has the will, the means, and the ability to win. (Galula, 1964, p. 79). According to Maj. Matt Karres of the U.S. Army 3rd Special Forces Group, there is no coherent information operations plan or counter-information operations plan enacted at the local level to relay the progress made by the central government or to counter the claims of the insurgents as to the corruption and lack of progress of the Karzai regime (Personal correspondence, 1 November 2003). Due to the lack of information operations, insurgents convey their propaganda unopposed allowing them to dominate the beliefs of a population that is isolated from the rest of the world. Maj. Mohammed Issaq, commander of the Afghan National Army (ANA) unit in Qalat stated, “If we had a radio station in this province, we can tell people what the government is doing for them. As it is now, the Taliban can get the word out and tell people whatever it likes.” (Maykuth, 2003, p. 1).

The inability of coalition forces to directly attack the insurgent’s mechanisms for the conversion of resources into activity has severely impaired the

coalition's ability to reduce insurgent operations. However, the lack of a coherent integrated plan within Afghanistan has facilitated the unimpeded operations of the insurgents within the country. While the government's amnesty program represents an excellent effort to cause divide within the Taliban organization and undermine its ethnic support, the lack of security and information operations has allowed the insurgent to influence the beliefs and actions of the population, weakening the central government's tenuous hold over the country.

3. Counterforce

Galula (1964) contends, "The destruction of the guerrilla forces in the selected area is, obviously, highly desirable, and this is what the counterinsurgent must strive for. One thing must be clear, however: This operation is not an end in itself, for guerrillas, like the heads of the legendary hydra, have the special ability to grow again if not all destroyed at the same time." (p. 107). The primary characteristic of coalition counterforce efforts is the redundancy of effort applied to the strategy of attrition resulting from the lack of a coherent plan. The primary and overriding facet of the CJTF-180 mission statement that permeates all subordinate units is "to kill, capture, or deny sanctuary for al Qaeda, Taliban, or anti-Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan groups." (Personal correspondence, 8 August 2003). This single focus, driven by commanders seeking to demonstrate tangible efficacy through body counts, captured equipment, and the elimination or capture of High Value Targets (HVTs) has produced competing and many times conflicting efforts rather than integrated and complementary operations between units within the same command structure. Additionally, this singular focus is maintained at the expense of all other aspects of counterinsurgency, producing disjointed and unsupported civil operations and creating vulnerability in the population through the lack of local security. Leites and Wolf (1970) postulate, "A capability to prevent R [the insurgents]—that is a deterrence capability—requires a highly developed intelligence system, enlarged and improved paramilitary and police forces, and expanded engineering and medical units for civic action in remote areas, rather than conventionally armed and trained military units with heavy firepower and armor." (p. 74).

U.S. Army Field Manual 90-8 states, "Combat commanders deploying to conduct Counterinsurgency operations should understand... that neutralization of the guerrilla is

only one-third of the COIN [counterinsurgency] strategy. Balanced development of the country and mobilization of the populace against the insurgents must occur simultaneously for the insurgency to be defeated.” (FM 90-8, 2003, p. 1-13). Additionally, FM 90-8 lists synchronization as one of the four operational concepts for Air Land battle stating, “In the Counter guerrilla environment, it encompasses the effective, coordinated use of available combat power and its interface with noncombat operations.” (FM 90-8, 2003, p. 1-20). Galula (1964) states, “It is not enough for the government to set political goals, to determine how much military force is applicable, to enter into alliances, or to break them: *politics becomes an active instrument of operation*. And so, intricate is the interplay between the political and the military actions that they cannot be tidily separated; on the contrary, every military move has to be weighed with regard to its political effects, and vice versa.” [Emphasis in the original] (p. 9).

According to reports from members of the 3rd Special Forces Group operating in Afghanistan, there is a fundamental disconnection between aid programs and military operations. Despite the lack of intelligence cooperation with the military forces by the villagers, military commanders remain unable to stop the flow of aid and benefits to the villagers as a form of carrot and stick approach (Interview, Deh Rawod, 27 May 2003). This inability produces a disconnect between the villagers’ perceptions of the military and Civil Affairs and aid groups and demonstrates that despite the lack of assistance and continued attacks on Western personnel the benefits will continue. A Civil Affairs officer operating out of a firebase near the city of Deh Rawod stated, “People feel no obligation to the U.S. for CA projects. If a CA team is hit with a mine, the villagers will not give up the names [of the attackers] or intelligence. Even if we stop work in the village this has little to no impact on the villagers because they [the villagers] do not feel security comes from the U.S. but from local warlords.” (Interview, Deh Rawod, 26 May 2003).

The absence of local security results from a combination of factors stemming from the singular focus of the coalition on the attrition of insurgent forces and the overwhelming oversight and control demanded by the CJTF-180 headquarters. Increasingly restrictive force protection measures and the over-bureaucratization of operations have impaired the flexibility of coalition operations. FM 90-8 states, “To preserve the initiative, subordinates act independently within the context of the overall

plan. The overall attitude of the Army is one of action, not reaction, to the enemy's initiatives." (FM 90-8, 2003, p. 1-20). Reports from members of 3rd Special Forces Group in Afghanistan indicate that U.S. forces must obtain approval before conducting operations outside of six kilometers from their firebases (Interview, Deh Rawod, 26 May 2003). Additionally, all "named" operations (all those other than routine travel) require approval from the CJTF-180 headquarters, which may take up to 48 hours (Interview, Deh Rawod, 26 May 2003). Special Forces members in Afghanistan describe the CJTF-180 planning and approval process as "too slow and too large for all operations" and contend "the formal planning process demanded for all operations diminishes responsiveness to the point of inefficacy." (Ibid). The net effect of these restrictions is to impede the flexibility and response of local units, thereby surrendering the initiative to local insurgents. The lack of responsiveness of coalition forces has allowed insurgents to conduct operations unimpeded, thereby diminishing security and control by the central government.

The absence of local security coupled with the lack of contact between coalition forces and the population driven by over-zealous force protection measures has diminished the ability of the coalition to obtain operational intelligence. Force protection measures have limited the contact between coalition forces and the population, restricting coalition forces to movement through an area or to the conduct sweeps en masse, seriously impeding coalition efforts to gather vital information necessary to locate and destroy insurgent forces. The use of sweeps by coalition forces, uneducated in local customs and cultural sensibilities and wearing heavy body armor has produced the alienation of the local populace fostering mistrust, creating a further impediment to intelligence collection. Additionally, interviews with several Military Intelligence Officers serving in Afghanistan reveal that there exists no integrated intelligence collection plan or matrix to divide intelligence requirements among the collection agencies, further convoluting efforts to collect vital intelligence. An intelligence officer operating out of Kandahar Air Base stated, "CJSOTF (Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force) has no intelligence collection plan and does not pass down requirements resulting in insufficiently developed intelligence for certain operations such as no name or picture of the target." (Interview, Kandahar, 25 May 2003).

The inability of coalition forces to provide local security has directly affected its ability to conduct counterforce operations. The lack of local security reinforces coalition commanders' requirements for increased force protection measures, severing the link between the population and forces in the field. Additionally, the lack of local security prohibits the population from providing intelligence out of the fear of retribution by the insurgent forces that retain control over the area after coalition forces have departed. The coalition's lack of focus on the population has resulted in a downward spiral of operations producing diminishing returns. The continued single focus of military counterforce operations as an independent, autonomous strategy separate from social, political, and economic reconstruction efforts has led to the gradual attrition of government control and legitimacy and will eventually contribute to the usurpation of power by the insurgents as in Vietnam, unless strategic reforms are initiated.

4. Strengthening the State

The objective of strengthening the state is to increase both the state's and the population's capacity to absorb physical and political actions by the insurgents. This entails both active and passive-defensive measures as well as political action and reform. Leites and Wolf (1970) state, "Its passive-defensive aspects include such measure as building village fortifications ("hardening"), and relocating villagers so that they are less accessible to R (evacuation). Its active-defensive aspects involve creating or strengthening local paramilitary and police units with increased capacity to provide local defense against small unit actions by R." (p. 36). While the physical aspects of counterinsurgency seek to physically separate the insurgent from the population, the political aspect of this facet of counterinsurgency seeks to strengthen or restore the faith of the population in the capability of the government to rule and undermine the propaganda of the insurgents through demonstrated progress or reform. Leites and Wolf (1970) contend, "In the realm of political action, such capacity requires (1) A's adherence to law and order in contrast to R, and (2) its demonstrated ability to complete announced programs, thereby certifying that it should govern because it is governing. " (p. 37). While the majority of actions undertaken by the coalition have focused on the pursuit and destruction of insurgent forces, the government and coalition have instituted several programs and reforms characteristic of this aspect of counterinsurgency. The

development of a new constitution designed to provide for the stable leadership of the country seeks to mitigate ethnic and religious tensions through the elimination of political parties based on military, ethnic, or religious groups.

The mandated ethnic balance imposed on the ANA seeks to diminish fears of the ethnic domination of the military while increasing the security of the countryside and restoring government control. The decision in October 2003 to expand the International Security Augmentation Force (ISAF) as a temporary stopgap to counter the security vacuum caused by delays in the training and deployment of the ANA will begin to reverse the attrition of government legitimacy and control through the establishment of local security and law and order. Finally, the international Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) represent the first attempt by the coalition at an integrated effort combining security and relief to sever the hold of the insurgent forces while demonstrating the capability of the government to effectively meet the needs of its people. Despite the promise of these programs, they represent individual efforts not part of an integrated plan capable of expanding on success. The fundamental failure that coalition and international leadership continue to fail to perceive is the lack integration of effort caused by the absence of a unified command structure. Until efforts are coordinated and focused upon the long-term security and benefit of the population, they will continue to be individual tactics producing isolated success.

a. Reform

Possibly the most fundamental lesson to be taken from the analysis of the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines is the effectiveness of social and political reform in diminishing the ability of the insurgents to influence the population. The draft of the Afghan constitution, which was unveiled in November 2003, seeks to achieve these ends through guidelines designed to mitigate religious and ethnic tensions, eliminate corruption, and sever the ties between political authority and military power in its members thereby detracting from insurgent claims of the corruption and bias of the central government. The draft constitution, which was based on the 1964 Afghan constitution, creates an Islamic republic with representative political structures that directly parallel those of the United States. Under the constitution, the government would be headed by a popularly elected president, a National Assembly, with an upper and

lower house, and an independent judiciary. However, the government will also include a prime minister directly appointed by the president to avoid the problem of creating two powerful positions that could spark rivalry. The lower house will be popularly elected to ensure maximum political enfranchisement of the population while the upper house will be partially appointed by the president. The president will be the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and will have the ability to appoint cabinet members pending the approval of the lower house.

The constitution seeks to mitigate ethnic tensions and eliminate the participation of local warlords by prohibiting political parties based solely on ethnicity, language, region or religion (Watson, 2003, p. A3). This article is reinforced by legislation adopted in mid-2003 prohibiting those with private militias from holding office. The constitution seeks to eliminate corruption through a system of checks and balances by which a president may be removed by a two-thirds majority vote by both the lower house and a traditional grand council or *loya jirga* (Ibid). Finally, the draft seeks to mitigate the religious underpinnings of the insurgent movement by recognizing Islam as the national religion stating, “The religion of Afghanistan is the sacred religion of Islam.” (Ibid). Additionally, the constitutional convention added, “No law can be contrary to Islam,” however, the constitution does guarantee followers of other religions the freedom “to perform their religious ceremonies within the limits of the provisions of law,” and does not advocate a specific Islamic sect or school of thought (Ibid).

The process for developing the constitution sought to achieve the maximum political enfranchisement of the population through questionnaires distributed throughout the country to solicit the input of a wide variety of the diverse groups that comprise the Afghan population on what should be included in the document (Afghans to Have an Islamic Republic, 3 November 2003). In December 2003, a 500-member *loya jirga* will debate on and potentially ratify the draft of the constitution. While the government has undertaken much effort to address many of the issues underlying insurgent claims of governmental inefficacy and corruption, these efforts overlook several issues still impeding the restoration of government legitimacy. Many religious fundamentalists oppose the constitution as a document that takes precedence over the *sharia* or Islamic law as defined by the Koran. Mawlawee Sahib Khalik Daad, head

mullah of the Central Madrassah of Shah Joi District in Zabul Province stated, “I support any Islamic group that works against an Afghan government that doesn't fully embrace sharia [Islamic law].” (Kazem, 2003, p. 7). Additionally, many local social and economic issues still plague the country, which Afghans have sought to alleviate through the drug trade and reliance on local warlords and powerbrokers. Maj. Mohammed Issaq, commander of the ANA unit in Qalat stated, “The province needs lots of things. We need to get a lot more trained police in here. We need to get humanitarian organizations in here. The base and root of all problems in Zabul is poverty.” (Maykuth, 2003, p. 1).

The Philippine counterinsurgency example demonstrated the ability of social, political, and economic reform to break the ideological grip of the insurgents over the population through demonstrated progress. The key to the success of these programs lay in their ability to address the local and immediate issues confronting the population such as security, justice, and the alleviation of poverty. A peasant leader in the Huk movement noted of Magsaysay’s programs, “All the reforms that were promised and partially implemented, even though small and showcase in nature were encouraging for the people. Many people believed the government; they believed Magsaysay.” (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 238). While the efforts of the central government in Afghanistan are forming the basis for a stable representative government, little is being accomplished at the local level in terms of demonstrated progress. Insurgents have exploited the rampant crime and unfinished projects such as the highway from Kabul to Kandahar to highlight the lack of efficacy and progress under the Karzai regime. Member of 3rd Special Forces Group frequently hear villagers state, “At least I was safe under the Taliban.” (Interview, Kandahar, 24 May 2003). In order to produce results comparable to those obtained by Magsaysay, the Afghan government must begin at the local level through programs that produce tangible and immediate results; however, this cannot be accomplished until adequate security is maintained to separate the insurgents physically from the population.

b. Security

The inability of the central government to extend its control over the majority of Afghanistan stems directly from its inability to enforce its dictates beyond the threshold of Kabul and the protection of the United Nations’ International Security Augmentation Force (ISAF). This absence of control results from the government’s

inability to sufficiently pay its civil law enforcement and develop sufficient military power to counter that of insurgents, warlords, and local powerbrokers. Traditionally, the police represent the primary means by which the government exercises its authority internally, however, during the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in a country without an established infrastructure, the military assumes this role. However, the ANA has fallen severely behind schedule due to unexpected delays and political problems. As of September 2003, reports varied between six and seven thousand forces trained, and while the ANA began its first operations in January, the army is still drastically short of the estimated 70,000 it will require to secure the country. Further, reports of ethnic bias in the selection of officers by the Defense Minister and ethnic Tajik Fahim Kahn have slowed the process of developing an ethnically balanced force. An unnamed military officer in Kabul stated in a story by the *Washington Times*, "People do not want to send their sons to be servants of a faction. To have a national army, you have to have a national defense ministry. Without real political reforms and power-sharing at the top, nothing else can move." (Constable, 2003, p. 17).

Despite these impediments, reports from members of the 3rd Special Forces Group in Afghanistan indicate that the first few operations of the ANA achieved some success in diminishing the amount of criminal and insurgent activity. Further, operations were conducted in accordance with the "oil spot" principle that left ANA units behind in hostile areas to serve as a stabilizing force (Karres interview, 1 November 2003). The presence of the ethnically integrated ANA has had a positive psychological effect on the population facilitating limited cooperation in the regions occupied by the ANA. However, the area of coverage of the few ANA units remains too small to affect the widespread security necessary to produce permanent stability throughout the country. Maj. Karres of the 3rd Special Forces Group contends, "the populace knows they will have to fend for themselves against the enemy once the government forces leave." (Karres interview, 1 November 2003). Additionally, ANA operations, while facilitating independent civil relief actions by aid organizations in the area the ANA occupies, remain autonomous of large-scale planned relief and reconstruction efforts.

In light of the limited ANA forces, the United Nations voted to expand the role of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond the confines of Kabul in October of 2003. The U.S. Department of State defined the purpose of the expansion:

To support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement. (U.N. Authorizes Expansion of Security Force Beyond Kabul, 9 November 2003).

The expansion of ISAF will further contribute to the stabilization of the country in the areas it occupies; however, it too is constrained by limited manpower and will only provide security and stabilization in the limited areas occupied by its forces.

In an effort to remedy the absence of security resulting from limited military forces, the United Nations Development Program has undertaken an initiative to train and equip additional police members for deployment throughout the country. Currently, the existing police force is plagued by manpower and equipment shortages as well as being underpaid. This leaves them unable to enforce government rulings against better armed and equipped criminals and insurgents who offer money that many civil servants need to feed their families. Insurgent attacks throughout the summer of 2003 have directly targeted police and border guards using overwhelming force to achieve victories with maximum psychological impact on the rural Afghans by demonstrating the inability of the government to protect them from insurgent attacks. Further compounding this problem, many local militias used in lieu of police forces have abused their authority and committed numerous transgressions against local villagers. A United Nations report published in September 2003 highlights these issues,

When the Afghan Interim Authority came to office, police in the Kabul region came immediately back into operation with their salaries covered by donors through the UNDP-managed Afghan Interim Authority Fund (AIAF). Outside of Kabul, however, the police remain barely operational. Those who are present often have loyalties to local commanders and operate in a manner that violates international norms and human rights. In the absence of an effective national police force to ensure law and order during the elections and other democratic exercises, Afghanistan's entire

nation-building process will be jeopardized. (National Civil Police and the Law and Order trust Fund of Afghanistan, 9 November 2003).

The United Nations program entitled the Law and Order Trust Fund of Afghanistan in conjunction with police advisors provided by the government of Germany seeks to re-establish the civil police force through a five phase, prioritized program. The programs aims, in order of priority, are to provide police salaries, allowances, and benefits; procure non-lethal police equipment; rehabilitate police facilities, train and rebuild the capacity of police; and rebuild police institutions (Ibid). Further, the report states, “In coordination with the German government, we are implementing a \$26 million police and justice program that includes equipment and training for the Afghan police, and the establishment of an identification card system and a communications network for the police. We are in the process of planning, with our German colleagues, an expansion of police training in the provinces.” (Ibid). However, as of September 2003, the program, due to insufficient funding, has been unable to successfully fulfill its first objective of providing salaries, paying police in only 28 of 32 of Afghanistan’s provinces (Ibid).

The establishment of security at the local level represents a vital first step in the stabilization of Afghanistan by demonstrating the ability of the government to effectively govern the nation in the eyes of the population. The absence of security has allowed criminals and insurgents to influence and control the population through intimidation and coercion. Insurgents and local powers have gradually supplanted the authority of the government due to its inability to enforce its dictates and provide protection for its constituency. Therefore, the security of the population must take precedence over the majority of actions undertaken by the government in order to provide a stable foundation for the reconstruction of the country.

c. Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) represent the first truly integrated program implemented by the coalition in Afghanistan. The program combines security with civil action to facilitate reconstruction in a secure environment. The PRTs have three purposes: “To provide a safe environment for humanitarian activities; exchange information between the central government, the Army, and non-governmental organizations; and help the Afghan government project its presence outside of Kabul.”

(Wagner, 1 November 2003). U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Robert P. Finn said, "There are ongoing security problems. We want to provide a safe platform for other peacetime activities." (Ibid). The program has addressed the concerns of non-governmental aid organizations (NGOs) that have been increasingly targeted throughout 2003 by insurgent forces seeking to demonstrate to the population the lack of government progress. The teams are comprised of a joint civil-military effort of 50-100 military and civilian personnel tasked to provide relief and facilitate economic development in areas with ongoing security problems through projects such as building schools, repairing damaged bridges, establishing medical clinics, or digging water wells. As of September 2003, PRTs have been established in the Afghan cities of Kunduz, Bamian, and Gardez; however, U.S. leadership hopes to have eight teams in place by the end of 2003. (Brown and Thompson, 1 November 2003). News reports in the latter half of 2003 indicate that the teams have had some success and fostered renewed faith in the Karzai regime and coalition forces. Muhammed Dalili, governor of the Paktia Province said, "The suspicion between the local people and the central government has lessened because of the coalition PRT. They see that the central government is working to reconstruct their country, and because of the security forces, there is now a sense of security here among the people." (Wagner, 1 November 2003).

Despite the limited success of this initiative, the overall effort faces several issues impeding its effectiveness. NGOs have expressed opposition to this program stating PRTs blur the line between the military and civil relief and aid projects resulting in increased targeting of the NGO aid workers. Denis McClean, a spokesman for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, protested, "We don't believe that military forces should have any part in the delivery of humanitarian aid, or be involved in it -- unless in very extreme and difficult circumstances. And we feel that when people see soldiers throwing aid out the back of a truck and providing humanitarian assistance, it blurs the lines of distinction between humanitarian aid workers and the military." (Synovitz, 1 November 2003). Additionally, a State Department representative related that the teams maintain "storefronts" in numerous towns, but do not provide permanent security. (Phone interview, 25 October 2003). Provincial reconstruction teams operate over a wide area containing several villages and towns, the lack of permanent

security allows criminals, warlords and insurgents to reclaim areas once the PRTs have moved, allowing them to reap the rewards of the PRTs' efforts. Galula (1964) contends, "Political, social, economic, and other reforms, however much they ought to be wanted and popular, are inoperative when offered while the insurgent still controls the population." (p. 79). Galula (1964) also postulates, "The operations needed to relieve the population from the insurgent's threat and convince it that the counterinsurgent will ultimately win are necessarily of an intensive nature and of long duration. They require a large concentration of efforts, resources, and personnel. This means that the efforts cannot be diluted all over the country but must be applied successively area by area." (p. 79). While initial efforts have capitalized on the relative security of the cities and provinces in which they operate, attempts to expand these effort into less secure areas will result in the insurgents exploiting or mitigating the benefits provided by the PRTs.

The establishment of PRTs represents the first step in the development of integrated effort to facilitate reconstruction at the local level. However, the lack of a comprehensive plan consistent with the "oil spot" principle has resulted in insufficient coalition resources to provide permanent security over the entire area of coverage while the dispersion of effort has impeded the ability of the coalition to expand upon the local success of the individual teams. The plan requires further integration with efforts to train and equip local law enforcement that can gradually supplant coalition security forces, thereby allowing the PRT to create stability and security that will remain after the PRT has moved to the next area without fear of the original area returning to the control of criminals and insurgents. Until such efforts are consolidated and focused by a comprehensive plan to systematically expand security and stability and integrated with other programs to foster permanent security, the effects of the PRTs will remain limited and local.

5. Other Impediments to Counterinsurgency

While the Leites and Wolf systemic approach provides a comprehensive analysis of the strategy associated with counterinsurgency, several other aspects of organization and administration are fundamental to the overall success of counterinsurgency operations. Unity of command, coordination of action, and the development of intelligence are essential components of a successful counterinsurgency strategy. This

section will analyze several of these factors absent from coalition operations that have directly contributed to the success of past counterinsurgency operations.

a. *Continuity*

The lack of continuity by coalition forces produced by short operational tours, the lack of overlap between rotating forces, and the inability of the coalition to reassign Special Forces and intelligence operatives to previously assigned areas has resulted in the duplication of effort and the inability to produce indigenous intelligence networks. Short operational tours in a protracted unconventional war such as in Afghanistan coupled with the lack of specific country training have diminished the ability of Special Forces to integrate with and exploit indigenous forces. Units rotating in and out of the field enjoy little if any overlap, frequently leaving on the same aircraft that carried in their replacements (Interview, Kandahar, 23 May 2003). These rapid replacements were conducted at the detriment of passing low-level source contacts and the introductions of new team members to local authorities, thereby severing the local ties necessary for the cultivation of trusted intelligence sources (interview, Kandahar, 23 May 2003). Additionally, when teams rotate back to Afghanistan, they frequently are assigned to other areas requiring the team to seek out new sources, eliminating the success the team had produced in their last area of responsibility. Anthropologist, Dr. Anna Simons of the Naval Postgraduate School contends what is perhaps equally important as establishing experience through extended tours is the credibility established by forces in fulfilling promises to return after making an initial successful impact on local leadership. (Simons interview, 29 October 2003). The lack of continuity in a protracted unconventional war such as in Afghanistan has further diminished the ability of the coalition to gather vital intelligence on the location and operations of the insurgent forces, allowing them to retain the initiative and inhibit coalition efforts.

b. *Lack of Regional Training*

The lack of cultural training, regional knowledge, and language skills by members of the coalition remains a major impediment to efforts in Afghanistan. The lack of language skills has created vulnerability within coalition forces by allowing the insurgents to obtain vital information on operations and coalition informers from the interpreters assigned to coalition units. The inability to speak one of the local languages

also represents an impediment to understanding and communication preventing units from creating essential ties with local villagers and receiving vital intelligence. Additionally, the use of local militias implicated in human rights violations and the abuse of villagers as guides has diminished the legitimacy and the popular perception of coalition forces as liberators and defenders. The ignorance coalition forces of cultural knowledge and sensibilities has generated alienation and resentment among the population. Frequent large-scale sweeps conducted without regard for traditional customs accompanied by searches of homes and women, erroneous imprisonment, and the disrespect of tribal elders has incensed the population decreasing their willingness to assist coalition forces in their pursuit of insurgents and HVTs. Additionally, the lack of knowledge regarding strict tribal codes such as Pusthunwali has generated additional recruits for insurgent forces through blood vengeance enacted following accidental civilian casualties by coalition forces.

c. Unity of Effort

Two key facets of counterinsurgency operations in Malaya that directly contributed to its success were unity of command and unity of effort. These concepts ensured the integration of effort towards the common objective of returning the control and loyalty of the population back to the central government. U.S., coalition, and international civil and military efforts remain divided in overall command and execution, leading to the implementation of aspects of counterinsurgency out of context and without the required support. Efforts remain distributed and ineffective due to the absence of a comprehensive plan fostered by multiple command structures and sources of authority. These distributed actions have precluded expanding operations beyond local success and have resulted in areas reverting to the control of warlords and insurgents following the departure of coalition or government forces. Additionally, the focus of coalition forces at all echelons on the elimination of insurgent forces through a strategy of conventional military attrition has led to the absence of local security and the severe impairment of coalition attempts to gather intelligence on insurgent forces. The duplication of effort resulting from the competition for increased body counts or equipment capture by the coalition has allowed insurgent groups to flourish in the uncontested cities and villages left undefended by reactionary coalition commanders, who consider static defense an

impediment to locating and destroying insurgent forces. Additionally, the absence of local security and lack of integration with other governmental and NGO elements operating within the country has impaired and in some cases negated their efforts at relief, alienating and diminishing the trust of the population in the central government. The solution to this problem lies in the consolidation of authority in a single command structure to facilitate the full integration of all operations to ensure the application of the full spectrum of counterinsurgency.

B. CONCLUSION

The lack of focus on the security and stabilization of the countryside produced by the singular pursuit of the strategy of attrition of insurgent combat forces and leadership has created conflicting and redundant military efforts and the neglect of other aspects of a viable counterinsurgency strategy. The dearth of security has severed coalition links to operational intelligence by leaving the population and reconstruction efforts vulnerable to insurgent operations. The insurgents have capitalized on this vulnerability by targeting relief workers and projects, as well as government authority figures in an effort to impede stabilization and progress resulting in the loss of legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the population. Insurgent propaganda continues to attrit popular confidence in the government reinforced by the lack of local progress while the absence of a counter-information operations campaign has allowed the insurgents to continue their misinformation uncontested. The authority and organization demonstrated by insurgents and local powerbrokers in the absence of government control have resulted in the shift of reliance of the population from the government to local powers. Despite several successful programs and tactics, the overall coalition effort represents a collection of discrete tactics competing for limited resources, scattered by the absence of an overall plan, and in many cases conflicting. Until such efforts are unified under a comprehensive and focused plan, disjointed tactics will continue to produce limited and isolated results overwhelmed by the influence of insurgents, criminal, and warlords.

CHAPTER V

Following the analysis of three cases of counterinsurgency and the study of the tactics utilized by both civil and military organizations that produced both success and failure, I concluded that while each insurgency operates in a unique context it is bounded by several universal concepts that may be exploited to form a general framework of counterinsurgency. Several discrete tactics may be adopted from previous counterinsurgencies to produce similar effects; however, these tactics require significant modification and integration into a larger strategy to prove effective. Discrete tactics applied out of the context from which they originally produced success will generate limited and isolated results or outright failure, as did the strategic hamlet program under Operation SUNRISE in Vietnam. Larry Cable (1986) contends, “There are seeming universals in insurgent war also: intelligence, the eschewing of area denial and high-lethality weapons, the centrality of non-military measures, unity of command among others. But it is most important that the universals be modified to fit the requirements of the local situation rather than the local situation be interpretively manipulated to fit the requirements of the universals.” (p. 281). While the study of these three cases illustrated the danger in attempting to transfer counterinsurgency strategy and tactics from one case to another, the cases highlighted three major themes common to both successful cases that when absent from the third (Vietnam) produced failure. These themes are unity of command; unity of effort; and a focus on the separation of the insurgent from the population.

Successful counterinsurgency strategies blur the lines of the Leites and Wolf categorization in that these strategies represent the unification of effort and the combination of social, economic, psychological, and military efforts to alleviate or mitigate the underlying causes that provide the insurgent movement with its *raison d’etre*. International civil and coalition military efforts in Afghanistan remain a collection of competing and unfocused efforts that suffer from the absence of a comprehensive plan for counterinsurgency. Reconstruction and counterinsurgency operations are divided along boundaries formed by the perception of separate civil and military jurisdictions that prevent the integration of effort in a conflict that covers the

entire gamut of the internal elements comprising the state (social, political, economic, and military). In the realm of counterinsurgency, each aspect is complementary and dependent, requiring the others to gain and maintain success over the insurgent forces. Military efforts may clear an area but cannot break the ideological grip of the insurgents on the population, while civil efforts may win the hearts and minds of the population but cannot sever the insurgent's physical controls. David Galula (1964) contends,

It is not enough for the government to set political goals, to determine how much military force is applicable, to enter into alliances, or to break them: *politics becomes an active instrument of operation*. And so intricate is the interplay between the political and the military actions that they cannot be tidily separated; on the contrary, every military move has to be weighed with regard to its political effects, and vice versa. [Emphasis in the original] (p. 9).

The overarching issue confounding efforts in Afghanistan is the lack of a single, unified command structure that integrates civil and military efforts under a systematic and comprehensive plan. Unity of command is essential for the coordination and integration of the efforts necessary to produce a comprehensive strategy to attain the separation of the insurgents from the population, the establishment of security, and the restoration of control by the government. Leites and Wolf (1970) contend, "The aim of successful tactics in insurgent conflicts is counterproduction: to impair the ability of R [the insurgents] to produce and reproduce forces while "hardening" the structure of government authority so that it can withstand R's attacks and permit the essential counterproduction effort to gain momentum." (p. 154). Success must be pursued through a simultaneous effort that institutes reform and institutional change at the government level while creating security and stability at the local level through permanent security, social and political reform, and economic relief and development. Efforts must be systematic and expand upon success. Large projects must focus on long term reconstruction such as economic development and the creation of agricultural infrastructure rather than short-term relief efforts that merely distribute food.

It is necessary to realize that military operations alone cannot effectively end an insurgency. Counterinsurgency involves a concerted effort of social, economic, and political reform that begins at the grassroots level by focusing on the needs of the

population. U.S. Army Field Manual 33-5 *Psychological Operations* (circa 1962) captures a truth of counterinsurgency in the statement,

No tactical counterinsurgency can be effective without concurrent major nation building programs. The causes for unrest must be in the process of reduction for the successful counterinsurgency operation. This implies extensive political, economic, and social reform... Counterinsurgency operations of the American military cannot be considered as separate from political aspects. (As cited in Cable, 1986, p. 150).

In an effort to produce a general framework for counterinsurgency applicable to the situation in Afghanistan, I will employ the Leites and Wolf systemic approach to systematically create an operational strategy based on the modification of past programs analyzed in the cases of Malaya, Vietnam, and the Philippine Insurrection. Following the introduction of each tactic, I will explain its applicability to the situation in Afghanistan as well as a strategy for its employment and integration into the larger framework. I will conclude by presenting the strategy as a whole and provide further recommendations for the successful stabilization and security of the country

A. INPUT DENIAL

After a thorough analysis of three cases of counterinsurgency in Chapter II, it became evident that a successful counterinsurgency must focus on the separation of the insurgent from the population both physically and ideologically. Leites and Wolf (1970) contend, “The organization of R [the insurgents], and its interface with the population, is the crucial target for A’s [the state’s] military and political efforts—not R’s forces themselves, or the transient territorial base from which R operates.” (p. 154). The state must reprioritize its efforts to focus on the control of the population as an end rather than the destruction of insurgent forces.

By necessity, the security of the population and their separation from the influence of the insurgent movement must be the first priority in any strategy of counterinsurgency. Galula proposes a generic framework to achieve success at the local level that the government may expand upon to diminish the control of the insurgents over the population. Galula (1964) proposes,

In a selected area

1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent's comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.
3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas.
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organizations.
5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.
6. Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units.
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement
8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.

Order having been re-established in the area, the process may be repeated elsewhere. (p. 80).

While Galula's theory provides a rough framework for the requirements to eliminate the insurgent from the midst of the people, it serves only as a generic guideline and requires extensive modification for effective application to a traditionalist Muslim society bounded by both tribal and religious customs that have the force of law.

Phases 1 through 3 of Galula's plan concern the deployment of government forces into a region to establish security and physically separate the insurgents from the population through the institution of law and order. The government may implement this stage with little to no modification utilizing the ANA or coalition forces. The military unit deployed to the area must focus on a clear and hold operation in which forces deployed to the area live among the population. Galula (1964) contends, "The unit must be deployed where the population actually lives and not on positions deemed to possess a military value. A military unit can spend an entire war in so-called strategic positions without contributing anything to the insurgent's defeat." (p. 111). The government forces must supplement this defensive role with mobile patrols to deny the insurgents in the area freedom of movement. Daily contact and personal knowledge of the population are essential to the success of the operation; however, it is imperative that the government forces display cultural sensibility, adhere to the laws they enforce, and minimize the use of violence to avoid antagonizing the population and to establish their legitimacy.

However, these forces must enact strict population controls such as those utilized in the Malaya to separate the remaining insurgents from the population. These controls take the form of registration and identification cards; Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR); movement controls; and curfews implemented and enforced by the security forces that reside in the community. The government must integrate these controls with an information operations campaign designed around a carrot and stick approach that rewards compliance with the lessening of restrictions while non-compliance results in a tightening of the restrictions. Leites and Wolf (1970) contend, “A [the state] must protect the population, identify desired behavior and reward it by effective programs; and withhold such programs in areas that have failed to perform in desirable ways.” (p. 154).

The fourth phase of Galula’s framework requires extensive modification in its application to the situation in Afghanistan due to the religious nature of the insurgent’s political organizations. Afghan insurgents have utilized religious institutions such as mosques and madrassas to convey their political message through religious leadership to instill their cause with legitimacy. Local and national leaders remain apprehensive with regard to shutting down these known sources of insurgent recruitment and organization due to the perception of religious persecution by the population and world Islamic communities. However, state and local leaders have done little to support pro-government religious leadership resulting in the assassination of many pro-state Islamic clerics and mullahs by the insurgents. While the government cannot shut down a religious institution, it may be possible to replace a pro-insurgent religious leader with a pro-state leader by arresting the insurgent and instating the pro-state leader in his stead while providing the necessary security to defend him from insurgent reprisals. Dr. Glenn Robinson of the Naval Postgraduate School states, “Everywhere in the Muslim world over the past 50 years, clergy (‘ulama) have become civil servants, which is a sharp break with Islamic history. Generally, governments have been pretty successful at appointing clergy who won’t cause trouble, but not always.” (Personal correspondence, 14 November 2003).

The fifth phase involves the establishment of an indigenous administration that will eventually replace that of the military to provide the community with a method to

implement local change through political enfranchisement without resorting to social upheaval. This aspect requires modification in smaller villages and towns due to the tribal custom of the *shura* or council of elders, which serves as the overall legal and political authority for smaller settlements in Afghanistan. However, in larger areas with modern political structures and formal institutions, the Galula approach may be applied with minimal modification as the situation dictates. In smaller communities, government forces may utilize various techniques to secure the loyalty of members of the local shura such as offers of economic development, formal political positions, and material incentives.

The sixth phase of the Galula framework requires testing the capabilities of the appointed officials to determine their credibility, loyalty, and capability as leaders of the community. This unique aspect must be approached on a case-by-case basis and as the situation dictates. The seventh phase of the Galula model involves political education and indoctrination. This step involves psychological operations aimed at the population to convince it that the only way through the government will they achieve improved social and economic conditions leading to individual benefit. However, this program requires legitimization through both demonstrated progress and the advocacy of a trusted source. In the initial stages, due to the absence of demonstrated progress of government programs, the government can achieve this through the advocacy of pro-state religious leaders operating in existing socio-religious organizations such as madrassas and mosques.

The eighth and final phase of the Galula framework requires winning over or suppressing the remnants of the insurgent organization in the community. This effort requires intensive psychological operations targeting the loyalty of the lower echelon of the insurgent organization as well as the development of an extensive network for the collection of human intelligence (HUMINT) to discern the insurgents from the population. The foundation for this stage begins during the first three stages in which the government forces provide static defense of the population and provide the population protection from insurgent repercussions for their cooperation. The security, law, and order produced by the stationing of the ANA among the population, provided the soldiers' conduct is in accordance with that law and order, will engender the trust and

security necessary to produce a compliant population willing to provide the necessary intelligence to separate the insurgents from the population. In addition, population control measures will facilitate identifying the insurgents through their violation of the established procedures. Despite the increased security facilitating the separation of the insurgents, the government must target those members of the insurgency that operate outside of the populated areas as well as the mechanism used to convert resources into insurgent operations and militants.

B. CONVERSION MECHANISM DESTRUCTION

The primary mechanisms through which Afghan insurgent movements convert resources into operations and fighters are socio-religious organizations such as mosques and madrassas that operate both within and outside of the boundaries and control of the Afghan government and coalition forces. While neither the Afghan government nor those states containing these institutions are capable or willing to shut down these organizations due to their perceived religious legitimacy among the world Muslim community, these governments may replace the pro-insurgent leadership of these institutions with pro-state religious leadership to counter the insurgent war of ideas.

In addition to directly combating the conversion mechanism of the movement, Leites and Wolf advocate the use of psychological operations to induce surrender and defection within the organization, thereby impeding further insurgent activity by refocusing the movement on internal security. Leites and Wolf (1970) propose,

Effective programs for attracting defectors (for example, the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), in the Philippines, and though less successful, the Chieu Hoi [“open arms”] program in Vietnam) involve both military pressures and civil inducements: making the life of the guerrilla appear short or hard to bear, and making the option to defect an attractive alternative in terms of employment, income, or status. (p. 80)

To achieve this end the government must combine sufficient incentive with intolerable military pressure on the insurgent organization. Programs that offer amnesty as well as economic opportunity and stability through job skills training and employment would serve as an effective inducement for lower level insurgent members, while the political participation program reportedly offered by the Karzai administration to

members of the former Taliban regime could provide sufficient incentive to inspire defection within the insurgent ranks or serve to disrupt operations through questions of loyalty to the movement. Despite the attempts of the government to achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict, there will always exist those members of the insurgent organization possessing extreme dedication who are unwilling to surrender or negotiate. The only alternative for these members is eradication by the government forces.

C. COUNTERFORCE

While government forces maintain security, law, and order within the populated regions, the military must continue to patrol the countryside to curtail the freedom of movement of the insurgent forces. Once the government has effectively cut off the internal sources of the insurgent's input, the military and police forces must maintain pressure on the insurgents through aggressive counterforce operations to raise the cost of continued operations above the threshold that the insurgent membership is willing or is able to afford. Government forces accomplish this through small unit patrolling and ambushes, and reconnaissance based on intelligence procured from the population within the secured areas. Small units retain the flexibility and stealth necessary to obtain the initiative over the insurgent forces that the movement of large groups of government forces cannot attain due to their required support and sheer size. However, a quick reaction force (QRF) must be readily available to respond to the latest intelligence and reinforce government patrols operating against the insurgents to prevent the insurgents from attaining a victory, which they can exploit to detract from the confidence of the population in the government. While isolating the population from the insurgents and targeting their forces and their ability to regenerate those forces will produce a great deal of success, the state must institute reforms and demonstrate its ability to effectively govern its population to eliminate the underlying issues creating favorable conditions for continued insurgency.

D. STRENGTHENING THE STATE

The state must strengthen both itself and the population against the effects of the insurgent's actions and propaganda by severing the insurgent's physical and ideological hold over the population through local security and reforms that address those issues confronting the populace from which the insurgents derive their cause. In Afghanistan, warlords, corruption, crime, ethnic divides, and poverty manifest these issues. The government and its agents must eliminate or mitigate these problems through social, political, and economic reforms that simultaneously begin at the local and the state level. Chalmers Johnson (1982) contends,

The crucial question is whether or not the nondeviant actors—persons managing their disequilibrium-induced tensions in some private manner—continue to believe in the willingness and competence of the elite to resynchronize the system. In order to maintain widespread confidence, an elite must do two things: perceive that the system is diequilibriumated, and take the appropriate steps to restore equilibrium (p. 95).

Local reforms must identify and address the immediate and local concerns of the populace in an effort to alleviate social disequilibrium and demonstrate the efficacy and success of the central government through immediate improvements and benefits in the lives of the population. Reforms at the state level address broader issues such as corruption, economic stability, and equal representation and are designed to improve conditions countrywide and sustain the improvements began at the local level.

At the local level, the government must address pressing issues such as poverty, crime, and unemployment, which in Afghanistan lead many unskilled males into the service of criminals, warlords, or insurgents further contributing to the instability of the area in a repetitive, compounding cycle. Self-sustaining long-term solutions rather than short-term relief efforts are essential to the elimination of the social and economic issues underlying much of the unrest in Afghanistan. The creation of job skill programs and industrial or agricultural infrastructure to sustain employment will provide alternatives to participation in these groups and contribute to the long-term stability of the area by expanding the role of the community to create economically interdependent networks of stability. Additionally, the establishment of immediate medical care facilities available to the population, especially in an area such as Afghanistan in which gun wounds and

landmines are an everyday occurrence, instills the population with a sense of indebtedness and responsibility to the government forces facilitating continued loyalty. The intent of this argument is neither to diminish the utility of immediate aid nor to suggest stopping the distribution of aid where it is truly needed; however, it does suggest that greater effect is achieved with those projects that produce long-term benefits. Immediate benefits and short-term projects may be employed to induce compliance or as a reward for cooperation with government forces. Despite the utility of these concepts in obtaining the loyalty of the population, local aid and reform are ineffective without integrated security. Both the Marine Combined Action Platoon program (CAP) and the U.S. Army's Civilian Irregular Defense Force (CIDG) in Vietnam integrated security with aid to achieve the effective pacification of an area while the strategic hamlet program failed in part due to the absence of adequate security. Without the integration of security into relief and reform programs, insurgents are able to capitalize on the same benefits enjoyed by the population. Despite the benefit of local aid and reform, the government must integrate local programs into a larger effort of reform to capitalize on and reinforce initial success.

At the state level, reforms must address the underlying issues generating social disequilibrium. The proposed Afghan constitution confronts many of the issues causing division within Afghanistan. Ethnic schisms underlie both the majority of warlord infighting and Pashtun political unrest, providing additional recruits for the Pashtun-dominated Taliban and contributing to the overall instability of the country. The constitution seeks to eliminate these concerns through a representative democracy that forbids political representation based on ethnic, religious, or military groups and prohibits elected officials from maintaining personal militias. Despite the intent of the constitutional convention, the proposed document is insufficient to remedy the problems confronting the unification of the country. Corruption and ethnic bias still remain key concerns of the population and serve to bolster insurgent claims of the inadequacy of the current regime. The corruption and bias of local political officials has weakened the popular perception of the legitimacy of the Karzai administration. The government must attain the perception of legitimacy in the eyes of the population through efficient and unbiased operations within the confines of its laws to produce tangible success in order to

deny the insurgents a source of propaganda. The government requires sufficient oversight and controls through a system of checks and balances to maintain the efficient and legal operation of its agencies at all levels. In addition, the state must provide an avenue other than armed conflict for the population to air their grievances and resolve their disputes. This requires a formal system of justice and a program to ensure the maximum political enfranchisement of the population at all levels of organization and administration. Overall, the government requires balance and a system to maintain a social equilibrium within the tolerances of the majority of the diverse ethnic and religious groups that compose Afghanistan.

After a thorough analysis of the discrete programs applied in Afghanistan, I derived that the common fault among these programs is their lack of integration and mutually supporting effort. The integration and systematic application of these programs combined with local reforms has the potential to produce a mutually reinforcing effect as a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy leading to the security and stabilization of the country. The integration of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), poppy eradication, and police training, combined with the deployment of the Afghan National Army in a coordinated and systematic effort would achieve both reform and security at the local level simultaneously. This combined effort would foster long-term stability and self-reliance through economic development, job training, and the creation of a local police force that would gradually replace the ANA as local security and law enforcement. The programs offered under both DDR and poppy eradication promote the development of local industry and provide job skills training that can capitalize on the agricultural or industrial infrastructure established by the poppy eradication program. The law and order engendered under the static defense of the ANA, and eventually the local police, will facilitate the success of disarmament by mitigating the need for weapons of self defense and weaken if not eliminate the warlords' private militias. The eventual elimination of poppy farming combined with the permanent restoration of law and order will further inhibit the ability of warlords to generate revenue through illegal taxation, while the job skills and legitimate employment of the men in the community will inhibit the ability of the warlords to regenerate their armies.

In order for the government to expand upon its success, it must shift the responsibility of protecting the community from the military back to the civilian population. The integration of police training and DDR implementation into the overall strategy will facilitate this transition. As the police are trained and order is restored below the military horizon of armed organization, police may gradually assume responsibility for the security of their native area. Despite the gradual replacement of the military as local security, the military remains responsible for regional security to respond to insurgent or criminal threats that are beyond the capability of the local police forces. Additionally, to ensure the continued service of the civilian police force and avoid the problems of embezzlement currently plaguing local Afghan administrations, the central government should pay civil servants directly through a payment officer without intermediaries or ties to the local area or its members.

In addition to providing security within the country, it is essential that the government adequately secure its borders. The government must increase its surveillance and patrolling of the border areas that have facilitated the unimpeded operations of insurgent forces. While no country openly supports the Afghan insurgency, the porous borders of Afghanistan and uncontested tribal areas of neighboring Pakistan have allowed trans-national Islamic fundamentalist insurgents to serve as an exogenous source for both personnel and materiel. Until sufficient ANA forces can be adequately trained, coalition efforts must encompass increased border vigilance to deny the insurgent resources and access to the conversion mechanisms that are beyond the control of the Afghan government.

The goal of this strategy is to produce security and stability at the local level that the government may expand upon as part of a comprehensive strategy consistent with the oil spot principle. Through a simple cost-benefit analogy the goal of this program becomes readily apparent. The objective of this program is to raise the cost of operation for the guerrilla and the potential recruit for participation in guerrilla operations beyond what they are willing or able to pay, while rewarding compliance with the government's dictates and producing incentives for surrender. Carrying this business analogy further, the government must advertise its success through psychological operations. Cable (1986) states in reference to the Philippine Huk Insurrection, "Image building was

important as nation building in order to convince the residents that a nation was in fact being built courtesy of a determined, dedicated, and responsive central government.” (pp. 62-63). This program, directed at both the insurgents and the population, would rely on testimonials, pictures, and leaflets distributed throughout the country to demonstrate the effectiveness of the government, thereby generating a willingness to cooperate in the population and a desire to surrender and reintegrate among the lower echelons of the insurgents. Additionally, the government may employ amnesty programs, such as the reported political integration program instituted by Karzai in November 2003 to induce the surrender of middle and upper level insurgents, thereby targeting the entire insurgent organization with psychological operations.

Afghanistan faces a myriad of issues impeding its stabilization and security. The vacuum of security created after the fall of the Taliban has allowed many of these issues to resurface and spread. Ethnic, linguistic, and religious divides fuel this instability, giving rise to warlords and powerbrokers seeking local dominance and corrupting the fragile nascent political processes in the central government with bias. Opium production has facilitated the resurgence of criminals, warlords, and insurgents, providing them with a source of income that ties them into the interests of the population by providing short-term relief to the long-term problems underlying the widespread poverty in Afghanistan through the economic draw of poppy cultivation. Insufficient international aid has limited the ability of the government to secure the countryside. This problem is further compounded by the inability of the government to generate sufficient funding from within its borders due to the refusal of provincial warlords to relinquish the revenue generated by taxation from within their provinces. Inadequate funding and the governments’ lack of control have prevented it from paying its workers or funding its operations other than immediate relief further diminishing its control as government workers leave their jobs or are corrupted by bribery. The government remains unable to enforce its dictates due to the absence of a sufficient military or police force and the reluctance of coalition forces to become involved in intra-Afghan fighting. The absence of control and reform has allowed poverty, crime, corruption, and violence have spread throughout the country, creating a fertile ground for anti-government movements. Insurgents have capitalized on the lack of governmental control and the social issues

pandemic throughout Afghanistan to revive and spread their organizations. They have developed infrastructure both within and outside of Afghanistan to support their operations. International civil and military efforts are divided and there exists no comprehensive strategy to eliminate the insurgents from the country or address the issues underlying their cause. Military leadership, having failed to perceive a shift in tactics of their opposition from conventional warfare to insurgent operations, have focused solely on the destruction of insurgent forces, eliminating the ability of the coalition to procure the intelligence necessary to locate the insurgent forces. Despite the diminishing returns of the strategy of attrition, coalition military efforts continue to focus upon this single aspect of counterinsurgency while parochial perceptions of the separation of civil and military efforts have prevented their integration into a comprehensive strategy. The disunity fostered by separate command structures and competing efforts has produced discrete counterinsurgency and relief tactics that produce limited and isolated results. The inability of the government and international forces to capitalize on the limited success of these programs and adapt their tactics to a changing environment has locked Afghanistan in an operational quagmire that remains unable to progress beyond limited and local success and grand designs for the future.

Overall, the discrete tactics and programs applied in Afghanistan have the potential to form a valid strategy for counterinsurgency if the government and the coalition can integrate civil and military efforts under a unified plan that focuses on the population and its separation from the insurgents in a systematic manner. Separation entails both ideological and physical relief from the insurgent influence instituted through reform and security. Psychological operations and demonstrated success are required to foster in the population the belief that the government will defeat the insurgents and that this will result in be the overall betterment of the life of the individual Afghan. Larry Cable (1986) contends that this is necessary “to convince the peasants that their most basic need, to be secure and safe in their own persons, homes and fields was best met by the government forces and the peasants’ best course of action was to cooperate with the security personnel in achieving this goal.” (p. 63). The government requires religious legitimacy to counter that of the insurgents and must capitalize upon the support of pro-state religious leadership operating through pre-existing socio-religious institutions to

secure its hold over the population. Finally, government and international efforts at counterinsurgency must expand their purview from the pursuit of insurgent forces and immediate relief to encompass the entire spectrum of counterinsurgency and focus on long-term solutions to the problems underlying the current conditions. The government must interdict inputs, eliminate conversion mechanisms, develop intelligence networks, and strengthen the state in addition to the destroying insurgent forces. While the fight for Afghanistan is not yet lost, it remains locked in an operational quagmire that will gradually frustrate international support through lack of progress. Unconventional warfare is a protracted process that cannot be measured through body counts or the amount of land conquered. Its success is determined by the intangible support of the indigenous population and their perception of the legitimate rule of the government. Until civil and military efforts are integrated and focused on the control of the population rather than the attrition of insurgent forces, the Afghan government and the coalition will remain unable to demonstrate the progress necessary for continued international support leading to the inevitable withdrawal of international forces and an insurgent victory. The coalition must adapt its methods to suit the conflict rather than attempting to force the situation to conform to its methods. It must correctly perceive Afghanistan as an unconventional conflict requiring the integration of civil and military efforts focused on the long-term stabilization of the region rather than the pursuit of a strategy of attrition, lest we repeat the mistakes of the past. As Henry Kissinger once said referring to Vietnam, “We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the most critical maxims of guerrilla warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.” (Kissinger, 1969, p. 214).

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Figure 1. Attack Frequency Chart 2002 - 2003






Figure 2. Evolution of Conflict in Afghanistan



Taken from Gordon H. McCormick Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2003, Lecture 20 January 2003

Figure 3. Leites and Wolf Systemic Approach (Modified)



Adapted from Leites and Wolf, 1970, p. 35

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